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A Note on Orthography 
Most of the quotations of primary works in this study evince ortho-
graphic conventions that deviate from modern norms. Three aspects 
of these deviations deserve special comment. First, the spelling of the 
same word may vary within the same text, as when Breitinger writes 
for the dative plural both "unsren" and "unsern." Such discrepancies 
may reflect the printer's inconsistencies. Second, antiquated spellings 
may occur in texts in which the orthography appears to be otherwise 
fairly modern, as when Wegelin writes "Geschichtschreiber" instead 
of "Geschichtsschreiber." Third, the orthography of seventeenth- and 
early eighteenth-century French omits many of the diacritical marks 
that modern readers expect. Dubas has "reflexions" and not "reflex-
ions"; Leibniz has "verites" or "veritez" instead of "verites." More-
over, the letter o was often used in place of a. For example, the end-
ings -ait and -ais appear as -oit or -ois. Thus Dacier's Aristotle was 
"traduite en frarn;ois." All quotations have been carefully examined 
for their fidelity to the editions cited in the notes and bibliography. 
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The Poetics of Historical Perspectivism 

Introduction 
The development of aesthetics in late eighteenth-century Germany 
coincided with a strong scholarly interest in language and with a new 
reflection on history. The apparently sudden progress in these three 
fields is usually attributed to the seminal work of a brilliant philolo-
gist, cultural historian, literary theorist, linguist, and art critic-
namely, Herder. But the connections between aesthetics, the historical 
sciences, and the study of language, the reasons for the simultaneous 
attention given these disciplines in the eighteenth century, have yet 
to be explored adequately, primarily because scholars have often 
failed to examine in detail the origins of aesthetics in the early part 
of the century. This period was shaped by the Quarrel between the 
Ancients and the Moderns, which was intensely concerned with the 
interrelation of literary criticism, language, and history. My study is 
intended as a contribution to our understanding of this interrelation. 
By using Breitinger's text as a focal point, I hope to delineate a spe-
cific aspect of aesthetic thinking in the eighteenth century: how it was 
that poesis and historiography could increasingly come to resemble 
each other in their assumptions, purposes, and methods of presen-
tation. The concept that associates these two disciplines with each 
other in this period is "historical perspectivism." When applied to 
historiography, this notion holds that history is not accessible to us 
as an unrelated collection of "facts" or information, but only insofar 
as information can be placed in a context, a Zusammenhang. 1 The con-
struction of a context, however, was viewed as an essentially poetic 
task. The historian no longer simply writes out chronicles but "rep-
resents" the past. History, now understood as narrative, is a Gemiilde, 
an organized aesthetic whole that is not unlike the "Gemalde" that 
Breitinger says poets produce.2 The historical representation was, fur-
thermore, said to follow or be made possible by the adoption of a 
Gesichts-Punkt, a term that stood ready-to-hand in the poetic theory 
of the early Enlightenment. There the notion of perspectivism is 
manifest in the argument that the poet creates a literary work out of 
the perspective that he occupies vis-a-vis nature. When the term "his-
torical perspectivism" is extended to poetic interpretation, it means 
that the critic must account for the historical and cultural "distance" 
between himself and the work. A central contention of my study is 
that historians learned to utilize the notion of perspective after its 
1 
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development as an interpretive tool by the aesthetic thinkers of the 
early eighteenth century, of whom Breitinger is but one albeit highly 
significant example. 
To be sure, a German version of the words "historical perspectiv-
ism" is nowhere to be found in Breitinger's oeuvre. Instead he relies 
on the term "Gesichts-Punkt," 3 which he endows with a decidedly 
historical quality. His. text therefore exemplifies a reflection on the 
relationship between historical consciousness, language, and litera-
ture that permeates the querelle. This has, however, not been gener-
ally appreciated. There are three reasons for this oversight. First, Brei-
tinger's concept of language, his view of the historically changing 
nature of.languages, has remained curiously neglected. Second, the 
extent of Breitinger's reliance on French sources is not well under-
stood. Dubos is most frequently mentioned en passant in interpreta-
tions of the Critische Dichtkunst, but Breitinger's appropriations from 
Dubos's text have never been carefully analyzed. Moreover, because 
Breitinger's work has been traditionally viewed as a "revolt" of sorts 
against neoclassic normative poetics, his use of other neoclassic crit-
ics, such as Le Bossu or Mme Dacier, has not been registered. Third, 
recent developments in Germanistik, including the disfavor into which 
Ideengeschichte has fallen, have discouraged attempts to interpret Brei~ 
tinger's text from philosophic, poetic, and rhetorical perspectives at 
once. Although studies of Breitinger authored in the past decade, 
which usually avail themselves of rhetorical or semiotic concepts, 
have offered some novel explications of the Critische Dichtkunst, their 
interpretive aim (an elaboration of the Habermasian model of the lit-
erary public or an investigation of the relation between rhetoric and 
Wolffian psychology) sidesteps the issue of multiple influences.4 
The question of influence is one of the thorniest issues to resolve in 
the interpretation of the Critische Dichtkunst because it is nearly im-
possible to establish with certainty what Breitinger actually read. He 
doubtless cited only some of the things that he knew, but he also 
quoted texts without citing them, and cited still other texts that he 
may have never seen. His commentary on chapter 7 of the Poetics, for 
example, includes extensive references to Aristotle's Ethics and Poli-
tics. Braitmaier, who in the late nineteenth century approvingly noted 
these citations, would have been less impressed with Breitinger's clas-
sical erudition had he known that the entire commentary was lifted 
verbatim from Andre Dacier's La Poetique d' Aristote avec des remarques. 5 
Breitinger's rampant borrowing of passages from other critical trea-
tises was of course not anomalous for neoclassic authors. Eventually 
the preoccupation with original genius, coupled with the desire for 
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corporate profit, would manifest itself in publishing contracts and 
copyright laws, but in 1740 an author did not yet have to contend with 
such legal restraints. If he found a passage by another "Criticus" that 
was congenial to his meaning, he inserted it into his text. Often an 
insertion appeared not because it added to the sense of the work but 
because it added to. its legitimacy. Hence, although it is important to 
recognize the source of Breitinger's words, it is even more crucial to 
grasp the function of his thefts within the entire presentation. 
"Qu'on ne dise pas que je n'ai rien dit de nouveau: la disposition des 
matieres est nouvelle," Pascal had said, thereby designating exactly 
the neoclassic enterprise. 6 
An example of the naive handling of the problem of influence, in 
which the function of classical terms in the eighteenth century is not 
well understood, can be found in an essay by Wolfgang Preisendanz: 
"Selbstverstandlich folgt Gottsched dem Aristoteles auch darin, da8 
die poetische Nachahmung der Natur Fiktion ist. Dichten hei8t Ersin-
nen oder Erfinden von Moglichem, nicht Wiedergabe von Fakti-
schem; Dichtung ahmt nach, was zu sein und zu geschehen pflegt, 
nicht was geschehen oder gewesen ist. Dichtung ist Verbindung von 
Wahrheit und Luge, sie ist wahrscheinliche Fiktion." 7 This passage 
reflects a typical neoclassic distortion of Aristotle's distinction be-
tween history and poesis, a distinction I discuss in detail in the third 
chapter of this study. :More to the point here, however, is Preisen-
danz's suggestion that Gottsched is actually following Aristotle, when 
in fact Gottsched's Aristotle had traveled through centuries of com-
mentary before he finally came to rest on Gottsched's desk in Leip-
zig. Preisendanz has given us an accurate restatement of Gottsched's 
concept of "Fabel," but he errs in having accepted at face value 
Gottsched's contention (not quoted here) that his own "Fabelbegriff" 
is a faithful reproduction of Aristotle's concept of µ:v8o<; or plot. 
Gottsched's definition of "Fabel" is a neoclassic commonplace, while 
Preisendanz takes it as a sort of direct emanation from the Poetics. 
The problem with such misapprehensions is that many of the very 
interesting modern reconstructions or deformations of Aristotelian 
poetic concepts go unnoticed because there is no historical standard 
against which the eighteenth-century use of the Poetics can be mea-
sured. The purpose of such comparisons is not to establish which 
authors have "correctly" utilized The Philosopher's categories, but 
simply to inject some clarity into the discussion of what is at stake in 
the early eighteenth-century debates on poesis. A more recent inter-
pretation of Breitinger's poetics in terms of the classical tradition, Ger-
linde Bretzigheimer's Johann Elias Schlegels poetische Theorie im Rahmen 
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der Tradition, is, like Preisendanz's essay, based on an insufficient 
grasp of the historical refraction introduced into Aristotelian poetics. 8 
Perhaps the most influential attempt thus far to situate Breitinger 
on the horizon of early eighteenth-century poetics is Hans Peter 
Herrmann's Naturnachahmung und Einbildungskraft, which appeared in 
1970. 9 Herrmann's main-and laudable-objective was to excise Brei-
tinger's work from the ideological context of Genieiisthetik in which 
it had languished for nearly two centuries. Armed with a thorough 
knowledge of Baroque rhetoric and Wolffian philosophy, Herrmann· 
set about analyzing many more passages than the usual six or eight 
places from Breitinger's text that had been used traditionally to con-
struct the image of Breitinger as a "pre-Romantic," that is, as the 
defender of the "Entfesselung der Phantasie" ~n the face of the En-
lightenment's supposed "Herrschaft der Vernunft." 10 But because 
Breitinger's text is so thick with quotation, citation, and outright pla-
giarism that it occasionally borders on indecipherability, Herrmann 
finally concluded that Breitinger did not possess the requisite insight 
and expository skill to develop a coherent literary theory. Such criti-
cism recalls of course Goethe's statement that Breitinger's prose re-
sembles an "Irrgarten." 11 Herrmann's observation that in the Critische 
Dichtkunst "es blieb bei der Aufgabenstellung" (264) suggests in fact 
a sort of "dialectical reversal" on Herrmann's part. For whereas he 
begins with a critique of the concept of "Genie," he ends with a radi-
calization of the "precursor" notion that had always been embedded 
in the genius cliche. Thus, while the value of Breitinger's work had 
been found traditionally in its anticipation of later, "Romantic/' po-
etic theories, in Herrmann's account one senses the author's impa-
tience that Breitinger was merely a precursor, that he did not know 
more. 12 The reason, Herrmann contends, that Breitinger failed to 
produce a truly innovative poetic conception lies in his failure to tran-
scend the Baroque rhetorical categories of the seventeenth century. 
Breitinger himself, Herrmann suggests, remained entangled in the 
orthodox Protestant (i.e., Swiss patrician) political order. 13 
Precisely this aspect of Herrmann's interpretion is the basis of Da-
vid E. Wellbery's reading of the Critische Dichtkunst that appeared in 
his 1984 study Lessing's "Laocoon. " 14 Because this book contains the 
finest semiotic analysis to date of Breitinger's text, I want to discuss 
Wellbery's argument in some detail in order to clarify my own inter-
pretive method and aims. Wellbery argues that Breitinger's work is 
"characterized by an overlapping of theoretical paradigms" (207), 
which he calls the "performance" and the "representational" para-
digms (6, 207, etc.). Aesthetic experience and especially literary pro-
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duction and reception within the performance model is "intimately 
associated" (47) with rhetoric, from which it derives its "directives" 
(46-47) regarding successful presentation and appropriate appreci-
ation. Such directives are eminently didactic and therefore similar to 
rules of social conduct (cf. 46). The world from which they emanate 
is utterly hierarchical; the purpose of art in such a system is diver-
tissement, entertainment, or ornament, through which the existing 
structure of political, theological, and economic power is reinforced 
(cf. 45). 
The representational model, by contrast, is based on the analysis 
of supposedly universal faculties of the mind and their interaction 
in the production of images that "move" rather than "entertain" 
(45-47). In this paradigm, language is "{extricated] from its place 
within the ceremonies of religious and absolutist authority" and 
"[transformed] into a medium of communication and debate among 
equal subjects" (36). Literary language, indeed all art, "is located en-
tirely within the sphere of representations" (71). Its purpose is to 
evoke the "presence-to-mind of the [sensually absent] represented 
object" (71), and thereby to produce what was for the Enlightenment 
an essentially "specular" (11) experience: intuition or anschauende 
Erkenntnis. 
As a follower of Wolff, Wellbery says, Breitinger understood the 
links between language, seeing, and cognition that are established by 
the representational paradigm. But Breitinger departs from this para-
digm in that he subordinates poesis to the process of distinct cogni-
tion in Wolff's sense. The literary work is supposed to provide not 
anschauende Erkenntnis, or the illusion-of-presence, as for Lessing, but 
rather ever more detailed information about and interpretation of the 
discursive-conceptual order of reality, as opposed to the perceptual 
and sensual world of Lessing's aesthetic. For this reason, Breitinger 
remained indebted to the performance model in his distinction be-
tween poetry and ordinary language. Here he reverts to the "tactics 
of elocutio" (207). Poetry is reduced to the "use of ornaments, the de-
ployment of verbal artistry in order to heighten or intensify the poetic 
message" (207). And this "message" invariably involves "spiritual-
political hierarchies" (220) that Breitinger wants his reader to recog-
nize and accept. 
The distinction between ordinary language and poesis, however, is 
made by Breitinger not with reference to the presence or absence of 
ornament, but rather according to the use of metaphor (cf. my chap-
ter 1). Furthermore, his theory of language, which is set forth in the 
second volume of the Critische Dichtkunst, is based on an explicit re-
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jection of the ornamental function of the metaphor. In overlooking 
this rejection, Wellbery is able to consign Breitinger's work to the ear-
lier performance theory type. Thus Breitinger is said to have a socially 
regressive desire to "[interpret] the text of nature 'for the reader" 
(220). I shall argue, by contrast, that Breitinger's poetics should be 
seen as a progressive investigation of the act of interpretation itself 
that seeks to free literature from its neoclassic preoccupation with di-
dactic contents. 
Wellbery's apparent oversight regarding Breitinger's concept of 
metaphor illustrates how persistent the view has been, ever since 
Gottsched's original condemnation of the Swiss concept of poetic lan-
guage, that Breitinger intends metaphor merely as embellishment for 
the sake of heightened effect. Manfred Windfuhr, for example, had 
earlier claimed that the Swiss purpose with metaphor was "Emotions-
ausweitung," and that while Breitinger attempted to avoid the charge 
of "Mafslosigkeit," he nonetheless "entscheidet ... sich meist fur die 
Fiille." 15 And Eric Blackall, in what was for many years the standard 
work on German as a literary language, says nothing at all about Brei-
tinger's concept of language per se. He merely provides a list of meta-
phors that he says Breitinger felt would enrich the German language. 
Although these three scholars have vastly different notions of lan-
guage and literature, and thus should not be compared too strictly, 
their commentaries point to a recurring problem in Breitinger schol-
arship, namely, the faihfre to give Breitinger's second volume the 
careful attention that it deserves. 16 Had this occurred, one would have 
found there an early adumbration of the historicity of metaphor that 
is intimately connected to the emergence of historical poetics in the 
eighteenth century. 
The most important differences between Wellbery's approach and 
my own may well lie, however, in our differing approaches to literary 
history, that is, in our use of semiotic versus hermeneutic models. 17 
Wellbery says that he is in fact not writing literary history at all: this 
would imply for him the adoption of a quasi-teleological construct 
intended to reveal the "progressive unfolding" (6) of ideas. In the 
case of the eighteenth century, this has led to assertions of the 
historical development of "subjectivity," a term that has little ex-
planatory value for him. He is interested instead in describing the 
"Ihetasemiotic" (6) of the Enlightenment-its "attitude toward signs" 
(6)-of which literary discourse is merely one aspect. There remains 
nevertheless an implicit moment of progression in Wellbery's analysis 
in that he describes the sequential displacement of one paradigm by 
another over the course of the century. 18 History for Wellbery (at least, 
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as he presents it in the book under consideration here) is a series of 
"metasemiotic" strata that sometimes overlap but are generally to be 
viewed in terms of their disjunction. Because Wellbery accepts and 
elaborates Lessing's critique of Breitinger, which he grounds in the 
representational paradigm, Breitinger must be forced "back" into an 
earlier, and by implication, more regressive, historical stratum. 
While I share completely Wellbery's stated antipathy toward teleo-
logically colored literary history and toward the term "subjectivity" 
in explanations of the intellectual developments of the eighteenth 
century, I prefer to think of this period in terms of multiple historical 
strands or currents that may run simultaneously through any given 
temporal stratum. My objective in this study is to describe that strand 
I have termed "historical perspectivism" as it cuts through the cen-
tury beginning with the querelle. Wellbery prefers to focus on the field 
of discourse constituted by Wolffian philosophy and psychology; I 
have chosen to analyze Breitinger's use of multiple historical sources. 
As I have already indicated, however, in my remarks on "influence" 
and "function," this does not mean that Breitinger's text will be 
treated as the simple reanimation of, say, classical rhetorical notions 
or French neoclassic concepts of Homeric style. Here I agree with 
Wellbery that any given sign (linguistic, cultural, historical) must be 
interpreted within the system-I would say "context" -in which it 
appears. But whereas his semiotic, or metasemiotic, system is con-
ceived of as a closed synchronic structure, the hermeneutic context 
can, and usually does, encompass complex and extensive diachronic 
traditions. For this reason an analysis of the historical elements at 
work in Breitinger's text is, in my view, inescapable if we are to un-
derstand it. 
In my own attempt to draw the outline of Breitinger's argument, I 
have proceeded in the following manner: the first chapter contains an 
explication of Breitinger's theory .of language in terms of the contem-
porary debate on both language and style. Here I want to show that 
Breitinger's use of the term "poetische Mahlerey" is based on an ar-
gument for the necessary relationship between concept formation 
and metaphor. The chapter then addresses the epistemological prob-
lem that ariy discussion of the relationship between words, thoughts, 
and things must inevitably produce, and it relates this problem to 
Gottsched's and Breitinger's differing approaches to practical criti-
cism. Breitinger's notion of language as the historically determine~ 
evolution of conceptual differentiation is linked to his views on the 
interpretation of texts as historical documents. I argue that this is in 
fact the most significant difference between him and his antagonist. 
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The second chapter concerns creative process as poetic production, 
which in Breitinger's account is the depiction of possible worlds. The 
exposition there is an elaboration of the thesis presented in the first 
chapter, namely that Breitinger was interested in the relationship 
between historical perspective and poetic process. Perspective is 
analyzed in terms of Leibniz's notions of apperception, compossibil-
ity, and perfectibility. Breitinger's explication of creative process as 
the invention ("Erfindung") of possible worlds is then reviewed in 
the context of Wolffian logic and Leibniz's system of intellective 
integration. 
The third chapter discusses creative process as poetic reception. 
Here I deal with Breitinger's deviations from Dubos by analyzing his 
many borrowings from the Reflexions critiques, the often-supposed 
source of his concept of poetic effect. I argue that there is a pattern in 
these deviations that shows Breitinger's attempt to establish, against 
the French neoclassic version of "vraisemblance," the act of poetic 
reception as itself productive. In this construction of analogous intel-
lective functions for both author and reader one may locate an aspect 
of his poetics with potentially far-reaching implications. Literature is 
no longer an endeavor reserved for a cultural or artistic elite but ini-
tiates a general psychological process in which both poet and recipi-
ent participate. In this the Critische Dichtkunst indeed may be taken, 
with some qualifications, as an "anticipation" of later "Romantic" no-
tions of the autonomous reader. 19 
The final chapter begins with Lessing's critique of Breitinger's no-
tion of "poetische Mahlerey." I suggest that Lessing may not have 
grasped Breitinger's differences with Dubos, on which his defense of 
seeing as interpretation is based. Breitinger's "poetische Mahlerey" is 
then related to metaphors of historical interpretation in the eigh-
teenth century: to the notion of "Sehe-Punckt" developed by Chla-
denius, and also to perspectivist theories of historiography proposed 
by Jacob Wegelin, who joined the Berlin Academy following his as-
sociation with Breitinger's circle in Zurich. 
In none of Breitinger's works is there an explicit assertion of iden-
tity or similarity between history and poesis such as we find in the 
later eighteenth century. But Breitinger's temporalization. of poesis 
and his theory of perspectivist literary interpretation set the stage 
for the subsequent "poeticization" of historiography. This process 
should not be understood as a "making explicit" of something that 
was only "implicit" in Breitinger's work, but rather in a historically 
concrete sense as the adaptation of his interpretive paradigm to his-
torical discourse. 
1. Ut pictura poesis 
Breitinger's designation of poesis as "Mahler-Kunst" is an often no-
ticed but rarely examined adaptation of a sentence from Horace's 
epistle to the Pisos, or Ars poetica. The comparison of painting and 
poetry was a neoclassic preoccupation and not original to Breitinger, 
as the number of treatises on painting and poetry bears out: the es-
says by Dryden (1695), Richardson (1719), and Dubos (1719) are 
among the best-known examples. Breitinger's assertion that "was die 
Farben dem Mahler sind, das sind die Worter und der Ausdruck dem 
Redner und dem Poeten" also could have been copied from any num-
ber of sources.1 In view of the commonness of the comparison be-
tween painting and poetry, Breitinger's understanding of "poetische 
Mahlerey" is not readily apparent without analyzing his use of the 
Horatian simile in more detail than has thus far been attempted. This 
will be undertaken here first of all with respect to his concept of lan-
guage. This analysis will be followed by an examination of the epis-
temological problem imbedded in Horace's comparison itself.2 Refer-
ences to the ut pictura doctrine in secondary literature on the German 
Renaissance, Baroque, and Enlightenment appear to be universally 
indebted to a simplified notion of Horace's comparison. Horace is cast 
virtually without exception as the defender of strict mimesis, which 
in turn is defined as the notion that "art copies nature." Here scholars 
have been too willing to use one kind of neoclassic interpretation of 
Horace-the interpretation that equates imitation with the duplica-
tion of the object-as the basis of theirpwn. But literary history can-
not be written by unreflectively replicating the assumptions of the 
age that is being studied. The Horation simile is in fact much more 
complex than most critics would have us believe, and a careful scru-
tiny of what Horace actually says is essential for our understanding 
of neoclassic attitudes toward practical criticism. 
Language and Metaphor 
Breitinger opens his discussion of language by naming his sources: 
the French Cartesian Gerauld de Cordemoy and tht; English mathe-
matician and grammarian John Wallis.3 With apparent dependence 
on the terms of Cordemoy, whose treatise is marked by a radical di-
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vision between mind and body, Breitinger defines language as "eine 
Kunst den Gedancken <lurch Thone einen Leib und eine sichtbare 
Gestalt mitzutheilen" (2:13). Sounds and word meanings ("Bedeu-
tungen") represent the material and the intellective ("geistlicher") as-
pects of language respectively. The union of sounds with meanings 
has arisen because of conventions created by human beings. This 
union is arbitrary ("willkuhrlich," 2:13, 44, 200, etc.), which means 
that there is not a natural or divine law aq:ording to which any given 
meaning adheres to a given sound. Breitinger does not mean here 
that words are derived by fiat, such as is the case in artificial lan-
guages, but that word meanings have arisen over time in a process of 
association carried o~t as a historical intellective activity. Because this 
process is historical, it is subject to vicissitude: meanings can shift 
over time, or words can die out altogether ("<lurch den Gebrauch 
etwann geandert oder abgeschaffet werden," 2:44), while new words 
are created in their place. 
Yet Breitinger also maintains that just because words die, concepts 
do not die with them. In fact it is precisely the conventionality of 
language that allows other, new words to express the same concept 
captured in the previous word: "Denn so bald ein gewisser Thon, der 
in einer Sprache gebrauchet worden, einen gewissen Gedancken zu 
bezeichnen, abgehet, welches <lurch tausend Zufalle begegnen kan, 
so wird dieser Gedancke (denn auch die Seelen der Worter sterben 
nicht) mit einem andern Thone aus seinem Carper vereiniget, zumahl 
da mehrentheils die Gedancken nicht lange von einem Carper abge-
sondert seyn k6nnen" (2:95-96). This definition reflects Breitinger's 
position within the modern debate on the "natural" or "conven-
tional" origin of language. The proponents of natural language held 
that words proceeded necessarily out of the nature or essence of the 
things to which they referred, whereas the proponents of conven-
tional language argued that words referred to things only because 
human beings had come to agree that certain sounds should signify 
certain objects (mental or physical). 4 It is interesting that Breitinger's 
source, Cordemoy, counts himself among the radical conventionalists 
("ces signes ... n'ont aucune conformite avec les pensees que l'on y 
joint par institution," 32), but in order to avoid complete skepticism, 
he subsequently avails himself of the occasionalist deus ex machina by 
arguing that words make sense at all only because there is a God-
ordained (or "natural") exact correspondence between body and 
mind.5 
On this point, however, Breitinger parts company with his source. 
Although he had begun his exposition with Cordemoy's terms, defin-
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ing words as "angenommene Zeichen" (2:14) of thoughts, he now 
interjects, with a "Gleichwohl" (2: 14), his own reflections on why 
signs should be accepted as expressions of thought. He begins by 
citing Cicero and Quintilian on euphony, and then explains the de-
velopment of language-that is, the retention of some sounds rather 
than others to refer to specific thoughts-in terms of the auditory 
pleasure derived from certain expressions.6 Language is thus a func-
tion of man's natural inclination ("natiirliche Neigung," 2: 18) to pre-
fer one kind of sound over another. And yet this inclination is itself a 
kind of "natural convention" in that it varies from culture to culture. 7 
His argument is different than Cordemoy's notion of a divine corre-
spondence between sound and meaning. Breitinger emphasizes that 
euphony, not to be confused with the intellective content of words, 
is merely "eine Schonheit eines unbeseelten Leichnams" (2:35), and, 
in a reference to the proponents of Baroque "Klangmalerei," he criti-
cizes those who exploit it to claim a sort of "metaphysical" bond be-
tween sounds and meanings by endowing euphony with "eine Mag-
ische Kraft" (2:37). 
The conventional nature of language is responsible for the devel-
opment of many languages. That two different sounds can repre-
sent the same concept, a phenomenon Bre_itinger calls equivalence 
("Gleichgiiltigkeit," 2: 139), is demonstrated by the fact that one cul-
ture has preferred one sound over another to express a given idea. 
Equivalence is manifested not only synchronically, across several lan-
guage groups, but also diachronically within any given language: 
new words can replace old words, thereby preserving the concepts 
originally expressed. 8 This process requires constant, thoughtful ef-
fort by the users of a language. Breitinger therefore expresses his 
fear at a number of places that concepts will be lost because German 
"Scribenten" do not sufficiently attend to maintaining the broad-
est possible vocabulary; they "discard" some words through simple 
neglect before others have arisen to take their place, that is, before 
they can be technically called outmoded (cf. 2:211). This leads to 
the unfortunate state in which concepts and ideas ("Begriffe und 
Gedancken") become "verwahrloset und in Vergessenheit gesetzet" 
(2:204). 9 
There is, however, an infinite number of possible concepts that any 
given language can express (2: 307). The richness of a language is de-
termined by the number of vivid terms ("Machtworter") it contains; 
these terms are responsible for t~e level of conceptual differentiation, 
that is, how precisely discrete concepts can be expressed by a lan-
guage. The quality of a language is not to be found, Breitinger argues, 
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in the sheer number of terms, which are potentially redundant be-
cause synonymous, just as a library is better judged by the number of 
titles and editions it has and not by its number of volumes (2: 97). The 
sources of new concepts for a language are located by Breitinger, first, 
in the retention of "archaic" words and phrases whose concepts have 
yet to be more adequately represented by newer terms (2:211-12) 
and, second, in translation. Breitinger's model in both repects-the 
use of archaic terms and successful translation-is Martin Opitz. 10 
The purpose of translation is not merely "eine Verwechselung 
gleichgiiltiger Zeichen" (2: 143)-that is, it is not a search for literal 
corresponden~es. Literal translations are in fact not even possible, 
for two reasons. First, a phrase in one language grew out of a histori-
cally determined set of circumstances ("verschiedene Gemiithes- und 
Gedenckens-Art ungleicher Nationen," 2:144) that are not them-
selves transferable or translatable into the foreign context. Breitinger 
gives as an example the French "faire la cour a quelqu'un" (2:343-
44), which, curiously enough for the modern reader, he hopes will 
not enter the German language as "einem den Hof machen." Second, 
the concept represented by some words may simply not exist in the 
second (foreign) language. Here Breitinger mentions Leibniz's obser-
vation that the French have no word for the German reiten. 11 
The best translations, Breitinger says, will be carried out by those 
who demonstrate equal competence in both the original language of 
a text and the language in which it is to be rendered (cf. 2:142-44). 
Competence, however, does not mean a. simple command of vocabu-
lary and grammar, but rather the translator's ability to reanimate in 
his own mind the conceptual relationships that the original language 
expresses ("in eben solcher Ordnung, Verbindung, [und] Zusammen-
hange [der Begriffe]," 2: 139). Only when he understands how words 
express concepts can he attempt to find an equivalent form of expres-
sion for the language of the translation. The goal of the translation is 
identical reception': "einen gleichen Eindruck auf das Gem ii the des 
Lesers [ machen ]" (2: 139). Breitinger's critique of the treatment of Ho-
mer by the modernes is based on this consideration, for he sees the 
attempt to "modernize" /Homer by La Motte and others as evidence 
of their inability or unwillingness to reanimate the effect of Homer on 
his original audience. Those who find Homer "primitive" do not un-
derstand the historical context of his language. I shall return to this 
issue below. 12 
The growth of a language as it is fostered by translations means the 
development of its ability to express concepts, which should not be 
confused with the proliferation of words: to learn a new word for 
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every new concept "wiirde dem Menschen seine gantze Lebenszeit 
rauben" (2: 308). 13 What needs to be increased, rather than the 11Zahl 
der Worter," is the range of ,word meanings, the "Gebrauch ihrer Be-
deutungen" (2:309). How this should occur Breitinger explains with 
reference to John Locke's ideas on language. 
Earlier in this same passage (at 2:308), Breitinger says Locke ob-
serves that abstract terms ultimately arise from the perception of "cor-
perlichen Dingen, die in die Sinne fallen." The section from An Essay 
concerning Humane Understanding to which he must have meant to re-
fer his reader is 3.1.5, where Locke says that words "quite removed 
from sense" (one of Locke's examples is "spirit") may be traced to 
"sensible Ideas" (e.g., "breath"). Breitinger interprets Locke's point 
to be that all abstract concepts are ultimately figures of speech. 14 
While this had been implicit in Locke's words, Breitinger extends his 
meaning by asserting that there is a necessary connection between 
concept formation and metaphor. Given, however, Breitinger's state-
ment that metaphor, of all the figures, is the most "painterly" ("mah-
lerisch," 2: 320), and therefore the most responsible for vividness in 
expression, it seems curious that he would propose it as the chief tool 
of abstraction. Here it is necessary to discuss what Breitinger means 
by "vivid." 
In the opening chap1er of the Critische Dichtkunst, Breitinger ex-
plains why he has chosen the term "poetische Mahlerey" to stand 
for the activity of poesis. Painting, he says, makes a swifter and more 
effective impression on the mind than speech because it works 
through the eye, the organ with the greatest power over the soul 
("Macht auf die Seele," 1: 15). He then refers his reader to what he 
calls Dubos's thorough explanation of the matter in chapter 40 of the 
first part of his treatise. 15 There the difference between poetry and 
painting is set forth as the difference between "des signes artificiels" 
and "des signes naturels." Dubos, whose argument Breitinger will 
use in part, goes on to explain that the difference between "des signes 
arbitraires & instituez" and painted images is that the signs a painter . 
uses are in fact not really signs at all: "Je parle peut-etre mal quand · 
je dis que la Peinture emploie des signes. C' est la nature elle-meme 
que la peinture met sous nos yeux" (1.40.394). 16 Dubos then claims 
that the images of painting are immediately absorbed by the mind, 
whereas written representations have to be translated, as it were, by 
the mind "back" into visual images in order to be understood. 17 While 
Breitinger accepts some of Dubos's argument, namely, that visual im-
ages are stronger than verbal ones, he himself finds that one cannot 
be content simply with what is presented to the sight as a source of 
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artistic representation. Nature can be perceived under so many differ-
ent aspects ("Seiten," l: 18), and poesis therefore has the potential of 
presenting a more complete imitation of nature than painting. Ideally, 
it will do this by making those things not accessible to the sense of 
sight nonetheless accessible as visions of the mind: the poet makes 
"das unsichtbare sichtbar" (1: 19). 
Breitinger proceeds to argue that it is precisely because words are 
"willkiihrliche Zeichen" that they, in certain cases, will have a direct 
("unmittelbar," 1: 20) effect on the mind, specifically, in those cases 
where what is being depicted is an idea or quality that cannot be seen 
("Begriffe und Bilder, die sich alleine dem Verstande vernehmlich 
machen," 1 :20). Such representational objects, were they first re-
quired to appear as pictures, would lose their immediateness, having 
to be themselves "translated back" into qualities. 
The goal of "poetische Mahlerey" is to create the immediacy of the 
visual sense without restricting the representations to the merely pic-
torial. The way this is achieved is through the organization of the 
reader's apprehensions: "der poetische Mahler [sammelt] das Auge 
des Gemiithes aus der Zerstreuung" (1 :22). The poet uses "alle 
Kunst der Optick und Perspectiv" (1 :26) to present a unified impres-
sion that can then be "in das Gemiithe des Lesers eingepraget" 
(l: 24). Most important to the poetic impression is that it be a repre-
sentative selection of particulars: it is drawn out of the poet's desire 
to sift and weave them together (" aus dem Gemische so unzehliger 
Umstiinde alleine diejenigen auszusuchen, und mit einander zu ver-
binden, die einen gewissen Eindruck auf das Gemiithe befodern kon-
nen," 1 :27). 18 
At this point we can now understand Breitinger's interest in tocke. 
For in the process of" Aussuchen" and "Verbinden" the poet engages 
in exactly that process that Locke had called "the Workmanship of the 
Understanding" (3.3.12-14), whereby the mind "combines several 
scattered independent Ideas, into one complex one" (3.5.6). This is 
Locke's definition of a "mixed mode," which he says arises when se-
lected simple ideas (sensations or reflections on sensations) are com-
bined to form a new idea, or "Notion" (2.22.1), that is, the concept of 
a thing not apprehensible through sense impression alone. A meta-
phor is an abstraction for Breitinger in that it has isolated certain par-
ticulars of experience, which it then combines in such a way that the 
nature of the connection can be perceived. Breitinger gives as an ex-
ample the phrase "das Haupt des Staats" (2:315), which he says 
makes sense to us because the word "Haupt" has not yet lost its 
"wahre Bedeutung: .. in Ansehung des Korpers" (2:315). The viv-
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idness of the metaphorical expression derives from the fact that the 
reason for the connection is understandable in terms of things we 
already know through the senses, such as the function of the head 
with respect to the body. Hence Breitinger views metaphor as a 
remedy of sorts for the arbitrary nature of signs, for it is the vividness 
of the metaphorical expression that allows us to see the relationship 
between things and the words that describe them. 19 
As verbal constructs, however, metaphors remain arbitrary desig-
nations of our ideas and not designations of things; they represent 
merely a perceived similarity between two things in nature that can 
disappear at a later time. Metaphors can be "used up" ("abnutzen," 
2:334), by which Breitinger means they lose their ability to evoke a 
comparison between two disparate objects because the objects, 
through the constant use of the metaphor, will eventually be associ-
ated "naturally" or spontaneously in the language (2: 145 and 309). 
When a metaphorical expression becomes "naturalized" in a lan-
guage, the insight is lost into its original nature as a comparison of 
two discrete objects, or as a relationship between particulars. The 
metaphorical expression becomes an "eigentliches Wort" (2:306), a 
common term, and not a figurative one. The meaning of such words 
is accepted without any awareness of the original mental construct 
that produced them, and they become viewed as arbitrary signs 
("willkiihrliche Zeichen," 2:312) without any (understandable) con-
nection to the object they describe (cf. esp. 2:308 and 312). · 
Breitinger's statements on metaphor are not a defense of rhetorical 
or poetic ornament. The purpose of metaphor is not to provide "kun-
streiche Pinsel-Ziige" for a description, but to create itself "neue Be-
griffe und Wahrheiten." 20 His guidelines for the appropriate use of 
metaphor (2:346-48) bear this out. He gives three conditions: (1) it 
should not be employed where the same concept can be just as clearly 
expressed literally; (2) it should be necessary-metaphors help to ex-
press new concepts in a language, but once such concepts have been 
integrated, a figurative expression to animate them is not needed; (3) 
a metaphor should be probable, that is, its words and reference 
should be understandable in terms of existing usage even as it intro-
duces a new perspective on the already existing terms within a lan-
guage, as it enhances the "Gebrauch der Bedeutungen." 21 
Metaphor in Breitinger's analysis of language is an operation of the 
intellect in which new concepts are presented (or "painted"). Vivid-
ness, for which metaphor is responsible, is as a stylistic category less 
the surface effect of literature in which the mind's interest is aroused, 
than an aid to the mind in the integration of new perceptions. It is 
16 Ut pictura poesis 
interesting that Breitinger recognized this as a basic point of conten-
tion between himself and Gottsched. Gottsched would later write in 
the preface to the 1742 edition of his own Critische Dichtkunst: "Was 
war wohl von unserm Maler anders zu vermuthen, als daB er die 
ganze Dichtkunst in eine Kunst zu Malen, verwandeln, und von lau-
ter poetischen Malereyen, und denen dazu nothigen Farben handeln 
wiirde." 22 Gottsched is using "Farben" in the ancient pejorative sense 
of "deceptive elaboration" or "ornament." His criticism reflects what 
was to become a widespread notion of Breitinger's enterprise-not 
least of all because Lessing, in his famous critique of Haller and Brei-
tinger, would later take the same dim view of Breitinger's defense of 
metaphor that Gottsched had, although for different reasons. But 
Breitinger had already anticipated such criticism when he defined 
the limitations of Gottsched's understanding of "Mahlerey" (cf. 1: 12-
13). Regarding, for example, Gottsched's criticism of some figurative 
expressions in Bodmer's Milton translation, he says: "Die Censur 
fa.Ht eigentlich nicht auf die Redensart, sondern auf die Vorstellung 
einer gantz neuen und ungewohnten Sache selbst" (2: 75). Breitinger 
thinks that Gottsched refuses to see metaphoric language in any 
terms other than ornament, and that he is offended when it is used 
for purposes other than reinforcement or elaboration of what is 
already known. Thus Gottsched is taken to task at another point 
(2:331-32) for rejecting metaphors not because they are bad, but be-
cause they are new and unusual. Breitinger also criticizes (2: 338-39) 
those who reject out of hand all metaphors borrowed from foreign 
languages and translated into German-again, not because they are 
bad but because they are unusual. 
Breitinger's analysis of language and metaphor in terms of the 
generation of concepts, and Gottsched's failure to provide any theo-
retical reflection on language in his own Critische Dichtkunst, would 
prove decisive for the development of their conflicting literary judg-
ments. Breitinger and Gottsched were at odds because they were re-
lying on different, and heretofore unrecognized, philosophical prem-
ises about the nature of literature. In order to explore this question 
further, we need to examine the problem of knowledge and repre-
sentation as- it was presented in Horace's comparison between paint-
ing and poesis. Following this examination, I want to suggest that 
Breitinger understood the issues raised by the Horatian lines in a 
more accurate way than Gottsched had, although he too demon-
strates a characteristically neoclassic grasp of the question of repre-
sentation. The comparison of Gottsched and Breitinger with reference 
to Horace's simile is important not only for an appreciation ofBreitin-
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ger's work but because it allows us to "redraw the map" of the poetic 
issues separating them. 
Epistemological Implications of Horace's Comparison 
The passage under consideration from the Ars poetica is the following: 
A poem is like a picture: one strikes your fancy more, the 
nearer you stand; another, the farther away. This courts 
the shade, that will wish to be seen in the light, and 
dreads not the critic insight of the judge. This pleased 
but once; that, though ten times called for will always 
please. 
(361-65) 
Traditional approaches to these lines, as I have already suggested, 
simply assume that Horace wants to equate poetry with painting in 
that both "copy" nature. But his real purpose here is to get at the 
problem of two different kinds of (pictorial or poetic) representation, 
each of which demands different modes of reception. Horace distin-
guishes these modes by using visual metaphors of distance and light 
to describe two fundamentally different ways in which representa-
tions are apprehended. In order to grasp his point, the ut pictura pas-
sage must be analyzed according to strict parallel construction. 23 
On the one hand there are works that are better seen "up close," 
that should be displayed in the shade, and that exhaust their appeal 
after being viewed only once. On the other hand there are works that 
ought to be seen from a distance, that require good (sun) lighting, 
and that will be enjoyed upon repeated examination. One may sche-
matize Horace's comparison as follows: 
Model Mode2 
Viewed "up close" Viewed from a distance 
Displayed in the shade Displayed in bright sunlight 
One viewing sufficient Multiple viewings desired 
The significance of this comparison is not immediately evident. In 
fact, its terms appear to be very nearly obscure. But the divisions of 
this schema make sense when one considers that Horace probably 
borrowed them from Aristotle, who had himself compared two styles 
of rhetorical performance to two different kinds of visual representa-
tion. Horace has apparently adapted Aristotle's distinctions to his 
own remarks on poetry. Hence in order to understand the Horatian 
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simile, we need to review its probable origin in the work not only of 
Aristotle but also of Plato. 
In Rhetoric, 3.12.1, Aristotle describes two broad categories of rhe-
torical style: "But we must not lose sight of the fact that a different 
style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric. That of written compositions 
(ypa<fnKi/) is not the same as that of debate (aywvuTTLK1J); nor, in the 
latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts." 
Aristotle's general distinction, to which the Horatian division will be 
seen to correspond, is between written and oral discourse. (Within 
this latter category there is the additional distinction between public 
and forensic debate.) Aristotle continues: "The style of written com-
positions is most precise, that of debate is most most suitable for de-
livery. . . . When compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre 
in public debates, while those of the rhetoricians, however well deliv-
ered, are amateurish when read. The reason is that they are only suit-
able to public debates; hence speeches suited for delivery, when de-
livery is absent, do not fulfill their proper function and appear silly" 
(3.12.2-3). In other words, there is a scale of refinement appropriate 
to three types of audience: the crowd before whom civil questions are 
debated, the judge of the law court, and listeners who attend to sty-
listic excellence and accuracy during an epideictic performance. The 
style of spoken oratory, according to Aristotle, should be less precise 
than speeches composed for epideictic display, which themselves, if 
delivered before a large and miscellaneous crowd, would not be suf-
ficiently impressive. 
One method of impressive oral delivery, Aristotle suggests, em-
ploys repetition of phrase, and he cites some lines from the Iliad as 
an example. The designation of Homer's works as a paradigm of the 
oral style will be repeated by Horace, within the context of his own 
comparison, by marking Homer as the type of poet whose works 
need not be examined for precision, or which are best ''viewed" from 
a distance. 24 Aristotle's and Horace's identification of Homer with the 
oral rhetorical style will play an important role, as we shall see, in 
neoclassic discussions of the Horatian comparison. 
Aristotle then describes oral delivery with a metaphor significant to 
Horace's eventual comparison: "The deliberative style is exactly like a 
rough sketch (<rKtaypacpia), for the greater the crowd, the further off 
is the point of view; wherefore in both too much refinement (aKpt{3fJ) 
is a superfluity and even a disadvantage" (3.12.5). In the ancient 
Greek context, <TKtaypacpia denoted a boldly drawn sketch done on 
a white background using a single, usually dark, color to achieve vari-
ous levels of shading. Such a sketch was distinguished from <rKr,vo-
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ypa<J>ia, that is, a painting displaying subtle compositional effects 
achieved through the complex use of color-effects, however, that 
would be lost if displayed in bright sunlight far away from the view-
er's eyes. The axiaypmpia, by contrast, because of its size and rough 
outline, could only be appreciated ("made out") from a distance. Get-
ting closer to it would in fact prevent one from recognizing what is 
depicted, whereas the <TK'YJllO'Ypacpia requires the viewer to assume 
exactly the right position from which the many complexities of the 
composition can be discerned. 25 
Horace's ut pictura poesis thus may be compared with Aristotle's 
metaphorical distinction between oral and written styles of oratory. 
Horace has simply transposed it into his own Augustan setting: writ-
ten rhetorical performances are found in the "shaded" halls of the 
schools of declamation where the rhetor would have the leisure to 
develop his argument (with its many rhetorical flourishes, its "col-
ors") before an audience that would be "close" to the speaker by vir-
tue of both physical position and sympathetic attention. 26 Because 
such carefully crafted oratorical compositions were likely also to be 
somewhat precious, they would "please but once." They are exer-
cises only and of no lasting significance. The orally delivered rheto-
ric of the forum, on the other hand, forces the speaker to contend 
with a large and perhaps unsympathetic crowd, and challenges his 
strength and endurance in the heat, dust, and noise. Such a speaker 
"dreads not the critic insight of the judge" because his aim is not to 
produce carefully turned phrases for the inspection of his listeners 
but to be heard. He can only achieve his goal through forceful deliv-
ery and with arguments that impress his listeners. His performance, 
moreover, will please when repeated because its emotional power 
arises in part from the fact that it deals with matters of great concern 
to all members of the state. 
Yet Horace, however critical he may have been of the schools of 
declamation, is not interested in defending the oral style at the ex-
pense of the written, for he was himself a master of the finely crafted 
phrase. 27 Further on in the epistle, he cautions his readers, the Pisos, 
against turning their backs on the principles of careful composition 
(385-90), just as he had begun by advising them to take "care in 
weaving ~ords together" (46). Indeed the point of the comparison 
between written and oral styles for both Horace and Aristotle is not 
the juxtaposition of "well-wrought" prose against "spontaneous cre-
ation," for even the skiagraphic style, Aristotle emphasizes (Rhetoric, 
3.12.3-5), is an art. Horace says: "Often it is asked whether a praise-
worthy poem be due to Nature or to art. For my part, I do not see 
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what avail is either study, when not enriched by Nature's vein, or 
native wit, if untrained; so truly does each claim the other's aid, and 
make with it a friendly league" (408-11). 
While these words would become a neoclassic cliche, to be repeated 
more from habit than from understanding or conviction, Horace uses 
them in a decidedly Aristotelian sense that refers to his distinctions 
in the ut pictura poesis passage. In order to appreciate this link, it is 
necessary to cite one additional passage from his epistle: "Take a sub-
ject, ye writers, equal to your strength; and ponder long what your 
shoulders refuse, and what they are able to bear. Whoever shall 
choose a theme within his range, neither speech will fail him, nor 
clearness of order" (38-41). The key to successful composition is the 
ability to discern what subjects can be best represented by one's na-
tive wit in conjunction with one's acquired skills. _Not all authors may 
hope to treat the same kinds of topics. Poets have to decide what kind 
of topic is appropriate to their own inclinations and abilities. They 
must also choose what to represent based on their particular position 
with respect to the total range of possible matter. But such an evalua-
tion carried out by poets toward their own production is also analo-
gous to the critic's ultimate estimation of what the poet (or painter) 
has created. The critic must recognize that some forms of discourse 
are meant to be scrutinized from close up, while others are intended 
to be appreciated from a distance, with an eye less to minute detail of 
execution than to the total psychagogic effect of the statement. 
Underlying Horace's observations on the right choice and right 
judgment of poetic subject matter is a philosophic issue that, al-
though not pursued rigorously by Horace himself, nonetheless is cru-
cial for understanding the neoclassic interpretation of his ut pictura 
poesis. Critias in Plato's dialogue of the same name expresses the prob-
lem as follows: 
All statements made by any of us are, of course, bound to be an 
affair of imagery and picturing. Now, suppose we consider the 
ease or difficulty with which an artist's portraiture of figures di-
vine and human, respectively, produces the impression of satis-
factory reproduction on the spectator. We shall observe that in 
the case of earth, mountains, rivers, woodland, the sky as a 
whole, and the several revolving bodies located in it, for one 
thing, the artist is always well content if he can reproduce them 
with some faint degree of resemblance, and, for another, that 
since our knowledge of such objects is never exact, we submit his 
design to no criticism or scrutiny, but acquiesce, in these cases, 
in a dim and deceptive outline (<rKta-ypacpia). But when it is our 
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own human form that the artist undertakes to depict, daily fa-
miliar observation makes us quick to detect shortcomings and we 
show ourselves severe critics of one who does not present us 
with a full and perfect resemblance. Well, we should recognize 
that the same is true of discourses. Where the subjects of them 
are celestial and divine, we are satisfied by mere faint verisimili-
tudes; where mortal and human, we are exacting critics. 28 
Critias makes two points. First, he observes that the exactness of 
our knowledge will vary with the objects of knowledge. Those things 
subject to "daily familiar observation" are more clearly recognized 
than the distant divine creations. Second, he maintains that we judge 
the representation of knowledge in accordance with the level of ex-
actness fairly to be expected of the artist given the nature of the object 
represented. We tolerate, Critias says, the dim and deceptive sketch, 
the a-Ku.xypmpia or rough outline, because some knowledge about 
divine things, however inadequate it may necessarily be, is neverthe-
less desirable in view of the superior importance of the objects them-
selves. Moreover, the most valuable or "divine" things are paradoxi-
cally precisely those objects that cannot be known exactly to us, or 
"possessed" by the mind via its own perceptions. There is, in Critias's 
account, an inherent conflict between what we most want to know, 
and what we are most capable of knowing. 
The <TKtaypacpia is a "deceptive" picture of the object because our 
knowledge of the divine is necessarily incomplete. But such a repre-
sentation-this is the crucial point-will nevertheless be accepted as 
"complete" insofar as the viewer's possible knowledge is concerned. 
Similarly for Aristotle, <TKtaypacpia had meant, in the passage from 
Rhetoric, 3.12, a representation of things about which certain knowl-
edge was neither possible nor expected, such as questions concerning 
the future of a community that are debated in the forum. The object 
represented in the skiagraphic image cannot be known more exactly 
by "getting closer" to it, that is, by more precise representation, be-
cause its "knowability" is not a function of its representation. The 
degree to which the object can be known is determined by the nature 
of the object itself. The value of the <TKtaypacpia is not that it acts as 
a complete and accurate representation when viewed from afar, but 
that it provides some knowledge about things that are not subject to 
precise representation. Yet because of the compelling importance of 
the skiagraphically represented object, the viewer will be impressed 
and overwhelmed. 
This Aristotelian concept of rhetorical (agonistic) effect is a major 
influence on Pseudo-Longinus's treatment of the sublime, a docu-
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ment that acquires enormous significance in neoclassic discussions of 
poetic effect. Thus before we return to a discussion of the fate of the 
ut pictura passage in the eighteenth century, it may be useful to men-
tion briefly the relationship between the issues of reception that 
Horace raises and those found in the Longinian statement. (A fuller 
examination of the sublime appears in the discussion of Homer in 
the final section of the present chapter.) In the opening paragraph of 
his treatise, Longinus describes the sublime in terms that recall the 
Aristotelian distinction between epideictic craftsmanship, which Lon-
ginus calls "persuasion," and what he calls "transport," which cor-
responds to agonistic performance. Longinus then observes that "in-
ventive skill and the due disposal and marshalling of facts do not 
show themselves in one or two touches: they gradually emerge from 
the whole tissue of the composition, while, on the other hand, a well-
timed flash of sublimity scatters everything before it like a bolt of 
lightning and reveals the full power of the speaker at a single stroke" 
(1.4). He is careful to add, in keeping with Aristotle's and Horace's 
positions, that such effects are produced not by ignoring art but by 
concealing it. The sublime representation is not simply the result of 
"spontaneous" insight, or artlessness, but rather of appropriately 
conceived figures of thought and speech that produce the desired 
(overwhelming) effect: "Although [natural genius} is rather a gift than 
an acquired quality, we should still do our utmost to train our minds 
into sympathy with what is noble and, as it were, impregnate them 
again and again with lofty inspiration" (9.1). Elsewhere he affirms: 
"Above all we must remember this: the very fact that in literature 
some effects come of natural genius alone can only be learnt from art" 
(2.3).29 And like Aristotle and Horace, Longinus views the works of 
Homer as the primary locus of sublime composition. 
Although Ilepi viJ,ov,; is mainly a discourse on style, Longinus does 
not neglect the philosophic dimension of the problem. "Nature," he 
says, "from the first breathed into our hearts an unconquerable pas-
sion for whatever is great and more divine than ourselves" (35.2). The 
sublime aims at "Nature ... the prime cause, the great exemplar" 
(2.2) and not at what is "correct" but "mediocre" (33.1), terms recal-
ling Horace's distinction between the precise but ultimately less im-
portant composition of the shaded schools, and the striking skia-
graphic image. 30 
Neoclassic readings of Horace's comparison tend to eliminate his 
crucial distinction between the skiagraphic (the not completely know-
able/representable) and the skenographic (the exactly representable). 
To see how this reduction occurs, we can turn now to Gottsched's 
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interpretation of the Horatian passage in his translation of and com-
mentary on the Ars poetica that stands in place of an introduction to 
his Critische Dichtkunst. I first give his rendering of the passage, and 
then his relevant textual notes. 
Ein Vers ist Bildern gleich, wo manches uns gefallt, 
Wenn mans genau besieht und nah vor Augen stellt; 
Indem sich andre nur von ferne trefflich zeigen. 
Dem einen ist die Nacht und Dunkelheit fast eigen. 
Das andere liebt den Tag und volles Sonnenlicht, 
Und scheuet dergestalt die scharfste Priifung nicht. 
DieB mag man einmal kaum; und jenes zehnmal leiden, 
Denn man erblickt es stets mit neuer Lust und Freuden. 
Ein Vers ist Bildern gleich. Dacier erklart dieses auch 
von lauter guten Gedichten, und meynt, dais mancher guter 
Vers bey genauer Priifung Stich halte, ein andrer aber nur 
obenhin angesehen werden miisse: nicht anders, als wie 
Bilder von gewisser Art ihre gewisse Stellung oder 
Entfernung erfordern. Von Gemahlden hat dieses seine 
Richtigkeit: aber von Veisen ist es ganz anders. Ein 
Gedichte, das nicht die Priifung eines Richters aushalt, 
taugt so wenig, als das Gold, welches nicht Strich halt. 
Das GleichniB Horatii muB von solchen Bildern versta.nden 
werden, die im Dunkeln oder von weitem schon zu seyn 
scheinen, aber in der That schlecht sind: da hingegen 
andre desto mehr Schonheiten zeigen, je langer und genauer 
man sie betrachtet. 
Dem einen ist die Nacht. Das sind die schonen Werke der 
Poeten, die bey dem Pobel so viel Beyfall finden; Kennern 
aber nicht gefallen. Man muB sie gleichsam nur bey 
neblichtem Wetter lesen; sonst gefallen sie einem nicht. 
Ich will sagen, man muB einen finstern Verstand haben, 
wenn man sie bewundern will. Bey dem Lichte einer 
gesunden Critik verschwinden alle ihre Schonheiten. Daher 
filrchten auch ihre Urheber nichts mehr, als die Priifung 
eines scharfsichtigen Kenners. 
(96-97) 
In anticipation of my argument later in this chapter concerning 
Gottsched's arbitrary handling of texts, it is worth noting here that his 
version is not a close translation of Horace's poem. In the preface to 
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his translation Gottsched admits, but does not seem to regret, that 
"aus fiinfhundert lateinischen Versen habe ich mich genothiget ge-
sehen, fast 700 deutsche zu machen" (34). 31 More important for our 
discussion at this point, however, are the two typically neoclassic dis-
tortions that his commentary introduces into the Horatian text. 32 
First, Gottsched reads the passage as a chiasma. Horace's parallel con-
struction is ignored and his comparative terms are reversed, in the 
following manner: 
Mode 1 Mode2 
Viewed up close Viewed from a distance 
Displayed in bright light Displayed in darkness 
Multiple viewings desirable One viewing sufficient 
Second, based on this chiasmic reading, Gottsched changes the de-
scriptive metaphors of distance and light, with which Horace had 
distinguished between kinds of representation, into evaluative terms. 
This change allows Gottsched to speak, for example, of the "finsterer 
Verstand" of those who read bad literature in "Nacht und Dunkel-
heit." Horace's term here was obscurum, "shade." Moreover, Gotts-
ched's reversal of Horace's distinction means that works read in 
"Dunkelheit" are for the crowd, which Gottsched views as the unen-
lightened "Pobel," not for the sophisticated recipient sitting in the 
shaded halls of the school. 
For Gottsched, precise scrutiny of poetic works-up close under 
bright light-is the only method of appreciating their beauties be-
cause poetic works are themselves precise and exact imitations of the 
beauties of nature. The poet must produce his work such that it pro-
vides, "bey dem Lichte einer gesunden Critik," a completely clear or 
obvious correspondence to nature. It should replicate the natural or-
der, "Fufs vor Fufs" (141)-a phrase one finds repeatedly in neoclassic 
definitions of imitation. Of course, Gottsched's frequent references to 
nature as the poet's "einziges Muster" cannot in themselves express 
his conception of poesis; "nature" and hence the product of its imi-
tation can have a range of meanings that will require definition. His 
insistence, however, that poesis in some sense copies nature (which 
can, but need not, imply simple naturalism) belies the important fact 
that for Gottsched there is no fundamental uncertainty about what 
kind of representation might be appropriate for what kind of object. 
The object ("nature") is completely knowable and therefore com-
pletely representable to the poet with sufficient insight. 
Such certainty vis-a-vis the representation is most apparent in 
Gottsched's definition of "Witz," which he says is equivalent to ingen-
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ium: "Dieser Witz ist eine Gemiithskraft, welche die Aehnlichkeiten 
der Dinge leicht wahrnehmen, und also eine Vergleichung zwischen 
ihnen anstellen kann. Er setzet die Scharfsinnigkeit zum Grunde, 
welche ein Vermogen der Seelen anzeiget, viel an einem Dinge wahr-
zunehmen, welches ein andrer, der gleichsam einen stumpfen Sinn, 
oder bloden Verstand hat, nicht wiirde beobachtet haben" (152). 
Gottsched's definition of "Witz" reflects traditional Renaissance no-
tions of "wit" as the faculty responsible for seeing resemblances be-
tween things in nature. 33 What is interesting about this definition 
(and what is clear from the context at 152-54, which cannot be quoted 
here in full) is that Gottsched does not propose a representational 
form that might correspond to this faculty of the mind ("Vermogen"). 
The representation of similarities is for him entirely unproblematic; 
all that is required of poets is that they recognize them. The poetic 
realization then follows almost "automatically" out of this recognition 
itself. 
It may be helpful at this point to compare Gottsched's remarks with 
those of Aristotle on similarities and genius in the Poetics: "By far the 
greatest thing [in diction] is the use of metaphor. That alone cannot 
be learnt; it is the token [<T17µ,etov] of genius. For the right use of 
metaphor means ~n eye for resemblances." 34 Elsewhere (at 21.8-14) 
Aristotle defines metaphor as a logical operation: "the application of 
a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the 
species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one 
species to another or else by analogy." (Various examples follow.) He 
then explains metaphor-by-analogy as the transfer of a term from one 
analogy to another similar analogy. For example: "Old age is to life 
as evening is to day." Hence, the poet will call old age "the evening 
of life." 
Gottsched's passage on similarities recalls Aristotle's. But there is 
the crucial difference that for Aristotle genius is not the ability to be 
impressed or imprinted by nature via the "discovery" of its similari-
ties. It is not the equation of mind and nature, but rather the ability 
to recognize similarities, and then to "translate" this recognition into 
a representational form, the metaphor. Aristotle, unlike Gottsched, 
preserves essential distinctions between mind (genius), the object it 
perceives (similarities), and the representation of that perception 
(metaphor). 35 
These distinctions, however, are nowhere maintained by Gottsched. 
His assumption that the poetic representation can be an exact copy of 
nature means he has assumed as well (following not only Wolff but 
also the Stoic tradition) the exact coincidence of human ratio and cos-
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mic cf>vcn,;, or the identity of the mind, the object it contemplates, and 
the representation. This in turn accounts for the highly normative 
aspect of his poetic evaluations, because the judgments of human rea-
son then can be put forth as "natural law." 36 The conflation of ratio 
and </>v<Tt<; means that no "distance" or discrepancy exists between 
them, that no relationship is possible because they are identical. 
Hence Gottsched's intetpretation of the Horatian simile: poetic 
imitations of nature are legitimate only when they can be contem-
plated without any intervening "distance" between them and the 
"viewer." That is, there is no fundamental difference, expressed in 
the metaphor of distance, between contemplation (an activity of the 
mind) and representation. Imitations must bear out, under scrutiny, 
their perfection, which means for Gottsched their adherence to the 
"laws of nature": "Die Regeln namlich, die auch in freyen Kiinsten 
eingefiihret worden, kommen nicht auf dert blofsen Eigensinn der 
Menschen an; sondern sie haben ihren Grund in der unverander-
lichen Natur der Dinge selbst; in der Uebereinstimmung des Mannig-
faltigen, in der Ordnung und Harmonie" (174). Gottsched renders 
logical categories ("Uebereinstimmung," "Ordnung") as ontological 
categories, that is, as aspects of nature. Criticism becomes thereby 
merely a vehicle for establishing that the work has produced an exact 
replica of natural order, such that rules are not decided upon by in-
dividuals (cf. "Eigensinn") but only "discovered" in nature. 
Gottsched's neoclassic reading of Horace's comparison assumes 
that all objects of poetic depiction are completely knowable; it elimi-
nates the skiagraphic side of the comparison altogether. Another neo-
classic reading of the analogy disposes of the skiagraphic aspect in a 
slightly different fashion by claiming that the degree to which objects 
can be known and represented is a function of the distance between 
them and the viewer. This is not to say, with Gottsched, that objects 
are better perceived the "closer" they appear (the more exactly they 
are represented), but that the viewer, to use a term of Alexander 
Pope, must assume a "Due Distance" between himself and the object 
or the work. This is the second kind of neoclassic distortion of Hor-
ace's passage, which is Breitinger's.37 (The term "distortion/' which 
may be used normatively to imply "betrayal" or descriptively to des-
ignate "variation," means here the latter.) This second interpretation, 
however, more closely resembles Horace's original sense than the first 
distortion had because it does not assume-as in Gottsched's version, 
for example-that precise poetic representation of natur~ is possible 
as a result of careful scrutiny of nature. Although it proposes that the 
object ("nature") is knowable according to our perspective on it, the 
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interpretation also holds that this perspective requires constant read-
justment relative to the object if the object is to be correctly per-
ceived. Thus the existence of the object independent of the beholder 
is maintained, although it is subject to complete representation under 
the appropriate circumstances or, as Breitinger says in a number 
of places, from the proper "Gesichts-Punkt" or "in ihrem rechten 
Licht." 
Breitinger's terms indicate a reliance on optical perspective to pro-
vide the most valuable representations of nature. This means that the 
"ontological" assertion of the skiagraphic comparison, the unknowa-
bility of the object, becomes the "psychological" assurance of skeno-
graphic perspective, the intimate and complete experience of the ob-
ject. The compelling effect of the bold general outline, which acquires 
its power due to the importance of the object it represents, will be 
transferred to the "design," the careful organization of particulars in 
the clearly "focused" image of nature. In the skenographic represen-
tation, the emotional power of the image will derive not from the 
ultimate value of the object, as in the <TKiaypacpia, but from the viv-
idness of the representation itself. Such a shift in psychological func-
. tion from the <TKiaypacpia to the <TK'Y}voypacpia will prove to be of 
critical importance in Breitinger's discussion of vividness an.d "poe-
tische Mahlerey." 
The function of poetic language for Breitinger, as outlined in the 
first section of this chapter, is to provide a different perspective on 
objects than nonfigurative language would, and hence to tell us more 
about them: "Der figiirliche und verbliihmte Ausdruck Hilst uns die 
Gedancken nicht bloB aus willkiihrlichen Zeichen errathen, sondern 
machet dieselben gleichsam sichtbar; er stellet uns die Sachen nicht 
gerad in ihrer nackten Blosse vor das Gesicht; sondern zeiget uns 
dieselben in ihrem besten Vortheil, in dem angenehmsten Gesichts-
Puncten, und der vortheilhaftesten Entfernung" (2:316). 38 The con-
cept of "vortheilhafteste Entfernung" was foreign to Gottsched, but 
it is the central category for Breitinger in both poesis and the evalua-
tion of poesis. Because the following chapters of my study seek to 
define how Breitinger conceived of the "Due Distance" between the · 
poetic object, nature, and the poet or reader of the poetic work, the 
epistemological problem (i.e., the problem of what kind of knowledge 
is possible and desirable in poesis) will be pursued at a later time. 
Suffice it to say that "poetische Mahlerey" for Breitinger is depic-
tion-but not copying-and that he understood the process of "de-
picting" in a manner analogous to Leibniz's model of conceptual ac-
tivity, whereby for both men the notion of "Gesichts-Punkt" plays a 
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determining role. Here the term "focusing" on nature should be re-
membered as a metaphorical expression that will figure in the entire 
subsequent exposition. Now, however, we may proceed to the notion 
of "vortheilhafteste Entfernung" as it relates to Breitinger's practical 
criticism, for here lies perhaps the most interesting-and hi.therto ne-
glected-point of conflict between Breitinger and Gottsched. 
Issues of Practical Literary Criticism 
The single most important critical issue of the period in which Breitin-
ger wrote was the debate over the value of Homer's works, which had 
been the focal point of the querelle des anciens et des modernes. 39 Al-
though this literary feud was largely resolved (or at least had fallen 
silent) by the time Breitinger published his wbrk, it plays a role in his 
poetics because the German language was at that time still developing 
as a literary medium, that is, at a relatively late date in comparison to 
other European vernacular literatures. This process involved, as it 
had in the seventeenth century in France, the integration or rejection, 
on a selective basis, of the poetic theories of antiquity. The debate over 
Homer (itself the result of Plato's banishment of the poets and the 
many "defenses of poetry" that his banishment aroused) became a 
topos of literary critical discourse. Breitinger therefore opens his Cri-
tische Dichtkunst by commenting on this very problem. 40 
The controversy had five major aspects: (1) the possibility of trans-
lating Homer's works; (2) the evaluation of his style; (3) the proba-
bility of the epic scenes and events; (4) the morality of Homer's gods 
and heroes; and (5) Homer's identity as a poet. I have already indi-
cated Breitinger's position on the first of these issues with reference 
to La Motte in the opening section of this chapter. It may be added 
here that La Motte's "modernization" of Homer, which Breitinger 
found so questionable, is based on what was termed in the previous 
section the first distortion of the Horatian comparison. The applicabil-
ity of the comparison to Breitinger's critique of La Motte requires, 
however, a brief clarification. 
Horace uses metaphors of distance and light to explain that poems 
are subject to different criteria of evaluation based on the different 
kinds of perception they involve. One traditional distortion of this 
simile, as we have seen in Gottsched's interpretation, holds that no 
discrepancy exists between what the "viewer" (the reader) knows 
about the object of consideration (either nature or the work) and what 
the object is. Now, the discrepancy might also be conceived in tem-
poral terms: the "distance" between the reader and the work would 
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then be due to the distance in time between the production of the 
work and the reader's own opportunity (in time) to read it. 
Such a neoclassic temporalization of the Horatian simile, at work in 
Breitinger's evaluation of La Motte, would understand "discrepancy" 
in skenographic terms, that is, as a function of the viewer's, or read-
er's, historical knowledge of the object (the poetic work), and not as 
a function of the value of the work in itself. For there is no "objective" 
reason why old works should be eo ipso more (or less) valuable than 
recent works, arguments of the anciens (or the modernes) notwith-
standing. "If poems are like wine which time improves," Horace had 
mused, "I should like to know what is the year that gives to writings 
fresh value. A writer who dropped off a hundred years ago, is he to 
be reckoned among the perfect and ancient, or among the worthless 
and modern?" 41 
The differences between Breitinger and La Motte with reference to 
"temporal distance" illustrate how Breitinger, despite the absence of 
an authentic skiagraphic category in his poetics, nonetheless comes 
closer than Gottsched had to preserving Horace's (Aristotelian) inten-
tion. For whereas Gottsched viewed all "distance" as undesirable, 
arguing for the necessity of precise scrutiny "up close" of literary 
works, Breitinger argues that the distance between the reader and 
the work should not be destroyed but traversed. In the case of Hom-
er's works, temporal distance requires that the reader explore the his-
torical conditions of Homer's language and culture in order to under-
stand Homer's epic poem.42 
La Motte's desire, by contrast, to clothe Homer's ·language in a 
modern idiom, whereby the original syntax and word choice are ig-
nored, is based on the assumption that there should be no distance, 
meaning historical distance, between the perceiver and the object per-
ceived. The attempt to make Homer more "accessible" to the modern 
reader leads La Motte to claim that he is "improving" Homer's work: 
"C' est un usage immemorial parmi les Traducteurs, de relever l' ex-
cellence de L' Auteur qu'ils traduisent. ... Je traduis moins que je ne 
l'imite." 43 One might say that La Motte is carrying out the final de-
struction of distance between the poetic painting and its viewer: the 
artist's work is simply appropriated by the interpreter and the "paint-
ing" is made to conform to the viewer's expectations and desires 
rather than being allowed to confront the viewer with something new 
for eventual acceptance or rejection. 44 The destruction of distance, of 
ontological discrepancy, between the viewer and the object was a goal 
shared by La Motte and Gottsched. It is therefore not surprising that 
Gottsched simply repeated many of La Motte's criticisms of Homer. 45 
Breitinger's position on the second and third aspects of this contro-
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versy, the evaluation of Homer's style and the probability of his epics, 
derives from a remarkably consistent argument with respeet to viv-
idness. Both vivid (metaphorical) terms, or "Machtworter" (the na-
ture of which has already been discussed}, and vividness in style (or 
depicted epic event) are dependent on the poetic production of im-
ages, "poetic" here in the root sense of "making." The process as 
Breitinger conceives it involves a high degree of intellective partici-
pation by both poet and audience, in which particulars are organized 
into a compelling design. This is a thoroughly Horatian concern, al-
beit in the context of the neoclassic transformation of the skiagraphic 
into a skenographic metaphor. Breitinger found this appreciation of 
the intellective nature of vividness in Alexander Pope's interpretation 
of Homer, and his own evaluation of Homer thus is based to a great 
extent on what Pope said. The words "Due Distance" and "vortheil-
hafteste Entfernung" are not an accident of terms. 
One of Breitinger's most important borrowings from Pope is his 
famous comparison of Homer and Virgil: "Jede von diesen beyden 
Arten zu mahlen hat ihren besondern Werth. Die Homerische hat 
einen Original-Character, und machet sich dem mehreren Haufen an-
genehm; die Virgilische hat viel mehr Kunst, und ist gelehrter. Ho-
mer warder grofste Genius, Virgil der beste Kiinstler" (1 :43). Breitin-
ger does not tell his readers that these words at the beginning of his 
book are drawn from Pope's preface to the Iliad translation. 46 Near the 
end of the first volume, however, Breitinger returns to his source with 
an explicit reference: "Der Herr Pope" has said that "Homer macht 
uns zu Zuhorern, Virgil la.1st uns Leser bleiben" (1: 494-95). 47 And on 
the second to last page of this same volume, Breitinger says that "ein 
vortrefflicher heutiger Scribent" has given us the true observation 
that "Virgil habe zwar wenig schlechte und gemeine Gedancken, aber 
er habe auch bey weitem nicht so viele herrliche und erhabene" 
(1: 502). 48 
What is interesting about these borrowings is not their frequency 
but their theme: Breitinger has chosen those passages from Pope's 
preface that are congenial to the Aristotelian distinction between ago-
nistic and epideictic styles. 49 Thus Homer's skiagraphic style is for 
matters of general concern, those addressed to "dem mehreren Hau-
fen," whereas Virgil's precision is suited to experts, those who are 
"gelehrt." so Homer's work provides immediacy, it makes us listeners, 
while Virgil's asks for reflection and scrutiny from readers. Finally, 
the absence of both mean and sublime thoughts in Virgil recalls Lon-
ginus's"admonition regarding correctness and mediocrity, which was 
itself a restatement of the Horatian distinction. 
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The distinction that Breitinger, following Pope, draws between Vir-
gil and Homer becomes then his own general distinction between two 
kinds of "poetische Mahlerey." He expresses this difference as that 
between "erzehlen" and "zeigen." Here the neoclassic shift from the 
skiagraphic to the skenographic depiction is especially evident. The 
careful design of the epideictic piece is made to assume the impres-
sive (psychagogic) function that the agonistic display had had in the 
original Aristotelian context. Thus, the distinction between bold gen-
eral outline on the one hand and complex and subtle design on the 
other is transformed into a distinction between vivid design versus 
exhaustive collection of particulars without regard to their organiza-
tion. "Erzehlen" in this account occurs when the poet "blols histo-
risch beschreibet" (1 :470), in which case a number of particulars are 
simply brought together in accordance with completeness rather than 
according to the organization inherent in the skiagraphic-turned-
skenographic representation. Such an amassing of particulars (in-
stead of the careful organization of detail in the "focused" design) 
results in frigid ("frostig") works wherein "die starckgezeichneten 
Zuge und die Heftigkeit wiirden verschwinden" (1 :470). But Breitin-
ger's attempt to reanimate an agonistic kind of poetic effect, as evi-
denced in this last quotation, is carried out with epideictic methods. 51 
In a distinction between "poetische Schilderey" and didactic "Be-
schreibungen," the criterion is design rather than collection. The pur-
pose of "Beschreibungen" is "alle Umstande. und Merckmahle einer 
Sache ... sorgfaltig auf- und zusammensuchen" (1:47-48). By con-
trast, the "poetisches Gema.hide" whose purpose is "zeigen" relies 
on "auslesen" and "verbinden" of particulars in order to create its 
special effect on "das Gemiithe" (1: 48). Aristotelian epideictic form 
is realized in Breitinger's conception by the appropriate use of meta-
phor, the very function of which is to join together isolated particu-
lars into a new image: "Der wahre Verdienst eines Poeten [bestehet] 
im wenigsten darinn, dais er ohne Wahlund Unterschied alles schild-
ere, was in der Natur vorkommt ... die Poesie empfangt ihre grolste 
Starcke und Schonheit von der geschickten Wahl der Bilder" (1 :84).52 
The comparison of representations lacking compelling design to 
the style of Virgil, who was the "better artist," is an apparent contra-
diction that is understandable in terms of Breitinger's and Pope's use 
of the Horatian simile. Virgil's work is like the kind of painting viewed 
in. the shade, where boldly drawn patterns (which for Breitinger 
means vivid patterns!) are not to be found. Hence he quotes the 
passage from Pope's preface where Virgil's characters are said to re-
semble each other to such a degree as to be indistinguishable. They 
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are a collection, an amassing, of similar figures, rather than a repre-
sentation of clearly drawn individuals. The sometimes sententious 
speeches could be given by any of them, whereas Homer's characters 
are easily distinguishable in that their personalities stand in stark con-
trast to one another. 53 
Homer's value lies in his ability to set something before the eyes, in 
his talent with "zeigen." This is what would later be called the Lon-
ginian ability to bring about "transport": Homer "ziehet uns fort" 
(1: 43), whereas Virgil merely entertains and persuades (1: 43). At an-
other point in his exposition, Breitinger says, referring to chapter 15 
of Ilepi vlf,ov<;, that transport comes about as a result of the most 
intensely vivid images produced by the imagination and imparted to 
the reader: "Der aufgebrachte, und <lurch eine strenge anhaltende 
Leidenschaft erhizte Phantasie wird afters so sehr verziicket, dais sie 
ihre lebhaften Einbildungen von den Empfindungen gegenwartiger 
Dinge nicht wohl unterscheiden kan; der Poet, der das Wort fur sie 
fiihret, wird daher in wahrender Entziickung von solchen als von 
wiircklich gegenwartigen Dingen reden, und sie dem Leser gleich-
sam mit dem Finger zeigen" (1 :321-22). Breitinger is in fact so en-
amored of the notion of transport that he copies out Quintilian's en-
tire description of it into both of his own volumes in Latin (1 :334-37 
and 2:362-63). 54 It is interesting that for the line (6.2_.32) reading: 
"From such impressions arises that evap-yeia which Cicero calls illu-
mination and actuality . . . " Breitinger has in his second volume the 
word evepyeia. The passages differ in a few instances of punctuation 
but are otherwise identical: Whether he was quoting from two sepa-
rate editions is impossible to determine. The confusion of the Greek 
terms was, however, a common one in late antiquity and had been 
utilized, for example, by the Neoplatonist Proclus in his literary 
theory. 55 'Evap-yeia or "vividness" was then taken in the Renaissance 
to stand for evipyeia or "effectiveness" (of discourse). Breitinger 
is here repeating a philological "mistake" of the rhetorical tradi-
tion-probably without even realizing it-because he views these 
terms in analogy: the poet's vividness coincides with the receptivity 
of his audience to the vivid representation. 56 
Like Longinus, Breitinger views the phenomenon of "transport" as 
an art, and he criticizes those "Scribenten, die von dem Enthusiasmo 
reden" (1 :329). Readers should not be deceived about the quality 
of what such enthusiastic writers offer: "Sie kommen mit lauter 
prachtigen Wortern von einem heiligen Rausch, einer gottlichen Ras-
erey, Licht, Verziickungen des Gemiithes, Aufwallungen, aufgezo-
gen, welche neben einander gesetzet vortrefflich klingende Satze 
Ut pictura poesis 33 
machen, aber in dem Gemiithe keinen deutlichen Begriff hervorbrin-
gen" (1: 329-30). The passage recalls Longinus's criticism of "emotion 
misplaced and pointless" produced by authors "as if they were 
drunk" (3.5). The truly sublime is not achieved by assuming that 
"sublimity and emotion [are] the same thing, and that one always 
essentially involve[s] the other" (8.2). Sublimity for Breitinger is the 
result of vividness, and vividness is the result of careful design ("Ver-
binden") of particulars to produce the "Gerniithes-Bewegung" and 
the "deutlichen Begriff." Although Breitinger clearly prefers poesis 
when produced according to the emotionally compelling "Horner-
ischen Geschrnack" (1 :45), he does not equate this with "spontane-
ous" or "artless" creativity. This point, however, has been completely 
obscured in discussions of the "Romantic" Breitinger-perhaps be-
cause Breitinger himself contributed to this misunderstanding with 
his evaluation of Homer the man. 
The identity of Homer as a poet and the morality of his gods and 
heroes were two issues on which Breitinger took a particularly con-
servative position: "Was konnte Homerus anders thun, da er mit sehr 
aberglaubigen Gotzendienern lebete, die sich ihre Gotter nicht an-
derst, als unter rnenschlichen Gestalten vorstelleten, als sich nach 
ihrer Schwache richten, wenn er gleich mehr Erleuchtung gehabt ha-
ben mag, als andere" (1: 161). Homer's "Erleuchtung," he goes on to 
say, is nothing but a historical variation on Christian wisdom because 
the more acceptable Christian vocabulary was not available to him. 57 
Further, Breitinger makes the astounding claim that Horner himself 
was aware of the limitations ("Schwache") of his own audience. The 
most important point to be made about this passage is that Breitinger 
did not always subscribe to it. For in his actual interpretations of Ho-
mer, there is not a single justification of Homer's heroes or the proba-
bility of their actions on the grounds of Christian theology. Breitin-
ger's Homer was Pope's, and Pope saw Horner as a poet. 58 
Breitinger's defense of Homer's "Christian" genius is one of those 
annoying neoclassic inconsistencies caused by the need for legitimi-
zation of the critical text. It appears in a conservative German envi-
ronment that was only just beginning to come to terms with Christian 
Wolff's attempt to separate philosophy from theology. Breitinger's de-
fense of Homer's work, on the other hand, is a defense of vivid lan-
guage as it was preeminently developed in the Iliad and the Odyssey. 
It is in fact a striking anomaly in his work that he would list (1: 162-
63) a series of commentators on Homer who support, he says, the 
view that Homer was a brilliant framer of allegories, given the fact 
that he himself does not resort to allegorical interpretations. The list 
34 Ut pictura poesis 
is headed by Porphyry and Proclus, Homer's Neoplatonist defenders, 
and includes Palephatus, Heraclides, Ponticus, Eusthathius (a favor-
ite of Anne Dacier's and Pope's), Mme Dacier, Andre Dacier, and 
Pope. Breitinger follows the Neoplatonist tradition in that he views 
Homer as an original source of wisdom, but he casts his praise in 
the modern form. Homer is an "Original-Geist" who is credited 
with "die Erfindung aller dieser Gleichnisse" that make his work so 
powerful; he is "ohne einen Vorganger," and has "unbeschrankte 
Wissenschaft." 
But these phrases, which appear in the Gleichnis-Abhandlung (277), 
were influenced no doubt by Pope's preface, where Homer is credited 
with "the utmost Stretch of human Study, Learning, and Industry" 
(7:3) and where Virgil is said to have "scarce any Comparisons which 
are not drawn from his Master" (7:9), a sentence Breitinger quotes 
(1:35). All of these statements were, however, commonplaces by 
Pope's time. 59 They derived ultimately from the Neoplatonists, who 
had relied heavily on allegory to defend what was held to be Homer's 
privileged access to divine knowledge. 60 This particular debt of Brei-
tinger to the Neoplatonic tradition-his conception of Homer the 
poet-has not been recognized. 61 When Breitinger's "Neoplatonism" 
is discussed at all, it is confined to his supposed theory of the poet 'as 
alter deus, as was suggested by Oskar Walzel, and more recently by 
Hans Blumenberg, whose study is philosophically more sophisticated 
than Walzel's but nonetheless fails to account for the effects of Neo-
platonic categories on literary studies.62 
Interpretations of Breitinger's work throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury and up until recently in the present century tended to focus on 
the conservative strain in his thinking, by locating his contribution to 
poetics in the defense of the "genial" creative individual. This in turn 
was judged, quite mistakenly as I shall argue in the next chapter, a 
progressive attitude, while the truly progressive aspect of his poetics 
has been disregarded, namely the willingness to confront the literazy 
work as a historical object requiring interpretation on its own histori-
, cal terms. In this respect his poetics constitute a significant attempt 
to reconstruct, against the system of his antagonist Gottsched, the 
independence of the work, and it is here that his notion of "vortheil-
hafteste Entfernung" will prove to have significant positive conse-
quences for the study of literature. 
An example from Breitinger's later publications and an edition pro-
duced by a member of Gottsched's literary circle will illustrate the 
difference between the two critics. Partly as a result of Breitinger's 
prodding, the German literary milieu in the early eighteenth century 
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became interested in bringing out editions of the work of Martin 
Opitz. Breitinger and Bodmer produced one such edition them-
selves, which they published in 1745. One year later, a student of 
Gottsched's, Daniel Wilhelm Triller, al~o brought out an edition of 
Opitz's poems. A comparison of the two prefaces provides a good 
example of the fundamentally different attitudes toward literature 
fostered in Zurich and in Leipzig. 
Breitinger and Bodmer, for their part, explain that their text derives 
from "der letzten Auflage von einem jedweden Gedichte, die von 
dem Poeten selbst und unter seinen Augen besorget worden." 63 In 
addition, there are a number of "Lesearten" of the poems that they 
have analyzed and included in their annotations. These "Lesearten" 
are not to be confused, however, with the "Variantibus der Clas-
sischen Ausleger" because they contain the various versions that the 
poet himself produced. The "Variantibus," by contrast, is more the 
product of a copyist's "Begierde ... neue Meinungen in einem Scri-
benten zu entdecken ... damit man die eitle Freude habe, solche zu 
erklaren." Their responsibility, they say, is to supply their readers 
with "den Opitz aufrichtig, rein, und vollstandig." 
Triller also claims to offer Opitz's poems in a form that is "genau, 
treulich, rein, sauber, verstandlich." Nevertheless there have ap-
peared, he says, in all existing editions of Opitz's poems a number of 
"fehlerhafte Stellen" that he (Triller) has "verbessert" according to 
his own "wahrscheinlicher Mutmassung." The reader will also be 
spared what Triller finds to be the very confusing "Wortfiigung, Con-
struction, Sylbenmafs ... [und] allzuharter Reime" of Opitz's juve-
nilia, which the editor has corrected with "leichte Versezung der 
Worte ... Veranderung des Reimes, und dergleichen geschwinde 
Hiilffs-Mittel." 
Breitinger's philological standards are not a curiosity of his later 
career; they are directly linked to his theories of language and litera-
ture. For if "poetische Mahlerey" is to allow the reader to reanimate 
the conceptual relations expressed in the language of a particular 
historical period, a process that can contribute to the development of 
his own linguistic consciousness, then he must have the literary 
document as it was originally created. Triller, however, following 
Gottsched, does not see that poesis contributes to the generation of 
ideas; it only acts as an illustration of existing knowledge, and those 
aspects of the text that do not reinforce present conceptions are ma-
nipulated or destroyed. 64 
Breitinger's introduction of historical distance between the poetic 
painting and the viewer allows interpreters to assume a relationship 
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to the work by defining their exact position with reference to the ob-
ject. In terms of the now temporalized Horatian analogy, they "step 
back" from the "painting" by removing themselves from the moral 
and aesthetic criteria of their own time, which allows them to bring 
the many apparent improbabilities and imperfections of the work into 
historical focus. Breitinger says, following Dubos, that the. more one 
knows about a period and its customs, the better one will be able to 
provide an appropriate interpretation of the literary works produced 
at that time (1 :477-82). But this is not to agree with the modernes that 
the work is merely an archaeological artifact that at best can only il-
lustrate the crudeness or primitiveness of the period in which it was 
created, nor is it to agree with the anciens that such primitiveness 
should be glorified as a "Golden Age." Historicizing the poetic work, 
which means that viewers acknowledge their own historical distance 
from it, is the act of "stepping back" that is equivalent to view-
ing poesis from the "vortheilhafteste Entfernung," the position that 
places it in the most likely spot from which it can be understood or 
assimilated on its own terms. For Gottsched and his students, by con-
trast, the appreciation of poetry as painting meant "stepping closer" 
by examining exact likenesses of a nature already fully known. For 
Breitinger it is the focusing on otherwise obscure or remote, that is to 
say, wondrous mental images of nature by setting them in "ihr rechtes 
Licht." 
2. Poetic Production and 
Breitinger's Notion of Possible Worlds 
In his Gleichnis-Abhandlung Breitinger criticizes Gottsched for over-
looking the ambiguity inherent in the term "Nachahmung der Na-
tur": "Er [Gottsched] antwortet: Man darf nur auf die Natur sehen; 
alleine da wisset ihr nicht, was vor eines Dinges Natur gemeint ist; 
und das Wort Natur, wenn es so lediglich gesetzt wird, ist viel zu 
weitlaufftig und unbestimmt, als dais es euch einen deutlichen Begriff 
geben konnte." 1 Thus, while Gottsched's chapter on imitation is 
called "Von den dreyen Gattungen der poetischen Nachahmung," 
Breitinger's corresponding chapter in his own Critische Dichtkunst dis-
cusses imitation per se: "Von der Nachahmung der Natur." Neverthe-
less, their statements seem to be in neoclassic harmony with each 
other. Breitinger defines poetic production, "das eigene und Haupt-
Werck der Poesie," as "Nachahmung der Natur in dem Moglichen" 
(1 : 57). Gottsched defines "das Hauptwerk der roesie" as the "ge-
schickte Nachahmung der Natur" (141). Their statements differ only 
because Breitinger qualifies the term "Nachahmung" with a reference 
to "das Mogliche," which was itself a Renaissance commonplace. 2 Yet 
commentators assumed for decades that Breitinger's treatise repre-
sented an aesthetic adaptation of Leibniz's concept of possible worlds 
because Swiss allegiance to Leibniz is mentioned in the preface to the 
Critische Dichtkunst and in the first chapter (1 :9). 
In 1970, Hans Peter Herrmann pointed out in his important study 
of early eighteenth-century poetics that Gottsched had also relied on 
the notion of possible worlds and that in fact both critics were in-
debted not to Leibniz but to Christian Wolff. 3 Herrmann also took 
Breitinger to task for a muddled exposition-for example, in his 
equation of "Wahrheit," "Wahrscheinlichkeit," and "Moglichkeit" 
(an equation that is grounded in the Neoplatonic context discounted 
by Herrmann). Had Breitinger understood the true meaning of ideas 
such as internal consistency and organic structure, which Herrmann 
finds implicit in the Wolffian definition of possible worlds, Breitinger 
would have-indeed should have-produced the concept of form 
peculiar to German Classicism. Therefore, Herrmann concluded, Brei-
tinger cannot be said to have availed himself of a "hochmetaphy-
sischer Begriff," as traditional commentaries assert. Breitinger's ref-
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erences to possible worlds were, like Gottsched's, nothing more than 
a legitimizing device intended to add a philosophic veneer to his Prot-
estant didactic poetics. 4 
The salient feature of Herrmann's critique-Breitinger's failure to 
arrive at the principle of classical form because of his theological bias 
-was not new. Ernst Cassirer had already presented a similar argu-
ment in 1916 in his study Freiheit und Form. 5 Because the main points 
of Cassirer's influential interpretation recur in almost all twentieth-
century interpretations of the Swiss, it is useful to restate his position 
briefly. This will help to clarify the question of Breitinger's relation to 
Leibniz and Wolff, and his difference from Gottsched with respect to 
the notion of possible worlds. 
Cassirer bases his interpretation on the distinction, fundamental to 
Leibniz's system, between necessary truths ( verites necessaires or ve-
rites eternelles), and factual truths or truths of experience (verites de 
fait). 6 Truths of the former kind are independent of empirical verifi-
cation, and are based on the principle of identity or of noncontradic-
tion (A = A, or A #- non-A). Such propositions are necessary because 
their opposites are impossible. In truths of reason, possibility and 
necessity converge: by demonstrating that the sum of the angles of a 
triangle can equal 180 degrees, one shows as well that it can equal 
nothing else. Leibniz assigns to the class of necessary truths mathe-
matical, logical, and metaphysical propositions and definitions. 
Truths of fact are those things known to us either a posteriori 
through sense experience, or a priori through reflection on the ob- ' 
served order of nature.7 They do not derive their validity from simple 
possibility but rather from existence. Truths of experience are observ-
able, which does not mean, however, that they need be actually ob-
served to be true. Leibniz uses the example: "I will write tomorrow." 
The opposite of this statement ("I will not write tomorrow") is equally 
possible, that is, it involves no contradiction. The truth of the state-
ment rests therefore on what actually happens tomorrow (whether or 
not there is a witness, including a writer conscious of his own ac-
tions). 8 Included in factual truths are the laws of nature, for example, 
the laws of motion. 9 
Necessary truths exist in the mind of God, yet it is not within his 
power to create or destroy them. 10 Rather he is bound by them in his 
creation of the natural order. Thus, while all necessary truths are pos-
sible, not all possibles are necessary. 11 The possibles represented in 
necessary truths are eternally true, that is, they are independent of 
realization in time and space. Truths of experience are the realizations 
of only some of the many options, or possibilities, God has available 
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to him within the constraints of necessary truth. 12 Their existence, 
which follows out of the Creation, is based upon the principle of suf-
ficient reason, that is, God's goodness and omnipotence. 13 
Cassirer says that Breitirrger's poetics are an attempt to open the 
realm of necessary truths to poetic representation. When the poet 
depicts possible worlds, he is not representing factual truths but 
rather the timeless truths of necessity, which he grasps with his 
imagination guided by the understanding ("Verstand"). The identifi-
cation of Breitinger's possible worlds with Leibniz's verjtes necessaires 
caused Cassirer to seek in Breitinger's poetics a new principle of form 
that might have allowed the Critische Dichtkunst to count as a signifi-
cant anticipation of the aesthetics of German Idealism. Breitinger did 
not deliver this new idea of form, Cassirer suggests, because it would 
have involved establishing the poet as an autonomous "second 
maker" who created new worlds out of the infinite possiblities pre-
sented by the necessary truths. The prospect of the poet as alter deus 
was apparently unacceptable to Breitinger's conservative and pious 
character. Hence Breitinger is said to have contented himself with 
confining his poetics to the safer territory of selection and recombi-
nation of that nature already provided by God. Breitinger is credited 
first with a great insight and then with a failure of nerve. 
Cassirer had included in his interpretation the often cited passage 
from the Critische Dichtkunst in which the notion of possible worlds is 
set out. "Alle diese moglichen Welten, ob sie gleich nicht wirklich 
und nicht sichtbar sind, haben dennoch eine eigentliche Wahrheit, 
die in ihrer Moglichkeit, so von allem Widerspruch frei ist, und in der 
allesvermogenden Kraft des Schopfers der Natur gegriindet ist." 14 
Because the quotation refers to both the principle of contradiction 
and the principle of sufficient reason ("in der allesvermogenden 
Kraft ... gegriindet"), we cannot properly identify Breitinger's pos-
sible worlds with Leibniz's verites necessaires because such truths were 
not grounded, according to Leibniz, in divine omnipotence. That is, 
God does not have the power to decide what shall count as a contra-
diction.15 Moreover, in an earlier passage of the Critische Dichtkunst 
(1: 54) that Cassirer does not cite but that he must have seen, Breitin-
ger expressly excludes from poetic representation all those truths that 
are independent of empirical verification ("die alleine dem reinen 
und von den Sinnen gantz abgekehrten Verstand vernehmlich sind"): 
that is, truths of logic ("Vemunft-Lehre"), of geometry ("Meis-Kunst"), 
of metaphysics ("Lehre vom Wesen der Dinge") and of arithmetic 
("Rechen-Kunst")-in other words, the n~cessary truths as Leibniz 
defines them. 
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Breitinger's exclusion of the necessary truths from poetic represen-
tation was apparently based not only on what he read in Leibniz and 
Wolff, but also on what he took from Muratori. 16 This passage corre-
sponds to another apparent borrowing from Muratori in which Brei-
tinger distinguishes between "das Wahre des Verstandes," which 
does indeed capture the necessary truths, and "das Wahre der Ein-
bildung."17 It has often been argued (following Cassirer) that Breitin-
ger anticipated, but did not achieve, the classical-Idealist "poetics of 
autonomy" with his notion of "das Wahre der Einbildung." Breitinger 
is always seen to revert to "philosophic truth," or Enlightenment ra-
tionality, to which the poetic representation is made subservient and 
which guarantees its ultimate validity. 18 
The discussion of "Verstand" and "Einbildung" has been particu-
larly distorted by the nearly universal tendency, even among recent 
critics of Genietisthetik, to compare Swiss poetics to later developments 
in German aesthetics. The proper historical context, however, for un-
derstanding this issue is not the latter part of the eighteenth century 
but rather the late seventeenth century. This period witnessed an 
enormous expansion and diversification in the mathematically based 
natural sciences, as well as a consolidation of the philological disci-
plines initiated in the Renaissance. The Quarrel between the Ancients 
and the Moderns, in the literary sphere, was precipitated, in part, by 
a sense among the modernes that ancient literary artifacts were no 
longer valuable, having been created in the prescientific phase_ of 
Western culture. Only present-day authors (or present-day "transla-
tors" of ancient works), writing in the age of rational exactitude, 
could be credited with universal, timeless insights into human na-
ture. As a debate over the value of literary historical texts, the querelle 
was a conflict between universalists, whose methodological model 
was mathematics, and historists, whose model was philology. 19 In 
Germany, this debate manifested itself, among other places, in the 
controversy between the universalist Gottsched and the historical 
philologist Breitinger. 20 
Breitinger's adoption of the historian Muratori's distinction be-
tween imaginative and rational truth (the theft is too rarely recog-
nized) has been generally viewed as an example of a polarization in 
his thinking between "feeling and reason" or "intuition and reason" 
or "Sinnlichkeit und Verstand" (as a recent book title suggests). By 
casting Breitinger's project in such Kantian terms, the historical posi-
tion of his poetics cannot be grasped. His work should be interpreted 
instead as the reflection of a distinction, emerging out of the querelle, 
between the kinds of knowledge provided by the exact sciences and 
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the human sciences (a question that was, to be sure, not resolved 
when Kant began to write his first Kritik). In both the Critische Dicht-
kunst and in the Gleichnis-Abhandlung, Breitinger expresses his fear, 
that modern authors are failing to produce new knowledge-hence 
his reformulation, examined earlier, of the task of metaphor. In these 
passages Breitinger holds up the progress made in the natural sci-
ences to the lack of comparable achievements among German poets. 21 
While Gottsched responded to this crisis in the humanities by at-
tempting to assimilate his poetics to the exact sciences, Breitinger pro-
poses that poesis be viewed as a historically evolving field of knowl-
edge. This is his fundamental link to Leibniz, whose philosophy is 
the preeminent statement of the problem of knowledge and represen-
tation at the end of the seventeenth century. Leibniz's concept of pos-
sibility therefore needs to be examined in detail in order to under-
stand Breitinger's enterprise. Breitinger's primary philosophic source 
was of course Christian Wolff, who took his notion of possible worlds 
directly from Leibniz. 22 
Leibniz's Concept of Possibility 
Leibniz's system is founded on two essential types of distinction, one 
metaphysical (or ontological), the other epistemological. The epis-
temological distinction-between verites necessaires and verites de 
fait-has already been discussed. The metaphysical distinction in-
volves a fourfold division (Figure 1). In his own version of the onto-
logical argument, Leibniz argued that the Cartesian proof of God's 
existence was inadequate because it assumed God's possibility. The 
Leibnizian version, stated briefly, holds that the idea of a thing's ex-
istence cannot be true unless the possibility of that thing can first be 
demonstrated. The idea of a possible is not simply that which is think-
able, for we can conceive of any number of things that are impossible, 
such as the idea of the most rapid motion. A wheel, for example, that 
spins at the fastest possible rate could have a spoke protruding from 
its outer rim that would move faster than the rim itself. Hence the 
idea is absurd (impossible). 23 An idea is possible only when it involves 
no contradiction. In the case of our idea of God, there is no contradic-
tion between a perfect being and an existing being. Therefore God is 
possible. Further, because (following Descartes) existence is a kind of 
perfection, God exists necessarily. 24 (This version of the proof mani-
fests of course the same circularity as its scholastic and Cartesian pre-
decessors.) God's necessary existence also is proved by Leibniz a pos-
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Figure 1. 
teriori: there are contingent beings, all of which are caused by 
something rather than nothing. Contingents are caused by anterior 
contingents, but an infinite regress is not possible because there then 
would be no reason for the chain of contingents itself. Thus there is 
necessarily a self-cau:;;ed cause that stands outside contingency. 25 
According to Leibniz's form of the ontological argument, God is the 
only being whose possibility necessarily involves existence. 26 (The 
parallel epistemological formulation, already outlined, is that neces-
sary truths are rendered true by their possibility.) No other possible 
being exists necessarily. The existence of contingent beings is deter-
mined not by their simple possibility but rather by divine will27 (just 
as the truths of fact require more than possibility to be true). Hence 
some contingent beings remain merely possible, "existing" only in 
the divine mind, while others become real, that is, actualized. More-
over, Leibniz posits this distinction not as a disjunction but as a con-
tinuum: "Les possibles pretendent a l' existence a proportion de leur 
perfections." 28 The difference between possibility and existence is a 
matter of degree, not of kind. The universe appears to be constructed 
in completely Plotinian terms as an "upward" scale of reality (as the 
arrow to the left in Figure 1 indicates), whereby God is posited as 
the most real being and the contingents as less real. Unlike the Neo-
platonists, however, Leibniz assigns greater reality to the existents 
than to the possibles, whose relative perfection determines their de-
gree of reality or existence (which is shown by the arrow on the 
right). 29 Both arrows in Figure 1 therefore refer to value. The existing 
world is contingent, as are all possible worlds, of which group indeed 
this world is the most perfect member. By definition the contingents 
realize themselves in time and space and are represented by the 
. truths of fact. Because their existence (or nonexistence) is based on 
divine will, which "decides" on their existence based on their perfec-
tion, the possibles are not necessary. Had they been necessary, they 
could not have been the object of divine choice because even God is 
bound by necessity. 30 
There is an infinity of possibles, such as, Leibniz suggests, those 
depicted in the novels of Mme Scudery th~t may never become real 
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(actual), but that are not therefore impossible. 31 Some possibles that 
have not yet manifested themselves in time and space may still be-
come actualized. But Leibniz also distinguishes in the Theodicee (8-9) 
between those possibles of the existing world that have still to be 
realized and the possible worlds rejected by God at the Creation. 
Whether or when the actualization of any given possible occurs is 
based on the preestablished harmony of the universe.,Some possibles 
will never harmonize with the existing world, therefore will never 
be actualized. God, unlike all other existents, can envision at once 
the connection of all of the possibles to each other and thus their 
position in the unfolding universe. 32 The intellectus divinus alone dis-
tinguishes between the possibles chosen for existence and those for-
ever rejected. 
The actualization of the world does not occur according to neces-
sity. Leibniz's argument goes as follows: divine prevision of the world 
does not account for the truth of those contingencies that are subse-
quently actualized. Actualization follows not from prevision but from 
the actions of individual existents, all of which are indeed divinely 
ordained but carried out nonetheless in time. Their possibility does 
not automatically result in their actualization.33 Their existence is "cer-
tain" or "determined" but not necessary. This distinction between 
necessity and determinacy was, and remains, one of the most dis-
puted aspects of Leibniz's thought. Lovejoy, for example, remarked 
that it "is manifestly without logical substance; the fact is so apparent 
that it is impossible to believe that a thinker of [Leibniz's] powers can 
have been altogether unaware of it himself." 34 
However that may be, the difficulty appears to stem from the fact 
that Leibniz is using "possible" in two completely different senses-
one logical, the other metaphyskal. The logically possible is neces-
sary; the metaphysically possible is contingent. Because Breitinger 
expressly rejects the (logically) necessary truths as objects of poetic 
representation, that is, those truths that follow necessarily out of their 
possibility, we must assume that the possibles he means are meta-
physical, that is, those things whose existence may or may not follow 
from their possibility. And because some of these possibles were re-
ject~d by God at the Creation, this would appear to leave Breitinger 
in the theologically embarrassing position of recommending inferior 
worlds as aesthetic objects. 
Yet this would hardly be the correct approach for a critic attempting 
to stimulate increased respect for literature among a presumably pi-
ous public. What seems.more likely is that Breitinger meant literature 
to depict those metaphysically possible worlds that have not yet been 
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actualized. The new epistemological significance that Breitinger as-
signs to literature lies in its role as an agent of contingent truth, that 
is, as the means by which contingent truth is realized in time. In 
order to understand this process, which is the basis of Breitinger's 
poetic conception, it is necessary to execute a digression into Leibniz's 
metaphysics. 
Leibniz's Concept of Substance 
"La Substance est un Etre capable d' Action." The sentence opens one 
of Leibniz's last metaphysical essays, Principes de la Nature et de la 
Grace, fondes en raison, and expresses an axiom of his system. In place 
of the Cartesian division of substance into res extensae and res cogi-
tantes Leibniz sets the concept of activity or force: 35 This new concept 
of substance, developed primarily during the course of Leibniz's 
mathematical and physical studies in Paris,36 refers to the unify-
ing activity that constitutes form in both the physical and mental 
spheres-which are not, however, oppositional dimensions as in the 
Cartesian system. With his concept of substance Leibniz shows how 
the physical and the mental are aspects of the continuum of Being 
such that the physical becomes increasingly mental, or better, the 
phenomenal becomes ideal in proportion to its degree of unifying, 
form-creating activity. Both corporeal and incorporeal things have the 
capacity to act, but substance (force) is that which is incorporeal in 
the corporeal. 37 
The phenomenal wor\d consists of the multiplicity of bodies acting 
upon each other such that the force of one (A), when transferred to 
another (B), is "felt" or registered by all bodies (Cx) impinging on (B), 
also by those bodies impinging on (Cx), and so forth ad infinitum. 
But each body (B) so acted upon is also the center of its own field of 
forces, such that the quantity of force it receives from any one source 
(A) will be determined by the force received from all other sources, 
"sources" meaning here not just the immediately impinging bodies 
but all those bodies impinging on them. The phenomenal realm is a 
web of an infinite number of forces (efficient causes) acting upon each 
other in accordance with the laws of motion. 38 
Force transferred from one body to another is not a mystical "qual-
ity" moving through passive receptors. Force transferred becomes 
force exerted, unless hindered by an opposing force. Thus each body 
is a center of both reception and generation of activity. The genera-
tion of force Leibniz calls the "immanent action" of substance. The 
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notion of immanence is what makes Leibniz's concept of force a meta-
physical idea rather than a mechanistic one. Primary matter, as distin-
guised from bodies, cannot generate action; it is not spontaneous. 
Secondary matter (bodies), by contrast, has a "vital principle" that is 
a soul, or "something analogous to [it], a first entelechy." 39 Hence 
matter is substance insofar as it is dynamic form. In the case of mo-
tion, form is the acting out from a center-point determined by the 
web of forces registered or "represented" at this point. 40 Each action 
or movement represents the unification of a multiplicity of forces, 
resulting in a new motion. Motion is, however, only one species of 
action. 41 The more general term for the unifying activity of substance 
is "perception." 42 
The term has caused considerable difficulty among those students 
of Leibniz who conceive of perception in the Lockean sense as the 
imprinting of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world on a passive 
mind. The problem is intensified when the perceiving beings, or 
monads, are said by Leibniz to be without windows. 43 The confusion 
was intended. Leibniz's point is precisely that the notion of percep-
tion needs to be reconceived as the spontaneous (i.e., self-generated) 
organization of disparate elements, an organization furnished not 
by the outer environment, but by a "principe interne" called "appe-
tition." 44 Indeed a_ monad does not "have" perceptions at all; it is 
perception. 
Perception occurs in various degrees of clearness arn:l distinctness, 
forming an infinite continuum that ranges from the divine intel-
lect-the continuum is closed at the top-downward to the most ob-
scure and confused perception. The reality or perfection of each mo-
nad is a function of the degree to which its perceptions are clear and 
distinct. Distinctness is a function of the level of multiplicity that has 
been organized. 45 In the monad with the highest perfection (God), 
the entire multiplicity of the universe is grasped with absolute clarity, 
unhindered by the confusion inherent in mere physical existence. All 
other monads are united in some degree to matter (the source of con-
fused or disorganized perception), which is recognizable in the force 
of their perception, that is, in its level of distinctness. Those beings 
more subject to physical existence necessarily have less intellective 
capacity, or ability to integrate a multiplicity in their perceiving. 46 This 
integrative function makes for the activity of the monad, whereas its 
failure to do so means the dominance of the multiplicity, the domi-
nance of matter in its representation, hence, its passivity. 
An example from the Monadologie (§§ 26-29) will illustrate the 
point. Animals, Leibniz says, have a memory based on successive 
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events in the phenomenal world. The memory causes them to antici-
pate certain events and to act out of this simple anticipation, such as 
when a dog is shown a stick with which it has been beaten and runs 
away. Similarly we may expect the sun to rise because it has always 
done so in the past. But rational beings (such as astronomers) as dis-
tinguished from "Empiriques" -who Leibniz thinks rather resemble 
animals in their thinking-are able to recognize the cause of events, 
that is, the necessary connection between all such successions of 
events in the future. Both reasoning beings and empirics observe the 
same phenomena, but they make different sense out of what they see. 
The phenomena themselves cannot be said to "cause" reasoning in 
the one and a conclusion based on habit in the other. Thus lesser 
monads are not "more affected" by phenomena (which would imply 
a causality); rather, their existence shows a privation of activity, that 
is, the absence of intellective integration of multiple events in a unity. 
In this case the insight into the cause of all future similar events uni-
fies more phenomena than the simple anticipation of one additional 
similar event in the future. 47 
I have thus far used "perception" as a generic term. Leibniz em-
ploys in fact a hierarchy of designations, availing himself of Cartesian 
language, to express the activity of perception, the lowest level being 
"confused" and the highest "distinct." Because perception is the ac-
tivity of substance rather than simply a state of the human mind, 
these terms have metaphysical significance insofar as substance is the 
intellective process of the ordering of a multiplicity. 48 "Petites percep-
tions" or "perceptions confuses" are representations unnoticed by 
the monad. (More will be said about them.) "Perception," similar to 
sensation, consists of clear but confused representations of (but not 
imprints from) the outer world, 49 such as color or coldness, whereby 
a quality is recognized independently of its causes. Leibniz gives the 
example of green pigment, which is a mixture of two very fine pow-
ders, one blue, the other yellow, whose existence in the color green 
cannot be discerned. 50 "Apperception" is reflexive perception, that is, 
the state in which the monad is aware of its own perceiving, thus 
aware of its own Self. 51 Leibniz illustrates the difference between per-
ception and apperception as that between sleeping and waking, or 
even between life and death, which is only an apparent cessation of 
all life, because perception never ceases.52 Simple monads perceive; 
souls apperceive. Finally, there is "la Raison" or Intellectus, in which 
the connections of all things to each other are established. 53 
The universe in the Leibnizian system is given as a field of force in 
a state of flux. There are continual shifts in position on the Chain 
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of Being ("[les]substances ... changent continuellement leur rap-
ports"},54 whereby some monads lose while others gain in perfection. 
These shifts, proceeding according to the law of continuity, are meant 
to be qualitative, not quantitative. Monads or souls do not have parts 
to be lost or acquired when they undergo changes in state. They do 
not lose or gain perceptions. Instead, their perceptions decrease or 
increase in force, that is, in the level of integrative activity.55 Such 
activity, however, never sinks "below" the level of the "petites per-
ceptions," which continue to inform or "incline" the monad even 
though it is unaware of their existence.56 Nor can the monad ever rise 
completely above "petite perception"; only the divine intellect is ca-
pable of this. 
Perception occurs according to a "principe interne," the individ-
ual's vital force driven by appetition. 57 This principle makes for the 
individuality of the monad in that new perceptions are generated 
strictly out of the specific history of perceptions of that particular mo-
nad, which is the basis for Leibniz's famous statement "le present est 
gros de l'avenir." 58 Thus it is curious that Leibniz would claim, as he 
does in the Monadologie (§ 17), that perception can never be explained 
mechanically. What he means is not that the perceptions are not con-
nected, but that they are not connected as in the phenomenal realm 
of motion by efficient cause, that is, by the direct transfer of the force 
of one perception to another. Perceptions are linked together instead 
purely by spontaneity, which is a final cause, namely, the divine 
choice of what is best. 59 And this choice has determined in what order 
perceptions shall evolve, through appetition, into new constellations 
of perceptions. 
The development of individuality in the ideal realm may be viewed 
in analogy with the phenomenal dimension of motion. In the phe-
nomenal realm, continuity is manifested as the law of the conserva-
tion of energy. When any body (B) is acted upon by another body 
(A), it receives not only the force of (A), but, in different degrees 
according to its own position, that of all other bodies that have acted 
on (A). In the metaphysical-epistemological context, all monads are 
said to represent the entire universe, though with differing degrees 
of distinctness based on their individual perspective, those things 
"closest" to them being perceived more distinctly. Continuity justifies 
the importance of confused and obscure perceptions (the "petites 
perceptions"}, which cannot be excluded by fiat from substance, or 
from the mind's activity. Instead, the "petites perceptions" provide 
the possibility for the intelligibility of the universe. For Descartes, and 
later for Locke, the only admissible mental entity was the clear and 
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distinct idea. Leibniz directed some of his sharpest words against this 
doctrine, accusing the Cartesians of denying the possibility of the 
soul's immortality (which Leibniz grounded in the unceasing nature 
of perception), and ignoring the true commonality of humans with 
other beings. 60 
While the theological issue of immortality is less interesting for us 
today, the model of the intellect that Leibniz proposed was of major 
consequence, not only for the exact sciences but also for the historical 
disciplines. In defending the significance of the lesser perceptions, 
Leibniz did not merely point out their usefulness but rather their ne-
cessity in the formation of all thought. For although God created the 
best possible of all worlds, populated by beings with infinite degrees 
of intellective power and perfection, he created it as a universe that 
finds itself in continual motion. And since the motion of intellection 
is thought, which is the movement from one perception to another,61 
all intellective activity is appetition, which integrates the "petites per-
ceptions." Leibniz seems to have been less concerned, in his concept 
of plenitude, with the continual production of new individuals within 
the Chain of Being, 62 than with the spontaneous development of sub-
stance out of its own ground, a process involving the integration, as 
a unity, of ever more perceptions into an increasingly differentiated 
whole. This is not, however, the "acquisition" of new perceptions, 
but a process of focusing on that which is already in the soul. The 
activity of substance is the movement from potentiality to actuality. 
The ontological goal, or telos, of Leibniz's system, the greatest pos-
sible variety coeval with the greatest level of order, 63 is also an epis-
temological goal, in that an increase in Being means an increase in 
intelligibility. 
Leibniz's notion of spontaneity preserves the problematic distinc-
tion between contingency and necessity that he attempted to resolve 
with the word "determinacy." In the assimilation or integration of 
ever more perception by the monad or soul, 64 not all "petites percep-
tions" are chosen-Leibniz says they "compete" with each other-
and some remain unnoticed. The final cause that governs the selec-
tion is the principle of appropriateness ("convenance"). Only those 
perceptions that contribute to the unifying activity of the larger per-
ceptual process are integrated. The ability to be integrated is called 
"compossibilite." Thus the competition among the perceptions is the 
conflict ("le combat") among the possibles for existence. The possi-
bles, striving toward existence in proportion to their perfection, are 
actualized according to their "intelligibilite," which is the definition 
of perfection. 65 The best possible world is getting better because it is 
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becoming more intelligible. The increasing intelligibility of the world, 
founded as it is in the continual absorption of previously unrecog-
nized (but not previously unreal) perceptions, is not a sequential 
revelation of individual necessary truths. Rather, intelligibility un-
folds on a scale of increasing probability (or increasing certainty), 
such that the determinacy of the world tends in the direction of neces-
sity, but never becomes identical to it. Stated in terms of human 
knowledge, no scientific theory is necessarily true, but subject to con-
stant revision as more evidence is collected and integrated. 
Based on the foregoing discussion of substance, the position of the 
possibles within Leibniz's metaphysical divisions can now be redrawn 
(see Figure 2). Contingent beings are like necessary being insofar as 
their perception rises to the level of intellection; conversely, their 
souls sink to ,the level of possibility (potent~ality) when the unifying 
activity of perception is greatly reduced. The divisions are not static 
categories, it must be remembered, but "regions" on a continuum. 
No contingent being can ever become identical to pure intellectus. As 
in Figure 1, the arrow represents increasing value. It should be noted 
that increasing value (increasing reality and intelligibility) means for 
Leibniz also increasing pleasure, 66 a point that will become important 
in the subsequent discussion of Breitinger's poetics. 
Although it is true that the possibles are less perfect than the exis-
tents, they become, when seen in context with the "petites percep-
tions," the very source of all that is valuable in the monads or souls. 
They are the condition of possibility for the greatest variety next to 
the greatest order. For without them there can be no multiplicity, 
whose integration makes for increased order and distinctness, which 
is the apprehension of the relationship of parts to each other. Because 
the individual substances shift "up" and "down" in their level of ac-
tivity, new perception is brought into the system and the universe as 
a whole progresses "upward." 67 To discount the importance of the 
possibles as potential actuality, to view them simply as logical pos-
sibility, is not only to ignore Leibniz's own application of the principle 
of plenitide, but also to miss completely the basis for his critique of 
Descartes. By arguing for the potential intelligibility of the less certain 
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and confused, Leibniz was aiming for the destruction of the Cartesian 
fascination with absolute certainty that he believed might destroy the 
development of knowledge. In this respect he embodies the spirit of 
Aristotle, whom he greatly admired, and who also defended the 
value of probable knowledge when certainty was not to be found. 
Whereas Aristotle's distinction between probable and certain was, 
however, primarily a logical issue, in Leibniz's system it is also a 
metaphysical issue. 68 His system is cast in Neoplotinian imagery that 
describes perception moving upward toward intellect as the devel-
opment in time of increasing probability. The process of Being is the 
universal movement toward necessary truth that is grounded in the 
vitality and spontaneous development of the individual ordained by 
divine will. 
It should now be clear that the question of Breitinger's adherence 
to Leibniz's concept of possible worlds is only incompletely answered 
by referring to Leibniz's theological reflections. In that context the 
possible worlds indeed have less value than the existing world and 
"exist" only in God's understanding as purely logical entities. In the 
context of Leibniz's metaphysics, however, "possibility" and "pos-
sible worlds" are given the status of dynamic potentiality. The possi-
bles are those things that are realized as the world becomes more 
perfect, which it does ceaselessly. Indeed they are the precondition 
for the world's perfection. Breitinger's choice of "the possible" as the 
prime object of poetic representation means that when literature de-
picts the possibles, it contributes to the continuing perfectibility of 
the world. 69 Yet this is not to say that poesis reveals necessary truths, 
as Cassirer suggested, because the metaphysically possible only tends 
or inclines toward necessity and cannot be identified with it. 
Breitinger, Gottsched, and Wolff 
Breitinger's reading of Wolff was augmented by his study of Muratori, 
so that the dynamic concept of nature as emanation peculiar to Neo-
platonism and preserved in Leibniz's metaphysics reappears in Brei-
tinger's literary theory. 70 A critic such as Gottsched, who proceeded 
from a conc~pt of nature based on static and timeless geometrical re-
lations, was bound to read Wolff differently than Breitinger did. There 
is now a widely held assumption that Gottsched and Breitinger, be-
cause of their mutual indebtedness to Wolff, used the concept of pos-
sible. worlds in nearly identical senses. An examination of how the 
concept functions in their poetics will clarify this issue. 
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It has already been established that Breitinger's poet depicts nature 
and all that lies "in ihren Kriiften verborgen." Stated in Leibnizian 
terms, poets do not confine themselves to actualized being, but rep-
resent potential being: "Denn ich darf vor gewiis setzen, dais die 
Dicht-Kunst, insoferne sie von der Historie unterschieden ist, ihre 
Originale und die Materie ihrer Nachahmung nicht so fast aus der 
gegenwartigen, als vielmehr aus der Welt der moglichen Dinge ent-
lehnen miisse" (1 : 57). 71 The traditional interpretation of passages 
such as this (to review briefly) is that Breitinger thought of the poet 
as an alter deus. As the creator of possible worlds, the poet becomes a 
quasi competitor with God by bringing to realization the possibles 
that God has not chosen to actualize. In this context, critics often 
point out Breitinger's supposed indebtedness to Addison, who had 
written in no. 419 of the Spectator that "the Poet quite loses sight of 
Nature, and ... has no Pattern to follow . ... Poetry ... has not only 
the whole Circle of Nature for its Province, but makes new Worlds of 
its own, shews us Persons who are not to be found in Being" (3:570-73, 
my emphasis). Invariably, however, critics return to Breitinger's reli-
gious side. and discount "his" alter deus as underdeveloped. 
This interpretive cul-de-sac should be avoided altogether by substi-
tuting the Leibnizian monad for the alter deus. For the latter term, 
although already widely used in the Renaissance, is nonetheless 
laden with the Promethean overtones of German Idealism. Leibniz's 
monad, by contrast, was never meant to displace but only to repre-
sent, imperfectly, the divine mind. It stands at its own center of intel-
lective integration of perception. The creative task of the poet qua 
monad is to absorb the "petites perceptions" -that is, that which lies 
hidden in nature's forces-by moving them "up" to the level of ap-
perception in the act of re-presentation that is "poetische Mahlerey." 
Poets make "das unsichtbare sichtbar" (1: 19) by focusing on and in-
tegrating the normally unnoticed manifold particulars of the empiri-
cal world into a poetic image that embodies their own artistic pur-
pose. "Die Natur hat denen Kunsten des Poeten und des Mahlers alle 
ihre Schatze, auch die verborgensten vor den ausserlichen Sinnen, 
eroffnet, und ihnen ohne Mafsgebung iiberlassen, die Wahl unter 
denselben nach ihren Absichten einzurichten" (1: 78). Unlike the Ad-
disonian "make[r] of new Worlds," Breitinger's poet uncovers the 
possibles hidden in nature itself that emanate out of the already exist-
ent: "Kennet der Poet die Gesetze, nach welchen alle Wurckungen 
und Veranderungen in der gegenwartigen Welt der wiircklichen 
Dinge erfolgen, und verstehet er die Natur der Dinge genau, so kan 
ihm nicht verborgen seyn, was bey jeder veranderter Absicht und 
52 Poetic Production 
Umstand nach diesen Gesetzen und vermoge dieser Natur der Dinge 
moglich ist, und erfolgen muB" (1 :271-72). 
Breitinger does, however, appear to follow Addison's reference to 
allegorical figures when he says (1: 143) that the poet "durch die Kraft 
seiner Phantasie gantz neue Wesen erschaffet," which he lists ("die 
Tugenden, die Arten des Lasters, die Welt-Theile, Konigreiche ... 
die Kiinste, die Wind-e, die Jahreszeiter\., und so fort"). Addison's "an-
other sort of Imaginary Beings" arises "when the Author represents 
any Passion, Appetite, Virtue or Vice, under a visible Shape" (3:573). 
But these allegorical figures do not constitute Breitinger's possible 
worlds; indeed they are said to have become so much a part of our 
literary tradition that "sie haben so zu sagen bey den Menschen das 
Biirgerrecht erhalten" (1: 143-44).72 
The poet's creative activity therefore does not "improve" nature by 
adding a new world. The poet merely acts as ·an agent of nature in 
the process of actualization. "Die Natur hat in der Erschaffung dieser 
gegenwartigen Welt nicht alle ihre Krafte erschopfet, wenn also der 
Poet etwas vorstellet, \das die Natur zwar noch nicht zur Wiirck-
lichkeit gebracht hat, aber doch an das Licht zu bringen vermogend 
ist, so kan dieses wieder keine Verbesserung der Natur, sondern nur 
eine Nachahmung derselben auch in dem Moglichen selbst, geheis-
sen werden" (1:268). 73 We recall that the monad neither lost nor 
gained perceptions but simply represented them with a greater or 
lesser degree of clarity. The continual reordering of perceptions 
means that each monad mirrors the universe in accordance with its 
own perspective.74 
This limited perspective of the monad is the basis of Wolff's ex-
planation of perfection. "Keine Creatur kan den groBten Grad der 
Vollkommenheit erreichen. Denn woferne dieses geschehen sollte / 
miisste ihr Wesen in das Wesen GOttes verkehret werden" (Metaphy-
sik, § 1088). And because, in the Leibnizian system explicated by 
Wolff, being and perceiving ( or representing) are identified with each 
other, the limited degree of perfection attainable by any one monad 
corresponds to the limited ability of nondivine beings to apperceive 
the perfection of the universe. "Wenn ... die Anzahl des mannich-
faltigen / so mit einander iibereinstimmen soil / sehr groB ist / fallet 
es schweer von der Vollkommenheit des gantzen zu urtheilen. Und 
dieses ist die Ursache, warum die meisten sich betrilgen, wenn sie von der 
Vollkommenheit der natilrlichen Dingen urtheilen wollen" (§ 171). More-
over, Wolff envisions a specific application of the monad's perspectiv-
ism to the problem faced by the artist. The passage continues: "Ja, es 
gehet ihnen auch wol in den Wercken der Kunst nicht besser. 1st aber die 
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Zahl grosser / als dais wir sie zu iiberdencken vermogend sind; so 
stehet gar nicht in unserer Gewalt I die Vollkommenheit des gantzen 
zu beurtheilen" (§ 171). 75 
Precisely these formulations are to be found in Breitinger's discus-
sion of artistic judgment. "[Es] ist ein blosser Betrug der men-
schlichen Unwissenheit, wenn wir wiirckliche und mogliche Dinge 
mit einander vergleichen, und uns einige davon, ausser ihrem Zu-
sammenhange betrachtet, von grosserer oder geringerer Schonheit 
und Vollkommenheit zu seyn beduncken !assen. Dieses riihret alleine 
daher, weil wir den Zusammenhang und die Uebereinstimmung aller 
Theile, als worauf die Vollkommenheit des Gantzen beruhet, nicht 
vermogen auf einmahl zu iibersehen" (1 :269). Breitinger's poet there-
fore faces a dilemma. On the one hand, he wants to compare his 
artistic representation of the possible with actuality (holding his work 
up to nature is a source of pleasure),76 but he will never be able to 
grasp sufficiently the total structure of nature ("Zusammenhang") 
against which such a comparison must be carried out. Breitinger at-
tempts to resolve this dilemma by suggesting that although poets can 
never assume the position of the divine intellect, they can replicate 
its activity in their own creative process. "Ich sehe den Poeten an, als 
einen weisen Schopfer einer neuen idealischen Welt oder eines neuen 
Zusammenhanges der Dinge, der nicht alleine Fug und Macht hat, 
denen Dingen, die nicht sind, eine wahrscheinliche Wiircklichkeit 
mitzutheilen, sondern daneben so vielen Verstand besitzet, dais er 
seine Haupt-Absicht zu erreichen, die besondern Absichten derge-
stalt mit einander verkniipfet, dais immer eine ein Mittel fiir die an-
dere, alle insgesamt aber ein Mittel fiir die Haupt-Absicht abgeben, 
miissen" (1 :426). 
The passage was apparently synthesized from two different para-
graphs in Wolff's Metaphysik that explain divine omniscience and 
omnipotence. At § 1048 Wolff has: "GOtt erkennet vermoge seiner 
Allwissenheit alle Absichten I die moglich sind / und alle Mittel / 
wodurch man sie erreichen kan (§ 972). Weil er nun nichts anders als 
das beste will (§ 985); so muis er auch die besten Absichten haben / 
und die besten Mittel dazu erwehlen. Derowegen weil er auch seine 
Absichten so einrichtet / dais immer eine ein Mittel der andern wird / 
insgesammt aber alle endlich als ein Mittel seiner Haupt-Absicht 
anzusehen sind (§§ 1034, 1044); so hat er die allervollkommenste 
Weiisheit" (§ 920). And at§ 1053 he writes: "GOtt hat Dingen / die 
<lurch seinen Verstand blois moglich waren / auch <lurch seine Macht 
die Wurcklichkeit gegeben (§ 1020). Diese Wiirckung GOttes wird die 
Schopffung genennet: von welcher wir keinen · Begriff haben / weil , 
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wir keine Krafft haben etwas zu erschaffen. . . . Denn wir bringen 
alsdenn Dinge hervor in Gedancken / in denen Wahrheit ist I und 
die zuvor nicht da waren / nach unserem Wohlgefallen / und erhal-
ten sie <lurch die Krafft der Seele gegenwartig / so lange wir wollen: 
jedoch konnen wir ihnen keine Wiircklichkeit ausser der Seele geben / 
welches doch GOtt in der Schopffung thut I und darinnen eigentlich 
die Schopffung bestehet." 
Wolff's point had been that divine creation occurs according to a set 
of infinitely complex yet organized purposes (" Absichten") whose ul-
timate interconnection the limited human mind is incapable of grasp-
ing entirely. Since all creation flows from these purposes, products of 
the human imagination are but a part of the overall divine plan for 
the realization of the world. God's "Rath-Schluls," rather than our 
own creativity, is responsible for the existence of "Wercke der 
Kunst." And "wir miissen ihm unwissende zu Ausfiihrung seines 
Rathes dienen" (Metaphysik, § 1031). Artistic service in this divine 
project of realization of the world means continual albeit imperfect 
cognition of the interconnection of all things to each other. Thus Brei-
tinger's poet seems to be a somewhat limited "Schopfer" insofar as 
he merely reproduces a limited version of the universal "Verkniip-
fung" of purposes in his own work. It is tempting to view the passage 
at 1 :426 simply as a discourse on the poet as the creator of a micro-
cosm. The topic under discussion there is not, however, the limited 
ontological status of the poetic product but rather the psychological 
process of "Erfindung" as he understood it according to Wolff. 
Wolff defines invention as "die Fertigkeit unbekandte Wahrheit aus 
anderen bekandten heraus zu bringen" (Metaphysik, § 362). 77 He then 
distinguishes (Metaphysik, §§ 362-67) between two methods, or "Ar-
ten der Regeln": invention a priori, which relies on "Witz," and inven-
tion a posteriori, which relies on "Verstand." The a priori method is 
the faculty of analogic thought, the ability to transfer arbitrarily, 
through "Verkehrung," something that is known to something un-
known, which is nonetheless perceived to be equivalent ("gleichgiil-
tig"). Invention a posteriori is the method of drawing new conclusions 
("Schliisse") based on what is already known. Because "Verstand" is 
defined (Metaphysik, § 277) as the ability to recognize distinctly what 
is possible, invention a posteriori produces statements or truths that 
are compossible with existing knowledge. That is, new conclusions are 
reached by analyzing the "Verkniipfung" of known statements or 
facts to each other. 
The inductive process of "Verkehrung" ensures that "man in den 
Stand gesetzet wird einen Anfang im Schliissen zu machen" (Meta-
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physik, § 364). But invention a priori must always be conducted in 
tandem with invention a posteriori (Metaphysik, §§ 367, 861). Wolff pos-
its a continual interplay between "Witz" and "Verstand," or the a 
priori and a posteriori methods. We can see why this interplay is essen-
tial if we look at what Wolff has to say about imagination. Although 
he does not explicitly equate "Einbildungskraft" and "Erfindung," 
they operate in analogous ways. 78 
Invention uses two methods and imagination operates according to 
two "Manieren." The first "Manier" Wolff calls "die Krafft zu erdich-
ten" (Metaphysik, § 242). This is the ability of the imagination to com-
bine two previous perceptions into an image that is impossible in the 
real world ("nicht moglich ist, und daher eine leere Einbildung ge-
nennet wird''). Wolff gives as examples "die Gestalt der Melusine / 
so halb Mensch und Fisch ist; die Gestalt der Engel / wenn sie als 
gefliigelte Menschen gemahlet werden; die seltsame Gestalten der 
heydnischen Gotter und dergleichen" (§ 242). Such imaginative prod-
ucts belong to the class of notions Wolff elsewhere calls "willkiihrlich 
formirte Begriffe": "Allein wenn wir nach unserem eigenem Willkiihre 
etwas determiniren, konnen wir nicht wissen, ob dieselbigen Begriffe 
moglich sind, oder ob wir nurleere Worte gedencken. Denn unser Wille 
kan nichts moglich machen. Derowegen miissen wir in dergleichen 
Fallen beweisen, dafs die erlangten Begriffe etwas mogliches in sich 
£assen. Es ist auch nicht genung, dafs die Determinationes an sich 
moglich sind, sondern es wird zugleich erfordert, dafs sie nebst denen 
iibrigen bestehen konnen." 79 Wolff makes two important points. 
First, the human mind can bring forth many things that are not pos-
sible. (This recalls Leibniz's distinction between nominal and real 
definitions.) Second, even if a concept contains no internal contradic-
tion (if it is "an sich moglich"), it must still be possible within the 
context in which it functions. Concepts that are not compossible thus 
cannot contribute to the formation of new knowledge; invention a 
posteriori cannot be circumvented in this process. "Erdichtung," there-
fore, is "Erfindung" carried out without regard for compossibility. 
The second "Manier" of the imagination is dependent on the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason (Metaphysik, § 245). Its product is not merely 
logically possible, but also -capable of actualization. This kind of 
imaginative work (Wolff mentions at § 246 the architect's image of a 
building) has been brought forth according to the rules of certain arts 
(e.g., "Baukunst"). Such an image can be actualized into an object 
because it has been conceived according to the principles of produc-
tion whose possibility in the real world has been demonstrated by the 
construction of other buildings. 
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Wolff's distinctions between "erfinden" and "erdichten" form an 
essential background to his discussion of poesis and possible worlds. 
(We must remember here that "erfinden" / "erdichten" are, like 
"Kunst," generic terms, and that poesis is merely a specific kind of 
invention.) At§§ 570-73 in the Metaphysik, he had compared the pos- · 
sible worlds with the "erdichteten Geschichten, die man Romainen 
zu nennen pfleget." He begins.by noting that the real ("wiircklich") 
world, that is, that which is described by the verites de fait, is in con-
stant flux. For example, he says, I am now sitting, but a new world 
could come about in which I would have occasion to stand up. So it 
is with novels. What is narrated may not have happened, but it might 
happen if the world were in a different configuration ("in einem an-
deren Zusammenhang"). Wolff seems to have restated fairly Leibniz's 
notion of possibles that are not yet buf still could be actualized. But 
whereas Leibniz's point in referring to books by Mme Scudery had 
been that not all possibles need necessarily be actualized, Wolff's use 
of Leibniz's example makes a different statement. Wolff concludes 
that novels depict neither what has been, nor what is, nor what will 
eventually develop in this world; they only show what is possible in 
another, completely separate world that cannot be actualized in the 
present world. 80 This means that Wolff identified the possible worlds 
represented in the literary work with the logical possibles rather than 
with the compossibles striving for actualization in this world. In other 
words, Wolff believed poesis operates merely according to the prin-
ciple of invention a priori but not according to invention a posteriori. 
In Wolff's restriction of poesis to one aspect of the process of "Erfin-
dung," namely, to what he called "Erdichtung," the ability of poesis 
to contribute to the development of new knowledge is considerably 
weakened. While Gottsched borrowed Wolff's limited notion of the 
poetic possible, Breitinger wanted to appropriate Wolff's entire pro-
cess of "Erfindung" for his own concept of literature. (The subtitle of 
Breitinger's book is, after all, "worinnen die Poetiscl;le Mahlerey in 
Absicht auf die Erfindung im Grunde untersuchet ... wird.") It is 
therefore misleading, as has been so often done, simply to point out 
that both Gottsched and Breitinger were indebted to Wolff. They used 
his work in different ways in keeping with their own purposes. Let 
us examine first how Gottsched defines possible worlds: 
Ich glaube derowegen, eine Fabel am besten zu beschreiben, 
wenn ich sage: sie sey die Erzahlung einer unter gewissen Um-
standen moglichen, aber nicht wirklich vorgefallenen Begeben-
heit, darunter eine niitzliche moralische Wahrheit verborgen 
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liegt. Philosophisch konnte man sagen, sie sey ein Stucke von 
einer andern Welt. Denn da man sich in der Metaphysik die Welt 
als eine Reihe moglicher Dinge vorstellen muis; auiser derjenigen 
aber, die wir wirklich vor Augen sehen, noch viel andre der-
gleichen Reihen gedacht werden konnen: so sieht man, dais ei-
gentlich alle Begebenheiten, die in unserm Zusammenhange 
wirklich vorhandener Dinge nicht geschehen, an sich selbst aber 
nichts Widersprechendes in sich haben, und also unter gewissen 
Bedingungen moglich sind, in einer andern Welt zu Hause ge-
horen, und Theile davon ausmachen. Herr Wolf hat selbst, wo 
mir recht ist, an einem gewissen Orte seiner philosophischen 
Schriften gesagt, dais ein wohlgeschriebener Roman, das ist ein 
solcher, der nichts Widersprechendes enthalt, fur eine Historie 
aus einer andern Welt anzusehen sey. Was er nun von Romanen 
sagt, das kann mit gleichem Rechte von alien Fabeln gesagt 
werden. 
(204) 
This extended quotation comprises very nearly Gottsched's entire 
treatment of possible worlds. His sole criterion for poetic possibility 
is drawn from Wolff's (Leibnizian) definition of logical possibility: 
"moglich sey / was nichts wiedersprechendes in sich enthalt" (Meta-
physik, § 12). Nowhere does Gottsched refer to the actualization of the 
possibles represented in the literary work; his possible worlds are not 
meant to be integrated into the configuration of this world. This is 
borne out by his definition of poetic probability. 
Gottsched says that "Wahrscheinlichkeit" is "die Aehnlichkeit des 
Erdichteten, mit dem, was wirklich zu geschehen pflegt" (255). He 
later revises this initial determination because it cannot explain what 
is for him the most valuable poetic genre, the didactic Aesopian fable, 
in which the presence of talking plants and animals manifestly does 
not accord with "was wirklich zu geschehen pflegt." For this special 
case Gottsched introduces the notion of "bedingte" or "hypothe-
tische Wahrscheinlichkeit," which relies, not surprisingly, on the con-
cept of logical possibility. In order to make'the fable seem probable, 
the poet need merely establish the hypothesis that in another possible 
world, animals and plants could talk. The probability of such a world 
is based on the absence of self-contradictory elements within the con-
fines of that hypothetical configuration. Of course, Breitinger had 
also defined the probable, like Gottsched, as that which has "keinen 
Widerspruch in sich" (1: 134), but he immediately goes on to say that 
our judgment of this must be based on "eine Vergleichung mit unsren 
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Meinungen, Erfahrungen, und angenommenen Satzen," a qualifica-
tion Gottsched would never have admitted. 
Although Gottsched undoubtedly believed he had correctly ap-
plied Wolff's concept of possible worlds to his poetics, the circularity 
of his definition demonstrates, ironically, precisely that tendency 
Wolff had described for a priori constructions of possibility to deterio-
rate into "leere Worte" (or Leibniz's nominal definitions). Hence poe-
sis, as we have already seen in the context of Gottsched's notion of 
metaphor, can have no role to play in the formation of new knowl-
edge, a process Wolff explains in his discourse on "Erfindung." The 
function of poesis for Gottsched is merely to reinforce the "niitzliche 
moralische Wahrheit." Breitinger's notion of probability is also based 
on the concept of contradiction, but it is the work itself that must not 
contradict what is generally perceived to be true or thought to be 
possible. "Da nun die Poesie eine Nachahmung der Schopfung und 
der Natur nicht nur in dem Wiircklichen, sondern auch in dem Mo-
glichen ist, so muls ihre Dichtung, die eine Art der Schopfung ist, ihre 
Wahrscheinlichkeit entweder in der Uebereinstimmung mit den ge-
genwartiger Zeit eingefiihrten Gesetzen und dem Laufe der Natur 
griinden, oder in den Kraften der Natur, welche sie bey andern Ab-
sichten nach unsern Begriffen hatte ausiiben konnen" (1: 136-37, my 
emphasis). 
In the second chapter of the Critische Dichtkunst, "Erklarung der 
poetischen Mahlerey," Breitinger says (1: 47-48) that the task of the 
poet is to bring together distinct but previously unnoticed qualities of 
discrete objects in such a way that the resulting image moves the 
mind ("Gemiithe in ... Bewegung setzen [und] ... riihren"). The 
poet exercises his "Kraft zu erdichten" by taking known qualities and 
extrapolating them into a previously unknown image that is new, un-
usual, or wondrous. As a result, "der wahre Verdienst eines Poeten 
[bestehet] im wenigsten darinn, dais er ohne Wahlund Unterschied 
alles schildere, was in der Natur vorkommt, und es ist bey weitem 
nicht das vollkommenste Lob, wenn man gleich von seinen Wercken 
sagen kan, dais sie wahr, natiirlich und ahnlich seyn; die Poesie emp-
fangt ihre grolste Starcke und Schonheit von der geschickten Wahl der 
Bilder" (1 :84). Although selection and recombination were of course 
well-established mimetic techniques in Breitinger's day, they do not 
in his poetics serve the purpose of the idealization of nature as they 
had, for example, in the Renaissance. Instead, Breitinger is following 
the principle of analogic transfer of the known to the unknown out-
lined by Wolff in his discussion of a priori invention. The poetic effect 
is heightened whenever the analogy is strained to its apparent limit. 
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At that point the image is wondrous, that is, it appears to stand in 
actual contradiction to the presently known: "Folglich hat das Wun-
derbare fiir den Verstand immer einen Schein der Falschheit; weil es 
mit den angenommenen Satzen desselben in einem offenbaren Wider-
spruch zu stehen scheinet," (1: 131, my emphasis). Breitinger stresses 
the apparent nature of the contradiction because he wants to claim, 
in keeping with Wolff's insistence on the a posteriori aspect of inyen-
tion, that "das Wunderbare muB immer au£ die wiirckliche oder die 
m6gliche Wahrheit gegriindet seyn, wenn es von der Liigen unter-
schieden seyn und uns ergetzen soll" (1: 131). 81 In Breitinger's view, 
unlike in Gottsched's, the poetic concepti~ is not mere "Jr:rdichtung" 
alone; it must always refer back to the existing configuration of 
knowledge, even as it advances beyond it. 
The application to poesis of this Wolffian process of invention is 
most evident in a passage from the chapter "Von dem Wunderbaren 
und dem Wahrscheinlichen," where Breitinger sets forth how proba-
bility is recognized when confronting the wondrous image: 
Das widersinnige Aussehen einer solchen [wunderbaren] 
Vorstellung ziehet unsere Aufmercksamkeit nothwendig an 
sich, und verheisset unserer Wissens-Begirde eine 
wichtige und nahmhafte Vermehrung: Die nachfolgende 
Beschaftigung des Gemiithes, da es die Vorstellungen mit 
seinen Begriffen und angenommenen Satzen vergleichet, da 
es durcq. den Schein der Falschheit durchdringet, und in 
dem vermeinten Widerspruch eine Uebereinstimmung und 
Vollkommenheit entdecket, muB nothwendig angenehm und mit 
Ergetzen verkniipfet seyn; zumahlen da diese Entdeckung die 
unschuldige List des Poeten recht verwundersam machet, und 
unsere Eigenliebe und vortheilhaftige Meinung von unserer 
eigenen Geschicklichkeit speiset. 
(1: 141-42) 
Through a process of comparison with the presently known ("Begrif-
fen und angenommenen Satzen"), the probability is established of 
the apparently impossible ("vermeinter Widerspruch") that has been 
represented in the work. During such an analysis ("Beschaftigung 
des Gemiithes"), the wondrous comes to be apprehended not as a 
possibility in itself but as a possible part of a larger series of assump-
tions and concepts. By working out this probability, one establishes 
com possibility. 82 
When the compossibility (i.e., probability) of the vision presented 
by the poetic work is recognized, it is held to be compatible with the 
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existing intellective structure or with existing "attitudes." Compati-
bility with the present world does not mean, however, that the work 
simply reproduces existing knowledge, for the wondrous vision is a 
new vision. 83 It is a glimpse into the possible and the future ("das 
Mogliche und Zukiinftige," 1: 61)-the realization of probable reality. 
As the assimilation of new perception into our consciousness, it is an 
act of apperception in Leibniz's sense of the term: the process of fo-
cusing that is continually underway in the system of monads as they 
assume varying perspectives. 
The "Gemiithes-Bewegung" (1: 83, 85, etc.) that accompanies ev-
ery encounter with the wondrous represents a pleasurable increase 
in knowledge in that "Wissens-Begierde" is satisfied. "Wissens-
Begierde" is the need for new visions that flows out of the principe 
interne, our innate desire ("angebohrene Begierde," 1: 61) for pos-
sibilities, novelty, and things of the future. Its parallel concept in 
Leibniz's system is appetition, the source of new perceptual integra-
tion. The new and unusual therefore exerts by itself a special power 
over the mind: "1st die Materie, die der Poet erwehlet hat, mit einer 
eigenthiimlichen verwundersamen Neuheit begabet, so wird sie das 
Gemiithe durch ihre eigene Kraft, auch ohne die Hiilfe der Kunst, 
einnehmen und entziickenlf (1: 293). But these "new things" belong 
to the possible worlds: "der Verdienst eines Poeten [besteht] vor-
nehmlich in der ... Erfindung solcher Materien ... welche vor sich 
selbst gantz neu, fremd und wunderbar sind, und ohne die Hiilfe der 
Kunst durch ihre eigene Kraft die Gemuther einnehmen und ent-
ziicken, von welcher Art alle diejenigen sind, die der Poet aus der 
Welt der moglichen Dinge mittelst der Erdichtungs-Kraft nach den 
Regeln des Wahrscheinlichen herholet" (1:294-95). The rules of 
probability are important because they ensure that the wondrous pos-
sibles will not just flash before our eyes as an entertaining diversion 
but will also be integratable into the existing structure of conscious-
ness. "Was die Erdichtung und Aufstellung gantz neuer Wesen und 
neuer Gesetze anbelanget, so hat der Poet diefsfalls eine grosse Vor-
sicht und Behutsamkeit zu gebrauchen, dafs das Wunderbare nicht 
unglaublich werde und allen Schein der Wahrheit verliehre. Er muB 
darum, seine Freyheit zu erdichten, wenigst nach dem Wahne des 
gr6Jsten Haufens der Menschen einschrancken, und nichts vorbrin-
gen, als was er weifs, daB es schon einigermaaJsen in demselben ge-
griindet ist" (1: 137). As a Wolffian writing in a period in which a 
German literary critical terminology was only j\lst emerging, Breitin-
ger uses "Erdichtung" and "Erfindung" interchangeably, but the pro-
cess he describes is what Wolff had called "Erfindung," the constant 
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interplay between a priori intuitions and a posteriori comparisons, be-
tween "Witz" and "Verstand," between the wondrous and the prob-
able that occurs in the mind of the poet and the recipient alike. 
Breitinger takes his possibles more seriously than Gottsched does, 
because he envisions a more serious and significant function for lit-
erature than Gottsched had. In Breitinger's poetics, the confrontation 
with possible worlds involves the development (Bildung) of individual 
and communal consciousness in the assimilation of probable visions 
of truth. In Gottsched's system, hypothetical worlds are vehicles for 
conveying sententia. Breitinger is interested in the dynamic relation 
between poesis and the perfectibility of the world, Gottsched in the 
replication and transmission of an already existing universal perfec-
tion. Breitinger's linking of poetic probability to the "Wahne des 
grolsten Haufens der Menschen" has been viewed as an abandon-
ment of poetic truth to relativity. But his reflection on probability is 
in fact an elaboration of Wolff's "Kunst zu erfinden" in terms of the 
complex relatio;n between possible truths and established truth, new 
experience and existing intellective structures, and finally, between 
poets and their audiences. Hence we turn now to the problem of po-
etic reception. 
3. Poetic Reception and 
la vraisemblance historique 
German literary historians have tended to view the Critische Dicht-
kunst exclusively as a "Wirkungspoetik." Breitinger is said to be par-
ticularly indebted to Dubos, from whom he adopted the primacy of 
"feeling" or "sense experience" in aesthetic reception. Wolfgang 
Bender, author of the "Nachwort" in the Metzler reprint of the Cri-
tische Dichtkunst, says Breitinger takes from Dubos "die Lehre vom 
Riihrenden," and notes Breitinger's appropriation ("wortliche An-
lehnung"),of Dubos's sentence: "S'il est permis de parler ainsi, l' esprit 
est d'un commerce plus difficile que le coeur" (1.8.63). 1 But Bender 
is too timid in his estimation, for a considerable portion of the first 
six chapters of the Critische Dichtkunst was-to use the eighteenth-
century expression-"stolen" from Dubos. 
The precise nature of Breitinger's reliance on Dubos has in fact 
never been thoroughly examined. In the following pages I attempt to 
show not only how Breitinger absorbs the neoclassic ideas of Dubos, 
principally his notion of la vraisemblance historique, but also how he 
transforms them. Neoclassicism, as we have seen in the case of 
Gottsched, conceives of the recipient as a medium on which nature, 
or the work, imprints its images. Although Dubos has a far more 
sophisticated concept of the recipient than Gottsched did, he none-
theless holds to the recipient's essential passivity. Breitinger, on 
the other hand, envisions a productive role for recipients that is 
grounded in their intellective participation in the poetic experience. 
How he arrives at this conception, however, can only be understood 
by reviewing some of the assumptions of Neoclassicism proper. 2 
Neoclassic Distortions of Aristotle's Poetics 
The neoclassic concept of reception, that is, the relation between the 
work and its audience, was determined by the concept of vraisem-
blance, or probability. 3 The popular notion of this relation is based in 
part on the criticism of the modernes (Figure 3). For both the neoclassic 
anciens and the modernes, art was the imitation of nature. At issue 
62 






~author---►► "Slavish Copy" 
~ Recipient 
between them was the definition of nature: the modernes, such as Cor-
neille and his nephew Fontenelle, believed that the anciens confused 
"nature" with its depiction by ancient authors, and that the poet 
would do better to imitate le vrai rather than "pagan fictions" or the 
"merely probable." 4 The conflict is summed up by Boileau in a fa-
mous gibe at Corneille in his Art poetique: 
Jamais au spectateur n'offrez rien d'incroyable 
Le vrai peut quelque fois n'etre pas vraisemblable. 5 
A modernist restatement of this rhyme would have it claim that a 
believable representation based on convention is preferable to an un-
believable but accurate representation. Indeed the anciens also de-
fined the probable as convention, as "tout ce qui est conforme a !'opi-
nion du public." 6 But Boileau is interested less in convention for its 
own sake than in believability, of which convention can be a means. 
Credibility is important because without it the poem will miss its (di-
dactic) effect. Thus Boileau continues his rhyme: 
Une merveille absurde est pour moi sans appas: 
L'esprit n'est point emu de ce qu'il ne croit pas. 
(339) 
For the recipient to be affected, he must believe that what he sees 
is probable, or like the truth, that is, verisimilar. Neoclassic decorum 
is based on this: 
Quiconque voit bien l'homme, et, d'un esprit profond, 
De tant de coeurs caches a penetre le fond; 
Qui sait bien ce que c'est qu'un prodigue, un avare, 
Un honnete homme, un fat, un jaloux, un bizarre, 
Sur une scene heureuse il peut les etaler, 
Et les faire a nos yeux vivre, agir et parler. 
(372) 
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In addition to. the "correct" drawing of character, decorum also in-
cluded the use of historical realism, a notion that French Neoclassi-
cism inherited from Scaliger. 7 Boileau writes: 
Conservez a chacun son propre caractere. 
Des siecles, des pays etudiez les moeurs: 
Les climats font souvent les diverses humeurs. 
(347) 
Because, however, the overriding concern of the anciens was the 
probable, and not the true, what could only be at issue in such a 
"realism" was whether the poetic depiction appeared to conform to 
"les moeurs et les climats"; whether such images actually conformed 
to historical reality would be irrelevant. The poetic representation 
therefore would not present historical information about a given 
country or period but would tend rather to reinforce the recipient's 
already defined view of the time and place in question, which he 
likely simply viewed as analogous to his own. 8 Any attempted fidelity 
to historical truth was of interest not because of the desire to preserve 
the integrity of a given epoch, but to assure the acceptance by the 
audience of the poet's vision .. Such acceptance would follow if the 
audience believed that the poet had made a faithful copy of "nature," 
that is, "les temps et lE:s moeurs des personnages." 
The essential circularity of this position points out the crux of the 
neoclassic concept of le vraisemblable. Probability means that recipients 
see in the work what both they and the author see in "nature" (how-
ever this latter term may be defined). The corresponding term on the 
level of poetic production is "imitation of nature," which assumes an 
act of precise seeing in which both author and recipient participate. 
Reception becomes, in the neoclassic context, a category for explain-
ing the relationship (i.e., functional identity) between poets and their 
audience. This relationship is diagrammed in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. 
It should be noted in passing that this identity of position vis-a-vis 
nature and work also explains, in a somewhat fairer way than in Fig-
ure 3, the neoclassic interest in literary models. Such interest is based 
on the belief that authors are also recipients. The dotted lines in Fig-
ures 4 and 5 refer to seeing, or "reception"; the solid lines refer to 
seeing that ends in production. Both the author and the recipient are 
in an identical position from which to compare the work (the "imita-
tion of nature") with nature itself. The author's relation to the work is 
active, the recipient's is passive, but both are engaged in a process of 
comparing one with the other. A work produced in imitation of an-
other "imitation of nature" (i.e., imitatio instead of mimesis) could be 
compared with both nature and with the model, whereby poets 
would be both the recipient of a previous work and the creator of their 
own work. To reflect the authorial role of the recipient, Figure 4 could 
be modified to produce the diagram in Figure 5. 
The neoclassic concept of probability, which assumes the mutual 
participation of author and recipient in an act of precise seeing, 
was not only shared but radicalized by the modernes. This neoclassic 
version of probability in turn informs Breitinger's notion of "das 
Wahrscheinliche" and poetic reception. It is therefore necessary to 
examine in more detail the "original" neoclassic concept of proba-
bility in order to trace its subsequent transformation. 
The author of Les Reflexibns sur la poetique de ce temps et sur les ouv-
rages des poetes anciens et modernes, Rene Rapin, believes he is faithfully 
adhering to Aristotle in his discussion of probability: 
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La vray-semblance sert ... a donner aux choses que dit le poete 
un plus grand air de perfection que ne pourroit faire la verite 
mesme, quoique la vray-semblance n'en soit que la copie. Car la 
verite ne fait les choses que comme elles sont; et la vray-sem-
blance les fait comme elles doivent estre. La verite est presque 
toujours defectueuse, par le melange des conditions singulieres, 
qui la composent. 11 ne naist rien au monde qui ne s'eloigne de 
la perfection de son idee en y naissant. 11 faut chercher des ori-
ginaux et des modeles, dans la vray-semblance et dans les prin-
cipes universels des choses: ou il n'entre rien de materiel et de 
singulier qui les corrompe. C'est par la que les portraits de l'his-
toire sont moins parfaits que les portraits de la poesie: que So-
phocle qui represente dans ses tragedies les hommes, comme ils 
doivent estre, est au sentiment d' Aristote, preferable a Euripide 
qui represente les hommes comme ils sont. 
(41) 
Nowhere in the Poetics, however, does Aristotle say he "prefers" 
Sophocles. In fact, he says precisely the opposite: Euripides is "the 
most tragic of the poets" because of his ability to construct plots (cf. 
Poetics, 13.10). Rapin makes this mistake because he (or the tradition 
out of which he is writing) has conflated two entirely different pas-
sages from the Poetics: the comparison of Sophocles and Euripides in 
chapter 25, and the distinction between history and poetry in chapter 
· 9. In chapter 25, Aristotle gives three possible sources for poetic rep-
resentation: "things as they were or are; or things as they are said and 
seem to be; or things as they should be" (25.3). Since all of these 
alternatives are equally usable in poetry, they may all be treated ac-
cording to probability. Later in chapter 25 Aristotle identifies Euripi-
des with the first, and Sophocles with the third alternative, whereby 
no judgment is made, contrary to Rapin's assumption, as to whether 
Sophocles' plots were "more probable" or "more perfect" than those 
of Euripides. 
Rapin likely thought Aristotle was carrying forth his argument 
from chapter 9, an argument that Rapin nevertheless also fundamen-
tally misunderstands. There Aristotle says that poesis is more "seri-
ous" or "philosophic" (<T1rov8au:>n:po~), not "more perfect," than his-
tory because poesis tells what might happen and history what 
actually happened (9.3). "What might happen" means what a given 
sort of man would probably say or do. "What has happened" means 
what a particular individual has actually said or done (9.4). This does 
not mean, Aristotle continues, that historical actions may not be used 
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in poesis: "For there is nothing to prevent some actual occurrences 
being the sort of thing that would probably or inevitably happen, and 
it is in virtue of that that he the [poet] is their 'maker' [1rot7JT71s-]" (9.10, 
emphasis in original). Rapin, however, assumes that Aristotle in-
tended a radical break between historical "things" ("les choses comme 
elles sont") and poetic "things" ("les choses comme elles doivent 
estre"). Moreover, Rapin endows his distinction with a sort of meta-
physical cast, implying that "la copie" actually "returns" the object of 
poetic representation to its more perfect original "ideal" form, which 
it lost through its birth into the world. Yet the notion that singular 
material objects are "corruptions" of universal forms is a thoroughly 
Plotinian concept and has nothing to do with Aristotle's distinction 
in the Poetics between the particular and the general. 9 
It is significant that Rapin's interpretation of chapter 25 does not 
represent an idiosyncratic reading of the text. Andre Dacier, for ex-
ample, has this to say about the passage in question: 
C' est a mon avis, le sens de ce passage qui est tres remarquable, 
en ce qu'il nous apprend, que du temps meme de Sophocle & 
d'Euripide, ii y avoit des gens qui trouvoient que le premier fla-
toit trop ses principaux personnages, & que l' autre les flatoit trop 
peu. En effet Sophocle tachoit de rendre ses imitations parfaites, 
en suivant toujours bien plus ce qu'une belle Nature etoit capable 
de faire, que ce qu'elle faisoit. Au lieu qu'Euripide ne travailloit 
qu'a les rendre semblables, en consultant d'avantage ce que cette 
meme Nature faisoit que ce qu'elle etoit capable de faire. 10 
Although Dacier does not mention the "vray-semblable" in Rapin's 
sense (Dacier's "semblable" means something like "copied natural-
istically"), his understanding of chapter 25 matches Rapin's in two 
. respects. First, Sophocles' imitations were "parfaites" because they 
copied the ideal ("la belle Nature") rather than the existent. Sec-
ond, and most important, the categories "things-that-might-be" and 
"things-that-are" refer to two-separate-states of Nature (which can 
be copied), and not, as in Aristotle, to two kinds of representation 
(i.e., history or poetry) whose objects may, but need not, coincide. 
The most important implication of the radical break between his-
torical "things" and poetic "things" is the transformation of proba-
bility from a quality of the representation into a quality of the "thing" 
represented. Whereas for Aristotle probability results from the way 
the plot is constructed, for Rapin it is a quality inherent in a particular 
object that renders it appropriate for poetic depiction, Rapin's syntax 
betrays as much: "la vray-semblance sert a donner aux choses . ... " 11 
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But his deviation from Aristotelian probability is most clearly re-
vealed in a later passage of his Reflexions in which he discusses what 
he finds to be "ce qu'il ya de plus grand et de plus noble dans la 
poesie" (71), that is, the epic. 
Although Rapin had earlier declared "vray-semblance" to be that 
which gives poesis "un plus grand air de perfection," he curiously 
neglects probability when discussing the abilities of authors of epic, 
"des plus parfaits genies" (72). They have, he says, "un discemement 
si exquis, une si parfaite connaissance de la langue ... une medita-
tion si profonde . . . "-the -list continues for about six to eight 
lines-but nowhere are they said to have the ability to make plots. In 
fact, plot and probability are totally divorced in his conception: 
Le prix de la poesie heroique est encore plus grand par sa matiere 
et par sa fin, que par la forme: elle ne parle que de rois et de 
princes; elle ne donne des lecons qu' aux Grands pour gouverner 
les peuples; et elle propose l'idee d'une vertu bien plus parfaite 
que l'histoire laquelle ne propose la vertu qu'imparfaite, comme 
elle est dans les particuliers: et la poesie la propose sans aucune 
imperfection, et comme elle doit estre en general. Ce qui a fait 
dire a Aristote que la poesie est une meilleure ecole de la vertu 
que la philosophie mesme: parce qu' elle va plus droit a la perfec-
tion, par la vray-semblance, que la philosophie n'y va par lave-
rite, parce que le poete ne rend jamais raison de ce qu'il dit, 
comme fait le philosophe, mais il la fait sentir, sans le dire. 
(74, my emphasis) 
Rapin here again probably has in mind the sentences from chapter 
9 of the Poetics, in which Aristotle states that poetry is more philo-
sophic than history because poetry reveals the causes of events, 
whereas history (i.e., chronology) can only record t~e sequence of 
particular moments and not their connection (cf. 9.11). Rapin cor-
rectly associates Aristotle's notion of philosophic activity with the 
study of causes, but he confuses completely the point of Aristotle's 
comparison of history and poetry. He therefore locates the general 
not in the articulation of causes, that is, not in the plot, but rather in 
the identification between poet and recipient, in which the recipient 
feels ("sentir") the poet's "raison," or meaning. 12 In view of Rapin's 
already demonstrated misapprehension of ~hapter 9, one must won-
der whether he was merely trying to "improve" on Aristotle's text, or 
whether he understood that he was asserting the exact opposite of 
what Aristotle meant. At any rate, his departure from the Aristotelian 
concept of probability could hardly be more profound. 
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Whether Rapin "violates" the Aristotelian meaning is less interest-
ing than how he modifies the earlier concepts for neoclassic purposes. 
When probability ceases to be the essential element of plot, and be-
comes instead a quality of the objects of poetic representation, its 
definition becomes arbitrary, and its presence or absence in the poetic 
work a matter of individual preference. Rapin defines the probable as , 
"tout ce qui est conforme a I' opinion du public," whereby "public" is 
of course not to be confused with "peuple" (39). "L'opinion public" 
defers to the example set by the "Anciens," who knew best how to 
depict "de grandes pensees et ... de grands sentimens" (46). That 
Rapin did not appreciate the arbitrary nature of this definition is clear 
from his attempt to ground the rules of decorum in what he viewed 
as an ultimately inscrutable universal: "le coeur de l'homme." 13 
The modernist attack on the neoclassic position did not challenge 
the conception of the probable itself, but only its content. That is, the 
modernes continued to view the probable as a quality of the objects of 
poetic representation, but they defined this quality differently. In his 
Reflexions sur la poetique of 1691, Fontenelle echoes Aristotle's history-
poesis distinction, but his interpretation departs as much from Aris-
totelian thinking as had Rapin's. "Le vrai,et le vraisemblable sont as-
sez differens. Le vrai est tout ce qui est; le vraisemblable est ce que 
nous jugeons qui peut etre, et nous n' en jugeons que par de certaines 
idees qui resultent de nos experiences ordinaires. Ainsi, le vrai a in-
finiment plus d'etendue que le vraisemblable, puisque le vraisembla-
ble n' est qu'une petite portion du vrai, conforme a la plupart de nos 
experiences." 14 Fontenelle substitutes "nos experiences" for Rapin's 
"l' opinion public," with the important result that the object of poetic 
representation (i.e., not the purpose but the thing), the probable, be-
comes historicized. This means that Rapin's abstract idealized univer-
sals, "les choses comme ils doivent etre," become a series of "con-
crete" (i.e., already seen and felt) particulars: "ce qui ... peut etre." 
Fontenelle then identifies the probable with the possible, by simply 
leaping from one term to the other, whereby "possible" is also his-
toricized. Thus, for the possible he very nearly repeats the defini-
tion he had just given the probable. The possible is that which we 
have already seen (experienced), and therefore believe can happen 
again: "II faut, pour etre re<_;u, que [le vraisemblable] se rapporte a 
nos idees communes. Incertains que nous sommes, et avec beaucoup 
de raison, sur l'infinie possibilite des choses, nou~ n'admettons pour 
possibles que celles qui ressemblent a ce que nous voyons souvent" 
(22). 15 The most rigorously probable representations are "extreme-
ment connu" (23). 
70 Poetic Reception 
Fontenelle's poetics introduce a "quantification" of probability: the 
most probable literary representation describes events that we have 
seen the most often, and therefore determine to be the "most pos-
sible" or lifelike. 16 Moreover, Fontenelle does not limit "nos experi-
ences" to what any given individual has witnessed. The term is ap-
plied as well to the cumulative experience of an entire culture 
manifest in its historical record. "Nos experiences" then takes on the 
double meaning of "how much of the historical record (i.e., witnesses 
of past events) has been witnessed (i.e., read or heard) by present 
individuals." The best candidates for poetic repr-esentation are "des 
sujets connus," such as the life of Pompey. Less satisfying but still 
acceptable objects are the stories "peu connu," which should none-
theless be "du moins vrais et historiques, comme le Cid et Polyeucte." 
As a last resort, the poet should use stories where at least the names 
are historical, if nothing else (22). 
Fontenelle's use of "nos experiences" (or history) as the criterion 
for evaluating poetic probability could not destroy, as he undoubtedly 
hoped it would, the attachment to litfrary convention among the an-
ciens. His critique was not fundamental, and his notion of probability 
merely replaces ancient with modern convention, as is evident from 
his definition of decorum: "si les personnages ne sont pas connus par 
l'histoire, les characteres doivent etre pris sur l'idee que l'on a com-
munement de leur condition, de leur age, de leur pays, etc." (23). On 
its face the statement is simple enough: if no specific historical infor-
mation is available on which to base the poetic characterization ( or if 
the characters are fictional, which means the same thing for Fonte-
nelle anyway), one should draw them according to generally held 
views about their class, period, country, and so forth. What Fonte-
nelle fails to discuss, but which is already implicit in his own defini-
tion of probability, is the source of this "l'idee que I' on a commune-
ment." The syntax of the passage suggests that the characters are 
drawn either historically or according to a vague "l'idee," whereby 
the idea appears almost ex nihilo. Indeed when this passage is taken 
in context with the entire essay, Fontenelle does not seem to realize, 
in the truly "modern" sense, that the idea can only be a product of 
history, even if it is ultimately based on information that is inaccurate 
or incomplete. Thus he eventually reverts to a completely neoclassic 
conception of decorum, based on a "timeless" standard, namely that 
of the present. 17 
A far more radical historicization of probability than Fontenelle 
himself attempted was carried out by Dubos and, later, by Breitinger. 
The Reflexions critiques sur la poesie et sur la peinture of 1719 attacks 
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· Fontenelle at certain specific points (though his name is usually not 
mentioned). These occasional disagreements with Fontenelle do not 
hinder Dubos, however, from conducting his discussion of poetic 
probability with the same terms that Fontenelle had used. "La pre-
miere regle que les Peintres & les Poetes soient tenus d' observer en 
traitant le sujet qu'ils ont choisi, c' est de n'y rien mettre qui soit 
contre la vrai-semblance. Les hommes ne s<;auroient etres gueres tou-
che d'un evenement qui leur paroit sensiblement impossible" 
(1.28.236). In keeping with the neoclassic tradition, Dubos does not 
refer probability to the plot but to the "thing" (in this case, "un ev-
enement"), which is "put into" the work ("y mettre"). Dubos's full 
definition of the probable-possible reveals his points of contact and 
his differences both with Fontenelle and with the Aristotelian base of 
ideas that is ultimately his source. "Un fait vrai-semblable est un fait 
possible dans les circonstances ou on le fait arriver. Ce qui est impos-
sible en ces circonstances ne s<;auroit paroitre vrai-semblable. Je n'en-
tens pas ici par impossible ce qui est au-dessus des forces humaines, 
mais ce qui paroit impossible, meme en se pretant a toutes les sup-
positions que le Poete s<;auroit faire" (l.28.237) .. Dubas appears to de-
fine probability in terms of a (vaguely Aristotelian) set of circum-
stances, or plot. But unlike Aristotle, the poet in Dubos's account is 
not making the circumstances, but placing ("fait arriver") the poetic 
event ("un fait") within a set of already existing circumstances. The 
passage continues: "Comme le Poete est en droit d'exiger de nous que 
nous trouvions possible tout ce qui paroissoit possible dans les terns 
ou il met sa Scene, et ou il transporte en quelque fa<;on ses Lecteurs: 
nous ne pouvons point, par exemple, !'accuser de manquer a la vrai-
semblance, en supposant que Diane enleve lphigenie au moment 
qu'on alloit la sacrifier, pour la transporter dans la Tauride. L'evene-
ment etoit possible, suivant la Theologie des Grecs de ce terns-la" 
(1.28.237-38). 
The statement might be construed as simply one more neoclassic 
reference to decorum based on "les temps et les lieux" such as can be 
found in Boileau, Rapin, Pope, and any number of others. Dubas, 
however, means here something rather different. Neoclassicism in its 
more trivial form (Rapin) locates probability in "l' opinion public" 
(which usually means "l' opinion des Grecs" as intepreted by the 
French critic); Fontenelle's version of neoclassic probability is based 
on what we think is possible given what we have ourselves seen or 
what we know about the past. Probability for Dubas is based on what 
the past epoch itself (or the foreign culture) thought was possible or 
usual. 
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For example, when Dubos takes his turn with one of the topoi of 
early eighteenth-century criticism, the issue of whether Homer was 
"right" to show Hector conversing with his horses, Dubos fills six 
pages of his book (2.37.546-52) with anecdotal historical evidence 
showing that conversations with animals, and especially with horses, 
were completely unexceptional in Phrygia, where Hector was raised, 
and in "l' Asie" (Dubos's term is a bit general here), where the horse 
conversation in the Iliad is set. In an earlier passage, Dubos had coun-
tered another criticism of Homer with the same kind of argument. "Si 
les Heros d'Homere ne se battent pas en duel aussi-tot qu'ils se sont 
querellez, c'est qu'ils n'avoient pas sur le point d'honneur le senti-
ment des Gots ni de leurs pareils" (2.37.542). 18 
Dubos creates a new category of probability, which one might .call 
the relative probable, and which Dubos himself refers to as "la vrai-
semblance historique" (1.28.242; 29.253; etc.). In effect, he has super-
imposed Aristotle's concept of plot onto history itself. In order to de-
cide on the probability of a given part of a work, "un fait," we do not 
refer this part back to the structure of the work but to the historical 
"plot," the historical context of which it is supposed to be a partial 
depiction. 
Je s<_;ais bien que le faux est quelquefois plus vrai-semblable que 
le vrai. Mais nous ne reglons pas notre croi'ance touchant les faits 
sur leur vrai-semblance metaphysique, ou sur le pied de leur pos-
sibilite: c'est sur la vrai-semblance historique. Nous n'examinons 
pas ce qui devoit arriver plus probablement, mais ce que les te-
moins necessaires, ce que les Historiens racontent; & c' est leur 
recit & non pas la vrai-semblance qui determine notre croiance. Ainsi 
nous ne croi:ons pas l' evenement qui est le plus vrai-semblable & 
le plus possible, mais celui qu'ils nous disent etre veritablement 
arrive. Leur deposition etant la regle de notre croi'ance sur les faits, 
ce qui peut etre contraire a leur deposition ne s<_;auroit paroitre 
vrai-semblable. 
(1.28.242, my emphasis) 19 
The "synonyms" for Aristotle's terminus "plot" are "recit" and 
"deposition." 
Dubos does not provide us with a fully developed "modern" reflec-
tion on historiography. He does not, for example, question the inter-
pretive bias of the historian, and the eventual discrepancy between 
"facts" and "interpretation." Fundamental skepticism concerning the 
possibility of even distinguishing "facts" and "interpretation" is not 
present in his treatise. He simply accepts the historical record for 
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what it is: our only source of knowledge about the past, which we 
can and should believe. Given this assumption, the task of the critic 
is to decide on the probability of literary works (or their elements, it 
does not much matter) based on the historical context of the period 
in which they were written or which they are intended to portray 
("paint") . 20 
In keeping with this task, the Reflexions critiques often more resem-
bles an encyclopedia of early eighteenth-century historical knowledge 
and anthropological lore than a treatise on poetics. Imitation of nature 
seems to mean for Qubos imitation of history. As a result, Dubas 
refers to historical accuracy in paintings (e.g., characters should 
be drawn in surroundings appropriate to their period) as "la vrai-
semblance poetique" (cf. 1.30.255). Presumably this is merely a trans-
fer of the term "decorum" from literature to a visual art, and indeed 
poetic probability-that is, the probability of the literary work-is 
called "la vrai-semblance historique." 
Dubos and Breitinger 
The presence of the Reflexions critiques in the Critische Dichtkunst is far 
more pervasive than has previously been recognized. Occasionally 
Breitinger will acknowledge that a passage comes from "der scharf-
sinnige Herr Diibos." At other times he introduces his borrowing 
with "man hat angemercket, dais ... ," while on still other occasions 
he simply uses what Dubas wrote as if it were his own. Whole pages 
may be excised, or Breitinger may insert an isolated sentence.21 More 
important than how much Breitinger might have taken from Dubas, 
however, is the question of what he did with what he took. 
The sixth chapter of the Critische Dichtkunst, "Von dem Wunder-
baren und dem Wahrscheinlichen," has two main divisions. The first 
part is a theoretical reflection; the second contains commentaries on 
literary examples drawn from both ancient and modern poets. This 
first section is what most concerns us here. It is written partially in 
Breitinger's words, but approximately thirty percent of the text is 
adapted from the chapter on poetic probability by Dubas that we 
have just examined. 
Breitinger's definition of the probable appears to be his own inter-
pretation of or variation on the definition given by Dubas. He shares 
with Dubas the notion of probability as historical possibility, that is, 
as determined by what we know to be true or to have been true under 
certain circumstances. "Ich verstehe <lurch das Wahrscheinliche in 
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der Poesie alles, was nicht von einem andern widerwartigen Begriff, 
oder fur wahr angenommenen Satze ausgeschlossen wird, was nach 
unsren Begriffen eingerichtet zu seyn, mit unsrer Erkenntnifs und 
dem Wesen der Dinge und dem Laufe der Natur iibereinzukommen, 
scheinet; hiemit alles, was in gewissen Umstanden und unter gewis-
sen Bedingungen nach dem Urtheil der Verstandigen moglich ist, 
und keinen Widerspruch in sich hat" (1: 134). 
Breitinger differs from Dubos by generalizing the field of objects 
available for representation. Thus while Dubos was interested pri-
marily in historical circumstances, Breitinger gives "Wesen der 
Dinge" and "Lau£ der Natur" as poetic objects; whereas Dubos was 
concerned with "ce que les Historiens racontent," Breitinger says we 
should align ourselves with "dem Urtheil der Verstandigen." A cur-
sory reading of Breitinger's definition might suggest that he is re-
verting to exactly that category of probability that Dubos had just 
rejected: "la vrai-semblance metaphysique." But this is not what Brei-
tinger means at all: "Man muls also das Wahre des Verstandes und 
das Wahre der Einbildung wohl unterscheiden; es kan dem Verstand 
etwas falsch zu seyn diincken, das die Einbildung fur wahr annimmt: 
Hingegen kan der Verstand etwas fur wahr erkennen, welches der 
Phantasie als unglaublich vorkommt" (1: 138). Breitinger is comment-
ing here on the same problem in Aristotle-the "impossible prob-
able" -that had moved Dubos to distinguish between metaphysical 
and historical probability. 22 But Breitinger changes one highly signifi-
cant term. The sentence just quoted continues: ". . . und darum ist 
gewils, dais das Falsche bisweilen wahrscheinlicher ist, als das Wahre. 
Das Wahre des Verstandes gehoret fur die Weltweisheit, hingegen 
eignet der Poet sich das Wahre der Einbildung zu" (1: 139). The sub-
stitution Breitinger makes is the exchange of "la vrai-semblance his-
torique" for "das Wahre der Einbildung." 
In context, this seems not so crucial. Breitinger had, on his previous 
page, provided a list of the standards used by the imagination in mak-
ing its determinations about the true, the false, and the probable. He 
calls these standards the "Grundsatze des Wahnes" ("Wahn" here in 
its older meaning of "Meinung," "Glaube"), of which there are five: 
historical witness; sense impressions; tales generally accepted by the 
common people ("dem grolsen Haufen") over several generations; ex-
aggerations or understatements (i.e., ones that are acceptable); and 
events that have happened before and can therefore [!] happen again 
(1: 138). The list appears to be a simple categorization of Dubos's cri-
teria for poetic probability. But Breitinger is radicalizing Dubos's con-. 
cept of historical knowledge still further by applying it not just to 
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poetic probability, but to a general psychological phenomenon, that 
is, the development and absorption of knowledge over time. Here we 
must compare briefly Breitinger's purpose with that of Neoclassicism 
proper. 
The sharp distinction between the mind and the heart, expressed 
in Breitinger's terms "Verstandeswahrheit" and "das Wahre der Ein-
bildung," runs throughout Neoclas'sicism. Its clearest formulation is 
perhaps Pascal's famous analysis in the Pensees of "l' esprit de geo-
metrie" and "l'esprit de finesse." 23 Dubos refers to the split in the 
sentence quoted in the opening paragraph of this chapter and re-
peated so often in Breitinger commentaries because it is tpought that 
this was one of Breitinger's few exact borrowings. 
For Rapin, poetry was able to approach the workings of the heart 
in a way superior to philosophy, even though this approach proved 
to be based on little more than a quasi-mystical identification by the 
recipient with the poet's meaning. Thus his attitude toward "la coeur 
de l'homme" remained rather primitive, as is evident not only from 
his "mysticism" and his reliance on ancient depictions of "de grands 
sentimens," but also from his inability to explain the attraction of the 
poetic wondrous in any terms other than the perverse curiosity of the 
socially inferior: "Tout ce qui paroist incroyable est d'un grand ra-
goust a la curiosite du peuple. Car le peuple ... n'a que du mepris 
pour ce qui luy paroist commun et ordinaire: il n'aime que ce qui est 
prodigieux. Mais les sages ne peuvent rien souffrir d'incroyable" 
(38-39). Breitinger makes an observation containing deceptively simi-
lar diction but expressing a quite different intent: "Die Verwunderung 
und die Leichtglaubigkeit sind Tochter der Unwissenheit. Daher Heist 
der rohe und unwissende Pobel gemeiniglich die abentheurlichsten 
Erzehlungen von Hexen, Zauberern, weisen Frauen, Gespenstern, 
und die Romanen von den irrenden Rittern, mit dem groisten Er-
getzen, welches nicht geschehen konnte, wenn dieselben ihm un-
glaublich und unwahrscheinlich vorkamen" (1: 140). Breitinger's 
nearly Socratic view at this point in explaining the appeal of the won-
drous is inherited from Dubos: people are receptive to "lies" because 
they think, based on their experience (class, education, etc.), that 
they are true. 
Dubos himself tells us in his opening chapter that he wants to ex-
plain the paradox of the pleasure we take in artistic or theatrical rep-
resentations of sadness and horror, and our fascination in viewing 
pictures of things that would be otherwise repugnant. In addition to 
this broad psychological investigation ("rendre compte a chacun de 
son approbation & de ses degouts," 1.1.3), Dubos also sets himself 
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the task of explaining ("en Philosophe," 1.1.4) why paintings and 
poetic works have such an effect on us. The two issues are of course 
not isolated in his account, and his argument goes something like 
this: human beings need and want to be constantly stimulated. They 
would rather place themselves in actual danger than be forced to live 
without those experiences that excite the "movements'' of the heart. 
Because they have discovered, however, that the arts can provide the 
desired stimulation without the dangers and consequences presented 
by the sometimes horrible experiences of life, they allow themselves 
to become engaged by artistic representations, knowing that they 
thereby fulfill their needs without having to take the risks of real ex-
perience. The remainder of Dubos's treatise appears to be an amplifi-
cation of this explanation. His views on poetic probability qua histori-
cal possibility are presented in the context of the question: what kinds 
of representations are most likely to be believed, hence most likely to 
move the heart? It is easy to see the connection of this issue to his 
psychological argument. Because art is intended as a kind of replace-
ment for the stimulus of "real life," the closer it is to historical reality 
(without being this reality-because it must remain representation to 
remain harmless), the better it will fulfill its intended function. 24 
Dubos's argument is based on an assumption about human nature, 
namely, that the movements of the heart are essential to existence. 
Breitinger accepts this assumption, but he transforms it, and the na-
ture of this transformation indicates that he actually has considerable 
differences with Dubas despite his massive borrowings. A compari-
son of specific textual passages is necessaryto indicate what Breitinger 
did with what "der scharfsinnige Herr Dubas" offered him. 
The third chapter of the Critische Dichtkunst, "Von der Nachah-
mung der Natur," is pieced together from portions of the opening 
twelve (approximately) chapters of the first volume of the Reflexions 
critiques in which Dubas sets forth his thinking on the topic of imita-
tion. As might be expected from his interest in the pleasurable sen-
sations aroused by art, Dubas quotes (1.3.28) the often quoted pas-
sage from chapter 4 of the Poetics in which Aristotle explains the 
pleasure we take in viewing likenesses of objects from reality. Dubas 
does not include, however, Aristotle's explanation of why this should 
be the case, but only those opening lines in which Aristotle states the 
phenomenon (roughly: looking at likenesses of things in themselves 
painful to see causes us pleasure). Dubas then provides his own com-
mentary: "Le plaisir qu' on sent a voir les imitations que les Peintres 
& les Poets s~avent faire des objets qui auroient excite en nous des 
passions dont la realite nous auroit ete a charge, est un plaisir pur. II 
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n' est pas suivi des inconveniens dont les emotions serieuses qui au-
roient ete caus~es par l' objet meme, seroient accompagnees" (1.3.28). 
Breitinger quotes (1: 69) the same limited version of Aristotle, and 
paraphrases Dubos by saying that "die strengen Leidenschaften" are 
made "ertraglich, ja angenehm." Dubos then launches into a series 
of examples, half of which Breitinger omits. Breitinger picks up the 
text again at Dubos's mention of the death of Phaedra ("Une mort 
telle que la mort de Phedre ... ," 1.3.29, and "Eine Art Todes, wie 
der Phedra war ... ," 1: 69), and continues translating this lengthy 
example to the end ("l'affliction n'est, pour ainsi dire, que sur la su-
perficie de notre coeur ... etc.," 1.3.29, and "Die Betriibnill liget so 
zu sagen nur an dem Rande unsers Hertzens ... etc.," 1 :70). But 
whereas Dubos then wants to go on with what is little more than a 
restatement of points already covered ("Nous ecoutons done avec 
plaisir les hommes les plus malheureux ... ," 1.3.30), Breitinger in-
terrupts Dubos in order to raise another issue in his own text: "Fraget 
man nun, woher und auf welche Weise dieses Ergetzen entstehe, 
welche die geschickte Nachahmung der Kunst <lurch ihre eigenthiim-
liche Kraft zuwege bringet, so ist die Haupt-Ursache davon diejenige, 
welche Aristoteles im vierten Cap. seiner Poetik angiebt, weil man in 
einer geschickten und gliicklichen Nachahmung . . . allezeit etwas 
neues innen wird" (1 : 70.:... 71). 25 Breitinger then quotes in full the pas-
sage from 1.11.23-25 of the Rhetoric where Aristotle mentions art 
works in connection with the learning process that occurs when like-
nesses are examined. 26 
It would be too simple to claim that Breitinger favors "didactic" art 
and Dubos "entertaining" art, for Breitinger inserts Dubos's major 
statements about pleasure and artistic effect into the Critische Dicht-
kunst. Moreover, Breitinger's notion of the learning process cannot 
really be described in terms of a simple "sugar-coated pill" didacti-
cism, nor in terms of the a1ra8ia ideal of Renaissance Stoicism. In 
introducing the passage from the Rhetoric, Breitinger says that like-
nesses of objects arouse a thought process in us ("dem Geist Anlafs 
zu Ueberlegungen und Betrachtungen giebt," 1: 71), a process that is 
the centerpiece of his poetic theory. In order to appreciate fully his 
differences with Dubos on this issue, we must look at one more 
crucial "theft" from the Reflexions critiques, and Breitinger's treatment 
of it. 
The poetics of Dubos are based on "historical probability" and the 
possibility of vicarious experience through art. I have already pointed 
out the complementarity of these positions. A corollary to them that 
Dubos mentions in different formulations throughout the Reflexions 
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critiques is that the imitation of an object will have a weaker effect on 
us than that object itself would have had. Breitinger uses one of these 
passages in his own argument in his chapter on imitation: "Ich weils 
zwar wohl, dais sich zwischen dem Eindruck, welchen die Natur 
durch die Gegenwart ihrer Urbilder auf das Gemiithe wiircket, und 
demjenigen Eindruck, welchen auch die geschickteste Nachahmung 
der Kunst verursachet, allezeit welcher Unterschied befindet, aber 
dieses nicht in Ansehung der Art des Eindruckes, sondern in Anse-
hung seiner Kraft" (1: 64). 27 The idea appears to combine Plotinian 
notions with Renaissance Neoplatonist aesthetics: the procession 
"outward" from the One into the absolute multiplicity of base matter 
is also a field of force growing ever weaker as it emanates out of the 
ultimate source of power, (as this source "overflows" from pure po-
tentiality into intellection, soul, body, and, eventually, into matter). 
Each "level" or "degree" of emanation is a weaker form or "copy" of 
the previous degree. The work of art, as a material "copy" of the 
original object, is more removed from "reality" (the ultimate Reality · 
being the source of power, the One) than the object is, and will exert 
on our minds less force ("elle est moins fort" -Dubos) than the object 
itself would have. 28 
Now, Dubos had predicated his entire theory of vicarious emotion 
on precisely this point, and Breitinger follows him in this-a certain 
part of the way. Continuing where the previously quoted passage 
ended, he says, again translating Dubos: "denn da die Gegenstande 
der Natur eine wahre Wiircklichkeit haben, so muB ihre Wiirckung 
auch strenger, ernsthafter, und dauerhafter seyn; als die Wiirckung 
des nachgeahmten Bildes" (1: 64). 29 This is a quasi-metaphysical rea-
son (i.e., based on the structure of nature); then comes (Dubos's) 
psychological application of the principle to art: "und da ihre Absicht 
ist, <lurch diese nachgeahmten Riihrungen zu belustigen, so ist noth-
wendig, dais ihre Eindriicke in einem geringeren Grade streng und 
dauerhaft seyn ... indem alles Widrige und Unangenehme in den 
Gemiithes-Bewegungen von der Heftigkeit und Dauer derselben ent-
stehet" (1: 65). That is, the positive benefits of vicarious experience 
would be impossible if the effects of art were as strong as or stronger 
than those of reality. Breitinger then "interrupts" Dubos and presents 
his own interpretation of the discrepancy between the effect of the 
imitation and that of the object imitated: 
Unter den Mahlern ist denn derjenige der geschickteste Meister, 
der so lebhafte und entziikende Schildreyen verfertigt, dais die 
Zuseher sich eine Weile bereden, sie sehen das Urbild selbst ge-
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genwartig vor Augen .... Und unter den poetischen Mahlern 
verdienet ebenfalls derjenige den ersten Platz, der uns <lurch 
seine lebhaften und sinnlichen Vorstellungen so angenehm ein-
nehmen und beriicken kan, dais wir eine Zeitlang vergessen, wo 
wir sind, und ihm mit unserer Einbildungs-Kraft willig an den 
Ort folgen, wohin er uns <lurch die Kraft seiner Vorstellungen 
versetzen will. 
(1 :65) 
The passage apparently merely amplifies Dubos's point that those 
imitations are the most successful that have a strong effect, that move 
(in Dubos's sense: stir up passions in) the recipient. But the pass-
age conflicts with Dubos's belief in the superiority of painting over 
poetry. 30 Breitinger is leading in another direction altogether. "Die 
Nachahmung hat in der That mehr Kraft, die Aufmercksamkeit der 
Leute zu unterstiitzen, als die Natur selbst .... Die Copie ziehet uns 
starcker an sich, als das Original" (1 : 72). 
This is a reversal of "his" original position ( copied from Dubos) that 
imitations exert less force on the recipient than the object imitated. 
The very few pages between that original position and its reversal 
contain the two quotations from Aristotle and Breitinger's comments 
on them, which have already been discus.sed. Breitinger apparently 
wants to modify the position of Dubos into a more "Aristotelian" one 
(a problem taken up shortly), and it is highly significant that his re-
versal follows directly after his citation of those central passages from 
Aristotle on imitation and learning that Dubos omitted from his own 
discourse. 31 Moreover, Breitinger appears to be actually responding 
to Dubos inasmuch as his reversal is yet another "stolen" direct trans-
lation-but of a position Dubos had rhetorically set up to refute. 32 
One need not, however, rely on this particular section of the Cri-
tische Dichtkunst to document Breitinger's departure from Dubos. It is 
more evident in Breitinger's first chapter, "Vergleichung der Mahler-
Kunst und der Dicht-Kunst," in which he immediately sets out his 
own differences with the French critic from whom he took so much. 
Dubos was right, Breitinger says (1: 15-16), to show in chapter 40 of 
his first volume that painting has a more immediate effect on the re-
cipient because it works on the eye. But poetry is superior to painting 
precisely because it works more "slowly" than painting, and there-
fore produces images that are infinitely more complex: "So ist in der 
Poesie alles das Ergetzen, welches die andern Sinnen nur einzeln ge-
wahren konnen, zusammen vereinet. Der Poet mahlet nicht fur das 
Auge allein, sondern auch fur die iibrigen Sinnen" (1: 19). Hence, 
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whereas Dubos is interested in the various implications of art as 
spectacle, Breitinger is interested in literature as a method of gen-
erating knowledge, although not simply using the "sugar-coated 
pill" -which could not produce knowledge anyway but only transfer 
it from poet to recipient. 
The generation of knowledge is linked in Breitinger's account to the 
stronger effect on the mind of the imitation of an object than the ob-
ject itself. This emerges in what must be,one of the longest sentences 
of the entire Critische Dichtkunst: 
Denn indem dieser kiinstliche Mahler mit einem jeden Worte, als 
mit einem neuen Pinsel-Zuge, sein Gema.hide in der Phantasie 
des Lesers vollfiihret, und immer einen Begriff an den andern 
hinzusezet, so la.1st er demselben keine Freyheit, mit fliichtigem 
und ungewissem Gemiiths-Auge miissig herumzuschweifen, 
oder sich in der Vermischung des Mannigfaltigen zu verirren; 
sondern er bindet seine Aufmercksamkeit auf das Absonder-
liche, dessen kiinstliche Verkniipfung er ihm der Ordnung nach 
vorweiset, auch zuweilen kurtze, aber niitzliche Unterrichte 33 
miteinfliessen la.1st, wodurch nothwendig Licht und Klarheit in 
dem Begriff entstehen mufs, und auf diese Weise bleibet er alle-
zeit meister, den Eindruck, den jeder Zug seiner Schilderey 
verursachen soll, auf denjenigen Grad zu erhohen, und auf die 
Weise zu massigen, wie es seiner Haupt-Absicht vortraglich 
seyn kan. 
(1:22-23) 
In this long passage the poet is said to transform the manifold and 
disparate elements of perceived reality into a unique whole: "das Ab-
sonderliche." This is fundamentally different from Rapin's "purifica-
tion" of experience by the work, or from Dacier's depiction of "la belle 
Nature." For where the neoclassic process of idealization meant the 
exclusion of some perceptions, Breitinger means the organization of 
perception. 34 The poet provides, and the recipient participates in, the 
ordering of the elements of reality impinging on the senses at any 
given time, thereby creating/receiving a more carefully focused per-
spective ("Haupt-Absicht" /"Bindung der Aufmercksamkeit") than re-
ality itself provides. 35 Thus whereas Dubos argues for vivid seeing 
(aroused by the painting or poem) as a means of simple stimula-
tion, Breitinger argues for vivid seeing as a means of structuring 
experience. 
This would appear to be an eminently Aristotelian undertaking. 
But Aristotle was not really interested in whether we saw the imita-
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tion of an object "more vividly" than we would see the object itself. 
He does not discuss the relative strength of the effect on the viewer 
of the imitation versus that of the object imitated. In short, he does 
not quantify the relationship between the imitation and the object 
because the imitation was for him not of the object: it referred to a class 
of objects. Breitinger's passage might, however, be interpreted in an-
other, actually more obvious, Aristotelian sense: the poem as a rep-
resentation of order, corresponding to Aristotle's concept of plot. But 
here again, a crucial difference remains. The order presented by Brei-
tinger is not one of plot, with causally connected episodes, but the 
order of things viewed in nature. This is his neoclassic preoccupation. 
A more likely candidate than Aristotle as a possiple philosophic 
source for this passage would be Pascal, whose "esprit de finesse" 
seems remarkably well represented here. The dilemma posed by the 
mass of particulars of experience in which one becomes so easily lost 
("sich verirren") is resolved by the artist with the intentional repre-
sentation ("Haupt-Absicht"), which would allow the reci£ient via the 
poetic representation to come to terms with the multiplicity. As Pascal 
observes about the "esprit de finesse," or, we might say, about the 
artistic mind and the manifold perceptions it confronts: "Les prin-
cipes sont dans !'usage commun et devant les yeux de tout le monde. 
On n'a que faire de tourner la tete, ni de se faire violence; ii n'est 
question que d'avoir bonne vue, mais ii faut l'avoir bonne; car les 
principes sont si delies et en si grand nombre, qu'il est presque impos-
sible qu'il n'en echappe." 36 Pascal's "bonne vue" would correspond 
to the artist's insight and subsequent representation, the "Haupt-
Absicht." An important point in Pascal's description of the artistic-
intuitive mind is the effortlessness ("ni de se faire violence") and 
immediacy with which it can, indeed must, grasp the particulars be-
fore it. Pascal elaborates this aspect of immediacy as his reflection 
progresses: "On les voit a peine, on les sent plutot qu'on ne les voit; 
on a des peines infinies a les faire sentir a ceux qui ne les sentent pas 
d' eux-memes: ce sont choses tellement delicates et si nombreuses, 
qu'il faut un sens bien delicat et bien net pour les sentir .... II faut 
tout d'un coup voir la chose d'un seul regard, et non pas par progres 
de raisonnement, au mains jusqu'a uncertain degre" (9-10). If we 
may transfer or apply this description to artistic production and re-
ception, the significant points here are, first, that the intuitive ipsight, 
or merging of the particulars, is felt, not seen or visualized; and, sec-
ond, that the insight occurs in an instant: "pas par progres de rai-
sonnement." In effect, Pascal is offering here the "classic" statement 
of neoclassic pessimism. It is indeed considerably more interesting 
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than, say, Rapin's statements on poetic insight, but it captures none-
theless the same belief in the essential inscrutability of experience-
even for the intuitive mind itself, which grasps the particulars, to be 
sure, but which cannot articulate their connection. 
There is, therefore, an important point of disagreement between 
Pascal and Breitinger, resembling Breitinger's disagreement with Du-
bos. It is the insistence on the intellective nature of the aesthetic 
insight as expressed by the words: "immer einen Begriff an den an-
dern hinzusezet," "Verkniipfung," "Ordnung," "Licht," ".Klarheit" -
Cartesian termini in part, but also Leibnizian. 37 In order to understand 
in its entirety the creative process suggested by Breitinger, we may 
recur to the process of intellective integration elaborated by Leibniz, 
carried forth by Wolff, and described in the previous chapter in terms 
of Erfindung. There the process was explained as the poet's produc-
tion of possible worlds. Now the model can be applied to Breitinger's 
notion of poetic reception. This in turn may clarify the nature and 
implications of the identity that exists for Breitinger between produc-
tion and reception. 
Breitinger's most important statements on poetic reception occur in 
the chapter "Von dem Wunderbaren und dem Wahrscheinlichen." 
On the basis of what he says there, and elsewhere in the Critische 
Dichtkunst, we may diagram the process of reception as an extension 
of the Leibnizian-Wolffian model of intellective integration (Figure 6). 
Breitinger's definition of these terms displays a high degree of corre-
lation to the Leibnizian model. Starting at the bottom, "das Falsche" 
is that which is perceived as a contradiction to the present perceptual 
order: "Zudem ist das Falsche, und in gewissen Absichten Unmo-
gliche keiner Nachahmung fii.hig, es ist ein Zero, ein Nichts, wovon 
der Verstand nichts begreiffen kan; und die Natur kan nichts wider-
sprechendes hervorbringen" (1 :63). The false corresponds to those 
possibles that are not (and may never be) compossible. It does not 
admit of representation, that is, it will never move from simple "pe-
tites perceptions" to perception. Because Breitinger is talking about a 
metaphysical process (i.e., about the process inherent in nature), the 
inability of the recipient to assimilate "das Falsche" is due not to its 
attempted but in fact highly improbable presentation in some poetic 
works, but to the nature of "das Falsche" itself. "Das Falsche" can be 
assimilated neither by the poet, nor by the recipient, for identical rea-
sons. Attempted representations of it, such as in overly fantastical 
works, do not count as poesis; they show the improbable, which is 
impossible, because it lies beyond the "threshold" of compossibility 
and intelligibility (cf. 1: 135-36). 
The wondrous is defined in opposite terms from those used to de-
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fine the probable. But it is important to note that Breitinge.r makes the 
probable and the wondrous relative opposites and not absolute op-
posites. That is, they are the end points of a series of "Staffeln" that 
has "verschiedene Grade" (1 : 129 and 140). The wondrous is "die 
ausserste Staffel" (1: 130) of a continuum of probability that Breitinger 
calls "die Staffeln [des Neuen]" (1: 129). The importance of this scale 
is twofold. First, the wondrous in Breitinger's conception (contrary to 
the "Romantic" interpretation to which his work has been subjected) 
is not the fantastic image that "conflicts" with "reality." Breitinger 
does not view literature as that which aims for Verfremdungseffekt, to 
use the modern term. Second, the claim of the wondrous to proba-
bility is not a function of the degree to which it copies what we al-
ready have seen or already know. It is a new insight that is compatible 
with existing conceptions but does not simply reproduce them. 38 
Breitinger's full definition of the wondrous connects his poetics 
with Leibniz's system perhaps more clearly than any of his other 
definitions: 
Ich begreiffe demnach unter dem Nahmen des Wunderbaren 
alles, was von einem andern widerwartigen BildniB oder vor 
wahr angenommenen Satze ausgeschlossen wird; was uns, dem 
ersten Anscheine nach, unsren gewohnlichen Begriffen von dem 
Wesen der Dinge, von den Kraften, Gesetzen und dem Laufe der 
Natur, und allen vormahls erkannten Wahrheiten in dem Licht 
zu stehen, und dieselben zu bestreiten diincket. Folglich hat das 
Wunderbare fur den Verstand immer einen Schein der Falsch-
heit; weil es mit den angenommenen Satzen desselben in einem 
offenbaren Widerspruch zu stehen scheinet. 
(1: 130-31) 
The most striking aspect of this definition is Breitinger's reliance on 
terms suggesting the split between appearance and reality. In Leib-
nizian language, Breitinger is saying that some things appear to be 
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nonassimilative but can in fact be absorbed into the system. Our first 
reaction, however, is to reject them. Rejection of perception in Leib-
niz's system does not mean, however, that the mind "sees some-
thing" and "runs away from it." Rejection means that "petites per-
ceptions" never "rise" to that level of activity where they represent 
themselves in perception. They are not compossible and remain un-
recognized. Following this, the wondrous in Breitinger's system com-
prises not those things we reject, but those things we may have never 
noticed but then eventually assimilate. The wondrous appears or oc-
curs at exactly that indefinable and constantly shifting point (repre-
sented by the asterisks) where "petites perceptions" become percep-
tion, become conscious. In his own terminology: it is where "das 
Falsche" becomes part of "das Wahrscheinliche." And this is why 
Breitinger says "Die Copie ziehet uns starcker·an sich als das Origi-
nal," because he is talking about the power of poetry to imitate some-
thing that we might not otherwise have seen or recognized. In this 
process, set in motion by the perception of the wondrous (in the work 
or in nature), that which "might be" is that which is coming to be. 
The aesthetic insight is a rational (though not strictly-a priori) pro-
cess of intellective integration that Breitinger describes, as we have 
already seen, in terms of a "Vergleichungs-ProzeB." This comparison 
of new perception with previous perception is "Gemiithes-Beschafti-
gung" (1:72 and 74), "Ueberlegung in den Gedancken" (1:74), "Ver-
gleichung mit unsren Meinungen, Erfahrungen, und angenommenen 
Satzen" (1 : 134). 39 Breitinger conceives of poetic process as occurring in 
poets, in recipients, and in nature, whereby nature must be under-
stood as history. He accounts for flux and growth in the historical 
system in two ways. On the one hand, there are infinite kinds of 
possible poetic recipients, and this for three reasons. First, at any 
given time, a variety of degrees of knowledge will be represented 
among all members of humanity: "[Es kan] einigen etwas in der Natur 
als fremd, seltzam, neu und wunderbar vorkommen . . . was andem 
gantz bekannt und etwas gewohnliches ist ... und das ungleiche 
Urtheil, welches von dem Neuen gefallet wird ... entstehet ... von 
der ungleichen Fahigkeit und dem daher riihrenden verschiedenen 
Maasse der Erkanntnils" (1: 123-24). Second, individuals learn over 
time and, hence, change their own perception of what is wondrous 
and probable. The passage continues: "welches Ursache ist, dais noch 
unerfahme Kinder alle Sachen ohne Unterschied mit einer dummen 
Bewunderung angaffen, weil ihnen alles fremd, neu und seltzam vor-
kommen muls" (1: 124). Third, new historical individuals will be con-
stantly entering the system, which changes its configuration: "Was 
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nun insbesondere die nach Zeit und Ort so verschiedenen Gewohn-
heiten, Sitten, Gebrauche, und Meinungen gantzer Volker anbelan-
get, so muB man freylich gestehen, daB das poetische Schone in 
dieser Absicht am wenigsten an eine besondere Zeit oder Ort kan 
gebunden und festgehalten werden, alldieweii diese Sachen <lurch 
ihre stete Veranderung den Begriff von dem Schonen, und den PreiB 
des verwundersamen Neuen in diesem Stucke zugleich mitveran-
dem" (1: 126). All of these passages may be applied to the poet as 
well: poets have a variety of levels of knowledge; poets acquire 
knowledge over time; and poets live in a variety of places and pe-
riods: "die besondem Absichten eines verstandigen Scribenten [kon-
nen] unendlich verschieden seyn" (1 :429). Because this sentence oc-
curs in Breitinger's discussion of the poet's organization of particulars 
into the individual poetic work, one might add to the three sources 
of variety already listed the additional one of changing perception or 
apperception at any given moment in time, in the smallest historical 
fragment possible. This would hold for the recipient as well. And 
· because an infinite variety of perceptions and impressions will be pre-
sented to an infinite variety of creators and recipients: there will 
never be a fully articulatable set of aesthetic standards. Breitinger 
thus anticipates, using the neoclassic diction available to him, the po-
sition of Friedrich Schlegel: "Darum ist es auch unmoglich, daB der 
gute Geschmack <lurch Regeln, die ein vollstandiges Systema der 
Kunst ausmachen, gelehret und vorgetragen werde" (l: 430). 40 
The constant flux in the system is its primary virtue, for it makes 
possible the "poetic" process of nature, the process of Bildung. The 
purpose of the system is the continual creation of form, of Bild, which 
could not occur if the individual mind were imprisoned in the con-
templation of an achieved perfection. The production of form, the 
poetic process, operates according to historically determined "Grund-
satze des Wahnes." The etymological correspondence between "wah-
nen," "einbilden," and "phantasieren" is still alive in Breitinger's dic-
tion, so that he can elsewhere speak of the "Grundsatze des Wahnes" 
as the "Logik der Phantasie." 41 The production of form, the merging 
of diffuse, numerous, unnoticed particulars of experience into a per-
ception, is an/ act of focusing executed in the aesthetic insight. Such 
an insight is not, in Breitinger's view, "owned" by the poet and 
"given" to the recipient. Because it is a process occurring in nature, 
both the poet and the recipient have an equal "investment" in it. 
The difference between Breitinger and previous neoclassic concep-
tions on this point may be illustrated by comparing Boileau's advice 
to the poet with that given by Edward Young in 1759. When Boileau 
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says: "Pour me tirer des pleurs, il faut que vous pleuriez" (350), he is 
advocating the use of an ancient rhetorical device to help poets con-
vey their meaning to their readers by encouraging poets to place 
themselves in the recipient's position. When Young writes: "Tread in 
[Homer's] steps to the sole fountain of immortality; drink where he 
drank, at the true Helicon, that is, at the breast of nature: imitate; but 
imitate not the composition, but the man," 42 he is assuming that the 
developing poet, who is the recipient of Homer's works, can assume 
Homer's position vis-a-vis nature and participate in (or identify with) 
Homer's insights. Young's statement, however, does not reverse the 
neoclassic concept; it radicalizes it. Rather than merely acquiescing in 
the poet's meaning, recipients themselves step into the role of poet. 
But the relationship between poets and recipients in the process of 
aesthetic insight remains a didactic one, for poets help readers to fo-
cus their multiple, scattered, unconscious perceptions: "Dieser kiinst-
liche Mahler ... la.1st [dem Leser] keine Freyheit, mit fliichtigem und 
ungewissem Gemiiths-Auge miissig herumzuschweifen, oder sich in 
der Vermischung des Mannigfaltigen zu verirren" (1 :22). The pas-
sage has already been quoted, but I introduce it again because of its 
extraordinary importance for Breitinger's argument. It tells us what 
the recipient "gets" from the poet. The poet does in fact provide the 
reader with a lesson, but it is strictly a formal one. That is, poets do 
not convey the "contents" of their aesthetic insight to the recipient, 
who would passively accept it (be "moved" by it). Instead, poets in-
form recipients by providing them with a lesson in the organization 
of experience itself. 43 Breitinger thus expresses a notion of Bildung 
that would receive ever greater elaboration in the course of the 
eighteenth century. The "lesson" to be learned from poesis changes 
thereby from the simple transference of a moral message from 
poet to reader, into the encouragement of the recipient to participate 
in an intellective creative process involving the formation of self-
consciousness as an aspect of historical experience. 
4. Perspectivism after Breitinger 
In the poetic creation of a new configuration of perception, poets or 
their works act as a catalyst for a process of comparison of images of 
nature with existing knowledge that assumes the mutual participa-
tion of poet and reader alike, both of whom share, as members of the 
same culture, a similar set of criteria of probability. This simultaneous 
participation of poets and their audience in the revision of their per-
spective on nature has not been generally understood. Breitinger's 
discussions of the wondrous, for example, have been interpreted only 
in terms of the effect of the wondrous on the audience. The wondrous 
has been approached purely as content, as the poet's vision that 
forces itself on the reader, whereas Breitinger's own discussion of this 
term must be viewed in the context of the psychological process that 
he calls "Vergleichung der Begriffe." Both the reader and the poet 
are confronted with wondrous material, that is, it is constellated, at 
that point where it can be integrated. Moreover, this point is con-
stantly shifting because it is a historically and culturally determined 
perspective. 
The influence of Breitinger's book, although at first substantial, did 
not hold in the years following its publication for at least two reasons. 
First, the book was intended as a corrective to Gottsched's poetics, as 
its title indicates. The terms of the debate between Gottsched and the 
Swiss were soon confined, however, to an argument over the nature 
and value of the wondrous, which Gottsched and Bodmer appear to 
have agreed was the most important point of contention between 
them. Yet Breitinger's actual criticism of Gottsched in the Critische 
Dichtkunst-and this has, I believe, never been noticed-was not 
aimed at Gottsched's rejection of the wondrous but at his failure 
to conceive of language and literature in historical terms. Because 
Breitinger's reputation was determined primarily in the wake of the 
more flamboyant Bodmer, his argument for poesis as intellective ac-
tivity was overlooked, while he himself took few steps to explicate it 
further. 
Second, Gottsched's critique of Breitinger's notion of "Farben" was 
carried forth by Lessing, whose brilliant essay style convinced a gen-
eration of developing art theoreticians that Breitinger's concept of 
"poetische Mahlerey" amounted to a defense of Baroque "mahlende 
Poesie." The irony of Lessing's criticism in Laokoon is t):lat his own 
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notion of "pragnanter Augenblick" could be compared with Breitin-
ger's concept of mimesis as intellective inte-gration. 1 Lessing's criti-
cism is important because it shows us how Breitinger's perspectivism 
was misunderstood by one of the most thorough, learned, and in-
fluential philologists of the mid-eighteenth century. 
Lessing adopts from Dubos the proposition that the eye perceives 
spatially and the ear perceives temporally. That is, the "images" of a 
poem are presented in language, which is a temporal sequence of 
words. Poems thus strike the mind in a series of perceptions, whereas 
the eye can "take in" the spatial image in an instant, in one perceptual 
act. Lessing then argues that the clear perception of a thing in space 
demands that we be able to relate immediately all of its parts as a 
whole. The perception of the poetic object runs the risk of its unity 
being lost because the mind is not as likely to remember sequences of 
impressions as it is to retain a multiplicity presented in an instant. For 
the poem to have a vivid effect on the reader, therefore, it must imi-
tate the effect of visual impressions: its unity must be instantly per-
ceivable, in a temporal flash, so to speak. 
In criticizing Dubos, Breitinger had for his part already made the 
psychologically astute observation that the mere visual confrontation 
with a scene provides no guarantee that one will remember it in de-
tail. 2 What counts for Breitinger is the organization of perceptions 
such that the mind can accept and retain them. This is accomplished 
not simply by making objects visible but by making them intelligible. 
The ability of the artist to organize perceptions is not dependent on 
what could be visualized in a single picture (or moment). Breitinger 
praises Haller's "Alpen" (1: 23-27) because it presents a natural sight 
in terms of the significance of the objects, the qualities of things as 
they appear (rather than their simple appearance to the eye), so that 
our impression of them "makes sense" t-o us. 
"Poetische Mahlerey" is a way of presenting an image of nature 
rather than a copy. But Lessing takes Breitinger to task on precisely 
this point, claiming that Haller's famous description of the "Enzian," 
which Breitinger praises, is not naturalistic enough. 3 "Es mag seyn, 
dais alle poetische Gema.hide eine vorlaufige Bekanntschaft mit ihren 
Gegenstanden erfordern," Lessing remarks sarcastically, but Haller's 
poetic description simply cannot compete ("wetteifern") with the imi-
tation of a Huysum, for example. Lessing takes Haller's description 
to be a naturalistic representation that misses its mark because it has 
been embellished to the point of obscurity. He assumes that Breitin-
ger's notion of vividness, which is illustrated with this Haller passage 
in the Critische Dichtkunst, aimed for extreme verisimilitude, even 
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though Breitinger had defended nothing of the sort. He then criti-
cizes Breitinger for having erred in praising Hailer's "Al pen" for its 
verisimilar quality. 
In other words, Lessing continues Gottsched's critique of embel-
lishment and the "painting" of qualities that contribute to a complex 
total effect, although for entirely different reasons than Gottsched's. 
"Wie steht es um den Begriff des Ganzen?" he asks, insisting that the 
visual unity and immediacy of the description is lost. It is interesting 
that Haller defended himself against this charge, in an unsigned re-
view of the Laokoon in 1766 in the Gottingischen gelehrten Anzeigen, and 
that his words reproduce the argument in the Critische Dichtkunst ex-
actly: "Ein Dichter . . . kan die Eigenschaften ausdrucken, die inwen-
dig liegen, die durch die iibrige Sinne erkannt, oder durch Versuche 
entdeckt werden, und dieses ist dem Mahler verboten." 4 Haller's 
point had been a central criticism of Dubos in the first chapter of the 
Critische Dichtkunst: "Der Poet mahlet nicht fur das Auge allein, son-
dern auch fur die iibrigen Sinnen" (1: 19). Equally interesting is Hail-
er's failure to acknowledge that he took this argument from Breitin-
ger. The result of this in terms of Lessing's criticism of Breitinger is 
that Haller deflected criticism from himself (whether or not success-
fully is not at issue here), but Haller did not defend Breitinger, the 
real target of Lessing's attack. 1 
One of Breitinger's principal admirers seems to have been Herder, 
who perhaps more than any other critic of the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury appreciated the thrust of Breitinger's ideas. To be sure, Herder's 
references to Breitinger are not extensive, nor does he question Less-
ing's treatment of him in his own attack on the Laokoon. But as a 
student of Leibniz's thought he commends "den wahrhaftig Philoso-
phischen Breitinger," the author of the "lehrreiche Critische Dicht-
kunst," 5 for abandoning normative poetics in favor of a historical 
approach to the individual literary work. And he explicitly associates 
this new approach with Breitinger's notion of language. This praise 
appears not to have been registered in most critical circles.6 
A treatise· that appeared almost simultaneously with but probably 
independently of Breitinger's work was Johann Martin Chladenius's 
Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernunfftiger Reden und Schrifften, 
published just two years after the Critische Dichtkunst, in 1742.7 Chlad-
enius was apparently well acquainted with many of the same classical 
sources that Breitinger cites, and he frequently mention.s his admira-
tion for Leibniz. It is therefore not surprising that his text bears some 
striking affinities to Breitinger's with regard to two significant-and 
interrelated-problems: first, perspectivism, which Chladenius ex-
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plains in terms of his notion of "Sehe-Punckt," and second, the con-
cept of metaphor. 
Both authors remark that Leibniz is a philosopher with a special 
interest in language. Breitinger had integrated Leibniz's Unvorgrei-
fliche Gedanken into his own reflections in his second volume. Chlad-
enius for his part mentions repeatedly Leibniz's proclivity for the 
use of metephor. 8 For the modern reader, the poetic aspect of Leib-
niz's discourse is manifest. But Chladenius, writing in the age of 
Gottsched, was praising a philosopher for his use of a device often 
thought responsible for distortions, "darkness," or unnecessary and 
distracting ornamentation in scholarly prose. Chladenius does refer 
us at one point to "des Herrn Biilfingers und des Herrn Cantzens 
gelehrte Abhandlungen," in which Leibniz's doctrines, "welche in 
metaphorischer Gestalt vorgetragen waren," are rendered "begreif-
lich" (§ 569). Nevertheless, he says, our inability to understand Leib-
niz's metaphors is not the fault of the philosopher but rather of his 
readers, who have not yet sufficiently penetrated the meaning of 
Leibniz's system and hence the language in which it is expressed (cf. 
§§ 564-67). 9 Here Chladenius emphasizes, as Breitinger had, the im7 
portance of context in understanding the sense of a metaphor. 
Whereas Gottsched would castigate authors for their metaphors, 
Chladenius views "darkness" as an opportunity: "Wenn man ein 
Buch verstehen lernet, so entstehen immer mehr und mehr Ge-
dancken in uns, die wir vorhin, da wir es lasen, noch nicht gehabt 
haben. (§ 161.) Wenn nun dieses darum geschiehet, weil wir Stellen, 
die wir vorher gar nicht verstanden, nunmehro verstehen, (§ 163.) 
so wird uns eine dunckele Stelle deutlich, und in etwas fruchtbar, 
(§ 164.) . . . Mithin bestehet unser Verstehenlernen darinne, da8 
uns gewisse dunckele Stellen deutlich, und unfruchtbare Stellen 
fruchtbar werden" (§ 166). Chladenius is willing to tolerate metaphor 
in scholarly texts because, like Breitinger and unlike Gottsched, he 
views metaphor in terms of the formation of concepts: "Wenn wir ein 
Wort in verbliimten Verstande brauchen, so entstehet allemal ein 
neuer allgemeiner Begriff in unsern Verstande" (§ 94). Thus, "die ver-
bliimten Reden haben noch einen andern Nutzen, als da8 sie unsere 
Einbildungs-Krafft belustigen. Man kan nemlich allgemeine Begriffe 
daraus herleiten, die, wenn sie deutlich erklart werden, die Wissen-
schafften erweitern helffen" (§ 96). 
Breitinger has a nearly identical formulation with reference to 
metaphors in his Gleichnis-Abhandlung: "in einer Schrift [sind] die 
Gleichni8-Bilder vor andern hoch zu schatzen, welche nicht alleine 
den Geist erfreuen, sondern auch die Wissens-Begierde befriedigen; 
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welche einen Gedancken mit Schonheit ausschmiicken, und zugleich 
den Verstand mit neuen Begriffen und Wahrheiten bereichern" (135). 
Both Chladenius and Breitinger may seem here to be chanting the 
"sugar-coated pill" formula of traditional ("Horatian") didacticism, 
but such an impression-resulting from an idiom that was rapidly 
becoming antiquated even as they used it-is deceptive. For the point 
of their statements is not that metaphors make moral truths palatable, 
but rather that certain kinds of metaphor make new ideas possible. 
Here again we see the shift in the eighteenth century from crude di-
dacticism to a concept of Bildung as a new formation of consciousness 
through poetic language. 
The "allgemeine Begriffe" to which Chladenius refers arise when a 
verbal expression is made more specific by the presence of a meta-
phor that ha~ been derived through the process of abstraction. (We 
have already encountered a similar apparent paradox in Breitinger's 
discussion of vividness.) Chladenius gives as an example the use of 
the word "fliegen": "Wenn uns ... eine geschwinde Bewegung vor-
gestellet wird, so kan uns davor, nach der Regel der Einbildungs-
Krafft, das fliegen einfallen; und daher geschiehet es, daB wir von 
einer geschwind lauffenden, oder reitenden Person zu sagen pflegen, 
sie £liege" (§ 91). In this case, the image of a person moving rapidly is 
clarified by comparing it with the movement of a bird-not, however, 
with respect to the actual motion of the wings, but only with respect 
to its speed. Speed is therefore the quality that has been "abgesondert 
(abstrahirt)" (§ 94), transformed into a generic notion ("Geschlecht," 
§ 94), and then applied to both "Arten (Species)" (§ 94), namely, bird 
and person. 10 Such expressions provide "Nachdruck" to ordinary 
words or statements by amplifying the "Umstande" that accompany 
the represented object (cf. § 114). The explication of these "Um-
stande" results in an increase in knowledge because the reader will 
learn to view an ordinary phenomenon (such as running) within a 
different context (that of rapid flight). 
But the interpretation of metaphoric passages is fraught with prob-
lems for Chladenius because of the "gantz verschiedene und widrige 
Wiirckungen" (§ 125) that identical words appear to exert on different 
minds. Even when readers are fully informed about the literal mean-
ing of the words, one must expect that metaphors will receive "ver-
schiedene Aufnahme" (§ 125) from them. This difference he ascribes 
not to an inherent ambiguity of language itself, but to the effects of 
individual perspective: "Man [kan] nicht sagen, daB zwey Personen 
eine Sache aus einerley Sehe-Puncte sich vorstellen, indem sich in 
den Umstanden ihres Leibes, ihrer Seele und ihrer gantzen Person 
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allemal unzehliche Verschiedenheiten finden werden, daraus auch 
eine grosse Mannigfaltigkeit in denen Vorstellungen erfc,lgen muB" 
(§ 310). It is important to remember here that Chladenius, unlike 
modern historiographers, uses the concept of "Sehe-Punckt" to de-
scribe our understanding of things-not of texts. 11 
Disputes over textual meaning, such as over the significance of a 
metaphor, arise for Chladenius not simply because words, phrases, 
or texts spontaneously evoke different responses, but because readers 
have different standpoints that are closer to or further away from that 
of the author whose account of "die Sache" is under scrutiny (cf. §§ 
310-14). "Correct" interpretation of the historical text follows when 
the reader or "Ausleger" succeeds in bringing his own perspective on 
history into harmony, with the perspective of the author. This is 
achieved by examining the context of the author's work in order to 
understand his "Absicht" (cf.§§ 355-65). 12 The process is not unlike 
Breitinger's notion of literary interpretation, where the reader learns 
to occupy the poet's position vis-a-vis nature by attempting to tra-
verse the historical distance between himself and the poetic work. 
A considerable portion of Chladenius's treatise is an elaboration of 
how linguistic, historical, cultural, and psychological factors result in 
the various "Umstande" that have been precipitated into the histori-
cal text. Differences in "Sehe-Punckt" among different authors are 
determined not only by physical position (Chladenius's example here 
is that of three different observers of a battle), but also by the "ver-
schiedene Verbindung" we have to things as well as our "vorherge-
hende Art zu gedencken, zu suchen, vermoge welcher dieser auf das, 
der andere au£ jenes Achtung zu geben sich angewohnt hat"(§ 308). 
Chladenius goes on to state in this same paragraph that "eine Rebel-
lion wird anders von einem treuen Unterthanen, anders von einem 
Rebellen, anders von einem Auslander, anders von einem Hofmann, 
anders von einem Burger oder Bauer angesehen." Here he comes 
close to a notion of individual standpoint in the modern sense of "at-
titude" or interest based on social and psychological experience . 
. More significant for our purposes here, however, is that he also 
comes close to Breitinger's notion of the "Grundsatze des Wahns," 
according to which judgments of probability about the literary work 
are made., But whereas Breitinger wanted to explain how we view a 
poem as a probable representation of nature, Chladenius wants to 
show how the truth of historical narratives can be established. 
This difference in aims is, however, not the result of different meth-
~ ods but of different objects. Probability of the literary work was de-
termined in Breitinger's poetics by a process of "Vergleichung der · 
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Begriffe," whereby apparently contradictory representations were 
integrated into an existing configuration of perception. But Breitinger 
conceived of nature as a dynamically evolving system; our represenJ 
tations or understanding of it will therefore require constant readjust-
ment. The object of the historical narrative, by contrast, is not con-
ceived by Chladenius as a dynamic entity, but rather as a closed 
system of past events that is subject to a "wahren Verstand" (§§ 
648-49). Historians may produce conflicting, even contradictory, ac-
counts(§ 313), but it is possible through correct interpretation to rec-
oncile them with each other: "Wenn zwey Geschicht-Schreiber einan-
der widersprechen, ohngeachtet sie sich die Sache recht, aber aus 
verschiedenen Sehe-Punckten vorgestellt und vorgetragen haben, 
(§ 312.) so wird der Leser gemeiniglich glauben, die Verfasser waren 
einander so zuwider, dafs der eine nothwehdig recht, und der andere 
unrecht haben miisse. Gleichwol kan dieser Widerspruch nur schein-
bar seyn, (§ 313.) und daher riihren, dafs der Leser den einen, oder 
den andern Geschicht-Schreiber, oder beyde nicht vollkommen ver-
stehet. Ein Ausleger soll demnach hier das widersprechende vereini-
gen" (§ 329). 
Given such concern with dispelling any ambiguity in the historical 
record, it is curious that Chladenius would defend the use of meta-
phor in historical writing. Even though its analysis enhances our un-
derstanding of the historical context that it captures, it also creates 
"dunckele Stellen" in a text that result in misapprehensions. Yet for 
Chladenius the source of ambiguity in historical writing is our lack of 
knowledge of historical context rather than the metaphor itself. It is 
precisely Chladenius's commitment to historical truth that arouses his 
interest in metaphor. Besides adding precision and clarity to the his-
torical document (if we assume, of course, that it has been ,;correctly" 
understood), metaphor also provides, potentially, insight into "die 
Sachen" that would be impossible to convey without it. 
Both of these criteria are present in Chladenius's definition of what 
constitutes a "richtige Metaphor," that is, a correctly used metaphor. 
Metaphors are preferable to ordinary words in those cases where 
"der Metaphorische Ausdruck die Sache umstandlich [i.e., in greater 
specificity] und <lurch ein Wort darstellet, welches <lurch ein [eigent-
liches] Wort nicht geschehen konte" (§ 121, my emphasis). "Die Noth," 
Chladenius continues, "welche uns antreibt, ein Wort in verbliimten 
Verstande zu · gebrauchen, bestehet in nichts anders, als in der Be-
gierde sich so vollstandig auszudrucken, als nur moglich ist, und also 
das nachdriicklichste Wort zu gebrauchen" (§ 122). Metaphor, in the 
hands of the historian, is a useful-and necessary~tool in the <level-
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opment of "neue Begriffe" that are in turn the source of new historical· 
knowledge for the reader. 
Chladenius's concept of metaphor is in fact the crack in the wall of 
his otherwise closed system of history, just as Breitinger's concept of 
the historicity of metaphor was the precondition for his move away 
from normative poetics. For here Chladenius provides a very early 
formulation of the historicity of historical understanding itself. This 
is clear from what he has to say about linguistic change. The mean-
ings of ordinary words, he argues, change only when "die Sache" 
that they represent changes (cf. § 85), or when our attitude toward 
"die Sache" changes. Chladenius gives as an example the word 
"Tyrann" (§ 86)i which he says originally had a neutral meaning but 
came to denote something negative as a result of certain changes 
in the behavior of those who carried this title. Conversely, when 
there are no changes in the "Sache" over time, the meaning of 
"eigentliche Worter" remains constant. Here his examples are the 
words "Ordnung," "Nothwendigkeit," and "Aehnlichkeit" (§§ 88-
90), terms whose definition the modern reader obviously finds highly 
subject to change. 
Metaphors, by contrast, do not remain constant but dissolve into 
ordinary meanings simply because our understanding of the histori-
cal context of the words has changed over time: "Wenn nun kein ei-
gentlich Wort vorhanden ist, wodurch die Eigenschafft der Sache 
konte ausgedriickt werden, oder der verbliimte Ausdruck scheinet 
die Sache besser und eigentlicher [!] auszudriicken, so werden sich 
die Leute nach und nach an dieselbe Redens-Art gewohnen .... Die 
Jugend, welche den Ausdruck bestandig von andern hort, auch wohl 
eher, als ihr die eigentliche Bedeutung des Wortes recht bekannt wor-
den, fangt an die verbliimte Bedeutung gleich bey dem Worte zu ge-
dencken, ohne sich der Sache, die es eigentlich bedeutet hat, zu er-
innern" (§ 97). 
The formulation could also have come from Breitinger, and its sig-
nificance is the same for Chladenius: the reanimation of the original 
historical context in which the metaphoric sense of the word was gen-
erated provides new historical knowledge because it allows us to wit-
ness the original attitude or "Sehe-Punckt" of the historian 13 (or poet) 
toward the events (nature) he observed. This is the goal, at least, of 
interpretation. Its achievement would remain problematic for Chlad-
e!lius because readers of history, bound as they are to their own 
"Sehe-Punckt," can never develop an absolute knowledge of the con-
text of the past. 14 Subsequent developments in historicism would of 
course include an ever more radical questioning of the very possibility 
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of the reader's identification with the standpoint occupied by the his-
torical witness as the notion of an ultrapersonal perspective gave way 
to the notion of a strictly individual one. 15 
Peter Szondi, in his influential and enlightening Einfuhrung in die 
literarische Hermeneutik that appeared posthumously in 1975, says 
that Chladenius made a momentous revision of an ancient rhetorical 
tenet. Whereas Cicero, Quintilian, and others had merely noted that 
metaphors sometimes arise when ordinary words are found to be in-
adequate, 16 Chladenius uses this explanation as the very foundation 
of his concept of metaphor. In fact, Szondi argues, it is metaphor 
and not "Sehe-Punckt" that is the focus of Chladenius's interest. 17 
Here Szondi juxtaposes Chladenius with Gottsched, who had writ-
ten: "Cicero lehrt im dritten Buche vom Redner im 38. Capitel aus-
driicklich, dafs die uneigentlichen Bedeutungen der W orter zwar zu 
allererst aus Mangel und Diirftigkeit der Sprachen aufgekommen; 
hernach aber auch zur Anmuth und Zierde gebraucht worden." 18 
Gottsched's critique of metaphor, Szondi rightly observes, is based 
on the belief that a metaphor is simply redundant: "Die Metaphore 
ist eine verbliimte Redensart, wo man anstatt eines Wortes, das sich 
in eigentlichem Verstande zu der Sache schicket, ein anderes nimmt, 
welches eine gewisse Aehnlichkeit damit hat, und also ein kurzes 
Gleichnifs in sich schliefst." Gottsched thinks metaphors are orna-
mental because he views them as pleonasms.-In allowing, however, 
Gottsched's position to stand for the entire "Poetik der Aufklarung" 
(91), Szondi forgets Breitinger, whose concept of metaphor, as we 
have already seen, is a remarkable anticipation of that of Chlad-
enius. Szondi credits Chladenius with a stunning original insight, but 
Chladenius was merely one of at least two and probably several aes-
thetic thinkers who were indebted to both the rhetorical tradition and 
to Leibnizian ideas. 
Szondi may have been led astray in his estimation by Chladenius 
himself: "Die Gelehrten, welche ehedem die Rede-Kunst in Regeln 
und Grund-Satzen vorgetragen, haben zwar gemeiniglich auch von 
dem verbliimten Verstande der Worter gehandelt; aber doch nicht so, 
dais sie den Ursprung derselben aus der Natur unserer Gedancken deut-
lich hergeleitet hatten; daher auch schwer seyn wird, aus ihren Leh-
ren von der Schonheit oder Unart einer verbliimten Rede, ein gegriin-
detes Urtheil zu fallen .... Wir miissen also von dieser Materie hier 
selbst so viel anfiihren, als zu Abhandlung der Regeln der Auslegung 
nothig seyn wird" (§ 93, my emphasis). If Chladenius is honestly giv-
ing his impression here, it appears that he had seen neither the Cri-
tische Dichtkunst nor the Gleichnis-Abhandlung. 
96 Perspectivism after Breitinger 
Additional evidence for this speculation appears in the "Vorrede" 
to his book. There Chladenius says he is working on a pendant to the 
Einleitung that will deal with the interpretation of literature. The 
present treatise will confine itself to historical and didactic writing. 
Poetic texts, however, deserve special consideration: "Denn wie hier-
inne eine besondere Art zu gedencken herrschet, so daB sie eine be-
sondere Vernunfft-Lehre in sich zu halten scheinen, also ist auch 
ihre Auslegung gantz anders eingerichtet, als bey gantz dogmati-
schen und blossen historischen Biichern." Once again, Szondi credits 
Chladenius with an "auBerordentlich kiihnen Gedanken" (35) in the 
context of the early eighteenth century. But he apparently misses the 
fact that Breitinger, in the opening pages of his Gleichnis-Abhandlung, 
had already sugges~ed just such a "spezifisch dichterische Logik" 
(Szondi, 35) in the form of his "Logik der Einbildungs-Kraft" or "Lo-
gik der Phantasie," which he makes responsible for the production of 
metaphor according to the principle of probability. 19 
Szondi believes (35) that Chladenius abandoned his plan for the 
study of literary hermeneutics because, as a historian, he lost interest 
in it. Such reasoning glosses over the crucial fact that in this period 
the "Art zu gedencken" of historians and poets was increasingly be-
ing described in similar terms. More likely is Chladenius's fear, at the 
threshold of the Kantian epistemological shift, that historians might 
lose sight of "the facts," might confuse "sinnreiche Geschichte" with 
"Poetische Geschichte" (§ 342). The former he understands as the 
historical account availing itself of metaphors; the latter is the quasi-
historical narrative made more entertaining with imaginative embel-
lishments "vor deren Wahrheit er [the historian] nicht stehen kan" 
(§ 342). (In a famous review of Herder's Ideen, Kant would later accuse 
his student of ignoring precisely this distinction.) Chladenius went 
on to publish, in 1748, his Vernunfftige Gedanken vom Wahrscheinlichen, 
und dessen gefiihrlichen Mifibrauche, which suggests his antipathy to 
"poetic" modes of historical apprehension-despite his interest in 
the aesthetic categories of metaphor and context. 20 
While Chladenius and Breitinger most likely availed themselves of 
common sources, the question of influence is less ambiguous in the 
case of the Swiss historian Jacob Wegelin, who was closely associated 
with Breitinger and Bodmer in Zurich before going to Berlin in 1765. 
There he promptly became a member of the Berlin Academy. 21 Al-
though Wegelin published his major works after the appearance of 
the Nouveaux essais in 1765, 22 his notions of history and historiography 
are in some respects more understandable in the context of Breitin-
ger's poetics than in strictly Leibnizian terms. 
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In his Briefe uber den Werth der Geschichte, published in Berlin in 
1783, Wegelin addresses three questions: Why is history important? 
What is its epistemological status? How can it achieve its greatest im-
pact? Wegelin posits the study of history as an antidote to what he 
views in nearly pre-Schillerian fashion as the primary· danger of mo-
dernity, namely, the tyranny of "Gewohnheit," "Gleichformigkeit," 
and the formation of character "nach dem gesellschaftlichen Stem-
pel." 23 In order to correct the "schlaffere Beschaffenheit des Geistes" 
(7) that results from such tyranny, we need, he says, to develop the 
native capacity of our minds to absorb a variety of different stimuli. 
This "zauberische Kraft unsers Witzes" (7), the imagination, occupies 
us with "tausend ersinnlichen Vorstellungen" (7) that are drawn from 
our social milieu ("von den Gegenstanden des gesellschaftlichen Le-
bens [entlehnt]," 8). 
Historians who merely allow "der todte Buchs ta be" (5) to speak for 
them leave their readers "kalt und unempfindlich" (5) and thereby 
miss their mark. The historian's proper goal is the poetic reanimation 
of the past because "die lebendige Vorstellung seiner Originale belebt 
alsdann den Geist" (5), a process that has a profoundly ethical func-
tion: "Dieser machtige Eindruck ist gewi.B nicht ein Spiel des Geistes, 
sondern man verbindet damit das wahre Gefilhl der menschlichen 
Wiirde" (5). History is capable of filling the soul "mit dem nachdenk-
lichsten und tiefsten Schauer" (5); indeed this sublime effect proceeds 
out of "weit starkern Empfindungen, als jemals durch die Kunst der 
Schaubiihne hervorgebracht warden sind" (5). 
The perceived proximity of history and poesis that Wegelin, like 
Breitinger, inherits from the French reception of Aristotle, causes 
him to return again and again to the issue of the boundary between 
the two disciplines. The problem is so vexing for him that in the final 
letter of his treatise he actually overturns one of his opening asser-
tions: "Das Erhabene, das Umstandliche, und das die Affecten heftig 
Erregende liegt ausser den Grenzen der Geschichte, und gehort 
nicht zu den Eigenschaften des Geschichtschreibers, <lessen Absicht 
eigentlich nicht seyn soll, Erstaunen zu erwecken, oder zu ergotzen, 
und das Gemiith in die starkste Bewegung zu setzen" (340-41). 
This apparent contradiction is symptomatic of Wegelin's desire, like 
Chladenius's before him, to appropriate the methods of poetic repre-
sentation for historiography without blurring the epistemological dis-
tinction between history and poesis. Thus, in words so laden with 
historical usage as to border on cliche, Wegelin states that for poets, 
"nicht das Wahre, sondern das Wahrscheinliche ... ist der Gegen-
stand seiner Bemiihungen" (341-42). History, by contrast, would be 
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empty and useless were it not based on "wirkliche und deutlich er-
kannte Thatsachen" (22). Historians must be concerned with "Wahr-
haftigkeit" (341), whereas poets can base their work "auf der poe-
tischen Moglichkeit" (342). Excluded from the historian's field of 
representation are "die abgezogenen Begriffe" (40), such as are found 
in the mathematical sciences, because Wegelin believes these "theo-
retische Wahrheiten" (41) have little relevance in the realm of atti-
tudes, behavior, and events that constitute the historian's proper ob-
ject. Here we recognize a distinction, already drawn by Breitinger 
and others, that is ultimately rooted in Leibniz's separation of the ve-
rites necessaires from the verites de fait. Whereas the poet expresses 
virtual or potential truth, the historian investigates the actualized 
truths of fact. 
Although Wegelin would like to think that history and poesis have 
different objects, the distinction he draws here does not demonstrate 
that assertion. For just as the French and Breitinger had done before 
him, Wegelin includes in his definition of "das Mogliche" the material 
of history itself. The most powerful "Romanzen," tragedies, and ep-
ics represent great historical figures and cast them in an embellished 
historical context (cf. 341-43). Such a notion of poesis as the fiction-
alized reworking of the historical record (as opposed to the purely 
fictive or "fantastic") had been circulating, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, at least since the Renaissance. What is "new" in Wegelin's 
work-but certainly not peculiar to it-is the degree to which he al-
lows history to resemble poesis. This is nowhere more evident than 
in what he has to say about probability and possibility. 
While the poet is confronted with the multiplicity of nature, the 
historian must somehow be able to capture "diese unbegrenzte 
Sammh.mg alles desjenigen, was die Menschen Cutes und Boses, 
Edles und Unedles, Natiirliches und Kiinstliches, gedacht und ge-
than haben" (1). Wegelin believes that "die menschliche Betriebsam-
keit [hat] so wenig einige [eigene?] Grenzen, als die Vorstellungskraft 
von dem Moglichen und Wahrscheinlichen" (101). In view of this 
wide range of possible human actions, the historian must decide 
which accounts of historical events are believable. Quite unlike 
Chladenius, Wegelin uses the category of probability to evaluate the 
legitimacy of the historical record. Human actions are not merely re-
flections of "ein allgemeiner Lau£ der Dinge" (83), but also and pri-
marily manifestations of "ein besonderer gesellschaftlicher Gang der 
Angelegenheiten einer Nation, welcher ... das offentliche Urtheil 
von dem Guten und Wahren bildet" (83). Historians are therefore not 
looking for general truths of human existence; instead their object is 
the attitude of specific historical groups toward "das Wahre." 
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In evaluating the historical record, the historian must decide to 
what degree it captures the "herrschenden Meinungen des Zeitalters 
und der Gesellschaft" (12). "Es kann" -Wegelin is echoing Breitin-
ger-"eine Sache in folgenden Zeiten ungereimt scheinen, weil sie 
mit dem Zusammenhange der Umstande nicht mehr paBt, aber sie ist 
anfanglich nie so beschaffen gewesen. Daher wir niemals irgend ei-
nem Volke, in uneingeschranktem Sinne, Thorheit und Unschick-
lichkeit zuschreiben diirfen, weil diese Begriffe, wenn wir sie auf so 
verschiedene Gegenstande anwenden, nicht nach unsern eigenen, 
vorgefaBten Urtheilen, sondern nach den verschiedenen National-
umstanden, und abwechselnden Verhaltnissen, beurtheilt werden 
miissen" (52-53). 
Sometimes the attitudes or events we encounter in the historical 
record conflict so strongly with what we know about the "ordent-
lichen Lau£ der Dinge" that they appear "wunderbar" (54). Yet such 
an impression is based on the "eingeschranktern Fahigkeit des Lesers 
und Erzahlers" (54), their joint failure to imagine how widely things 
may vary from their own expectations. The wondrous actions of the 
past will cease to be seen as "ausserordentlich" (54) as soon as the 
reader is provided with information about the "Nationalumstande" 
(53), in the context of which the extraordinary event will appear as 
prol>able. 
Wegelin concedes, however, that there have also been truly extraor-
dinary events in history, that is, events that were viewed as wondrous 
in their own time. Any historical age can occasionally produce "das 
Originelle" (195), an utterly new idea, attitude, or activity that ap-
pears as a "Widerspruch" (195) to what is generally thought to lie in 
the realm of "Moglichkeit" (196) for a specific set of "Localumstande" 
(196). Here the wondrous effect derives from the failure of the his-
torically represented community itself to imagine a new state of af-
fairs. But original thinkers have had a remedy for this shortcoming: 
"Statt daB sie ihre Begriffe weit iiber den Gesichtskreis des Yolks er-
heben wollten, bestrebten sie sich mit groBtem Fleisse, sich nach der 
Sinnesart eines jeden zu bequemen" (197). Original notions can be 
made accessible to a community when they are brought into "eine 
gewisse Verbindung und Vergleichung" (197) with the "besondern 
sinnlichen Vorstellungen" (197) with which a community is already 
familiar. New historical projects-we might even say historical change 
per se-occurs for Wegelin when original minds atten9 to the integra-
tion of their ideas into the existing configuration of experience. 
Such a concept of historical evolution within individual cultures is 
more than a little reminiscent of Breitinger's notion of how poesis 
captures the ceaseless transformations in our apprehension of nature. 
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History and poesis are established here as analogous processes. The 
new and the possible is made probable, and the probable is then ac-
tualized. History for Wegelin is a "stuffer;i.weise geschehende Ent-
wickelung unserer Fahigkeiten" (24), just as the individual "Charak-
ter eines Volks" is the "stuffenweise geschehene Ausbildung und 
Entwickelung seiner urspriinglichen Anlagen" (13). Every culture or 
"Nation" (13) has a characteristic "Art zu handeln" (13) that is in turn 
linked to the "Entstehungsart eines ... Volks" (13). The determinacy 
of'"Volkscharacter" (13) means that only certain kinds of actions will 
be generated within certain cultures (cf. 13). Individual actions-that 
is, actions of individuals as well as the web of action within individual 
periods-can only be grasped within the larger context of national 
character. "Um einen solchen Charakter wiir_dig zu £assen, ist es 
nothig, eine anschauende Erkenntnis aller Triebfedern offentlicher 
Handlungen zu haben, und zu diesem Ende alle Thaten eben diessel-
ben Volks auf einmal zu iibersehen" (13-14). 
The extraordinary ideas and actions of original minds are therefore 
not arbitrary but ultimately understandable when one has acquired a 
sufficiently broad perspective on any given culture or period. Like 
Breitinger, Wegelin is trying to reconcile the "skiagraphic" view of 
the whole with the "skenographic" attention to vividness that pro-
vides the illusion of presence ("anschauende Erkenntnis") at the his-
torical scene, which in turn forms the basis of historical understand-
ing. If we examine now Wegelin's use of the metaphors of painting 
and perspective, it is possible to see how he establishes the writing of 
history as an analogue to the process of history itself. 
The explication and elaboration of "Nationalumstande" and "ab-
wechselnden Verhaltnisse" produce what Wegelin calls the "Colorit 
der Geschichte" (12-13). It is based on "die Kunst, den Charakter 
ganzer Nationen, und die charakteristischen Ziige der merkwiirdig-
sten Personen eines Volks, der historischen Wahrheit gemas, richtig 
und wirksam zu zeichnen" (13, my emphasis). Wegelin distinguishes 
this kind of historical writing from the "Jahrbiicher der Monche" that 
were compiled out of "ihre Unwissenheit in der Kunst, das Zeitalter, 
worin sie lebten, zu charakterisiren, und die wenigen Ziige des vor-
handen Grosen und Edlen in einem wohlgezeichneten Nationalbilde zu 
vereinigen" (16, my emphasis). The historian may not simply amass 
or collect a multitude of particulars from the past. We need to see not 
merely the actuality of eveµts, but the significance of their actuality. 
The purpose of poetic effect in historical writing is nonetheless not 
the arousal of "staunende Bewunderurig" (29), which is little more 
than a temporary "Betaubung des Geistes" (29). Historical materials, 
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however fantastic, remain "blose Gegenstande der Neugierde" and 
are quickly forgotten when it cannot be shown how they relate 
("zusammenhangen") to the "Natur und den Grundtrieben der See-
len" (26). 
The historian should seek to provide vivid representations that de-
pict ("darstellen") characters and events as "malerisch, und gleich-
sam gegenwartig" (340). Placing events and behavior in such a "his-
torisches Licht" (28) allows them to be apprehended as "wichtig und 
interessant" (28). Wegelin is taking full advantage of the metaphors 
already developed in the aesthetic disciplines. History needs to be 
presented from a certain "Gesichtspunct" (38) if it is to affect us. The 
historian should create a "Gema.Ide" (4, 14, 16, etc.) that makes psy-
chological sense to the reader because of its "vorziigliche Anordnung 
aller Theile" (14). The "Geschichtsforscher" interested in the vivid 
reconstruction of what has been lost may have to deal with "Frag-
menten der Geschichte wie ein geschickter Maler und Bildhauer; der 
ein halb verloschenes Gema.Ide und eine verstiimmelte Bildsaule, ei-
nigen Original-Ziigen zufolge, ausbessert, und in einen vollstandi-
geren Zustand setzt" (4). 
But such filling out of the nistorical record is far from arbitrary on 
the historian's part. Wegelin shares the position that Breitinger had 
staked out in his poetics against the attitude toward history of the 
modernes. The past, he argues, is not to be painted in such a way as 
only to make it more palatable to modern readers, that is to say, more 
entertaining. The disjunction between past and present should not 
and cannot be destroyed. We occupy, he says, a "Dunstkugel" in 
space whose atmosphere prevents us from viewing "die himmlischen 
Karper . . . auf derjenigen Stelle . . . wo sie sich wirklich befinden" 
(12). Their position can only be apprehended through the distortions 
of "Strahlenbrechung." Similarly, the "praktische und moralische 
Urtheile der Seele," preserved in the historical record, deviate from 
"dem Ausdrucke der Wahrheit" (12). Understanding the difference 
between past and present is essential for modern ethical conscious-
ness because it allows us to put our own attitudes and actions in a 
historical context. "Wie konnten wir uns auch irgend einen ertrag-
lichen Begriff von der menschlichen Freyheit, und der Sittlichkeit 
unserer Handlungen machen, wenn uns nicht die allgemeinen und 
besondern/Handlungsarten der Menschen mittelst der Geschichte be-
kannt waren?" (24). The very source of "Fanaticismus" (33), an. ex-
treme form of enthusiasm, lies precisely in the inability to view one's 
own actions and thoughts against a larger historical picture: "der 
Schwarmer sieht eine Begebenheit . . . nicht in dem Zusammenhange 
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aller mitwirkenden Ursachen, Verhaltnisse und Absichten an, son-
dern er reilst davon ein einzelnes Stuck ab, und giebt demselben eine 
weit ausgebreitetere Wiirde, als der Zusammenhange des Ganzen 
wirklich erlaubt" (33). 
At this point we can return to Wegelin's dilemma regarding the 
priority of poetic effect or "truth" in historical writing. Because his-
tory is not only composed of events but also of culturally and tem-
porally specific attitudes, our historical understanding must have an 
emotional component if we are to appreciate the significance of the 
past. "Im historischen Sinne ist nicht so wohl die Frage von der 
Wahrheit iiberhaupt, und allgemein betrachtet, als von der Wirkung, 
welche eine jede wahrhafte Begebenheit auf die regen Krane der 
Seele macht" (26). The arousal of the "Krafte der Seele" (26), a Leib-
nizian term, is most easily achieved by imagining ourselves as partic-
ipants in the original historical setting. Thus Wegelin finds that "die 
wirksamste Geschichte ware also diejenige, welche sich am wenig-
sten in der Ausfiihrlichkeit und .Erzahlungsart von den Romanzen 
unterschiede" (27). This genre has been most effective in penetrating 
"die besondersten, innern und ausern Angelegenheiten seiner Per-
sonen" (27) so that readers feel they are present ("anschauend," 27) 
at the scene. 
Such illusionistic presence is the condition of possibility for histori-
cal understanding itself. Wegelin distinguishes between the ability to 
imagine how previous ages and cultures experienced the world and 
the arbitrary construction of fantasy images divorced from probable 
historical knowledge. The exercise by writers and readers alike of the 
historical imagination, stimulated by the painterly and perspectivist 
skill of the historian, contributes to the development of our con-
sciousness a~ members of a distinct period and culture. In other 
words, the experience of history is, in Wegelin's conception, itself an 
aspect of cultural-historical evolution. Nowhere does Wegelin iden-
tify perspectivism and the act of "contextualizing" as characteristic of 
modernity. But his adaptation of the metaphor of painting indicates 
the degree to which he views history as an interpreting rather than 
as a reporting activity. If a Hans Georg Gadamer can ignore the sig-
nificance of historical "painting" in his comprehensive work on the 
development of modern hermeneutics,24 we may assume that the pro-
cess by which history moved closer to poesis in the eighteenth cen-
tury has not been given sufficient attention. 
Scholars of the German literary tradition have most recently tended 
to argue, following the example set by Hans Peter Herrmann in 1970, 
that Breitinger's poetics cannot be viewed as an "anticipation" of Ro-
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manticism. Allowing Breitinger this role, it has rightly been shown, 
was the approach of an ideologically motivated and now completely 
untenable Genieiisthetik that was fixated on an incorrectly understood 
concept of das Wunderbare. But perhaps Breitinger's connection to Ro-
manticism, or rather, the significance of ideas developed by Breitinger 
and others, should be sought elsewhere than in a narrowly defined 
field of German literary history. The perspectivist notion of interpre-
tation that he and others put forth appears to have had considerable 
impact on the emergence of German historicism, which itself existed 
in a state of dynamic interaction (Wechselwirkung) with Romantic po-
etics. The work of Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, to name only two, 
is unthinkable apart from contemporary theories of history and his-
toriography. "Ein Geschichtschreiber [ miifste] notwendig ein Dichter 
sein," the Graf von Hohenzollern remarks in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, 
"denn nur die Dichter m6gen sich auf jene Kunst, Begebenheiten 
schicklich zu verkniipfen, verstehen." 25 Breitinger's poetics did not 
"influence" Romantic authors. Nevertheless, some of the ideas he 





1. The secondary literature on this topic is of course enormous. Presenta-
tions that I found especially useful are Allan Megill, "Aesthetic Theory and 
Historical Consciousness"; Hinrich C. Seeba, '"Der wahre Standort"'; and 
by the same author, "Lessings Geschichtsbild." For a concise review of con-
temporary notions of historical perspectivism, see Rudolf Vierhaus, "Wie 
erzahlt man Geschichte?" 
2. Herder uses "Gemalde" in a number,of places throughout his oeuvre 
to designate the vivid historical account. In Auch eine Philosbphie, for ex-
ample, he writes: "Gehe hin, mein Leser, und fiihle noch jetzt hinter Jahr-
tausenden die so lang erhaltne reine Morgenlandische Natur, belebe sie dir 
aus der Geschichte der altesten Zeiten ... welch ein Gemalde, wenn ichs 
dir liefern konnte, wie es war! ... Niemand in der Welt fiihlt die Schwache 
des allgemeinen Charakterisirens mehr als ich. Man mahlet ein ganzes Volk, 
Zeitalter, Erdstrich-wen hat man gemahlt? ... Das ganze lebendige Ge-
malde von Lebensart, Gewohnheiten, Bediirfnissen ... mii8te dazu kom-
men"; see Werke, 5:486-87 and 501-2, and cf. 4:389-90. Although a good 
deal has been written on Herder's concept of "Bild," his use of the word 
"Gemalde" as a topos of the rhetorical tr\ldition under investigation in this 
study has not, to my knowledge, been noticed. The issue deserves, how-
ever, a separate monograph and-can only be alluded to here. Demandt, Me-
taphern fiir Geschichte, 373, comments on Herder's use of the term, but is ap-
parently unaware of its rhetorical context. Thus he understands "Gemalde" 
as history itself, the "thing" to be represented, rather than as the historian's 
construction. 
3. Claudio Guillen, "Metaphor of Perspective," 317, notes that "perspec-
tive" remained a terminus technicus of the fine arts, while "point of view" 
became the popular term used in other disciplines. The German equivalents 
are "Sehe-Punkt" or "Gesichts-Punkt." 
4. Cf. Moller, Rhetorische Uberlieferung; Schmidt, Sinnlichkeit und Verstand; 
Wetterer, Publikumsbezug und Wahrheitsanspruch; Schlegel, Zur Wirkungsiisthe-
tik der Poetik Bodmers und Breitingers. The most sophisticated attempt thus far 
to interpret Breitinger in terms of Wolffian categories is by Wellbery, Less-
ing' s "Laocoon," a book that is discussed later in this Introduction. 
5. Cf. Dacier, Poetique, 110-11; Breitinger, Dichtkunst, 2:106-7; Brait-
maier, Geschichte der Poetischen Theorie, 208. 
6. Pascal, Pensees, 17 .. 
7. Wolfgang Preisendanz, "Mimesis und Poiesis," 539. Although Preisen-
danz alludes briefly (538, 539) to the fact that Aristotle's Poetics was "umge-
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deutet" in the Renaissance, he does not appear to have grasped the com-
plexity or extent of the revisions. 
8. See my review of this work in German Quarterly 61 (1988): 304-5. 
9. Chapter 2 of my study contains additional comments on his argument. 
10. Cruger, J. C. Gottsched und die Schweizer, p. LXII. 
11. Goethe, Werke, 9:262. 
12. Cf. "Und doch zeigt sich gerade hier wieder Breitinger's begriffliche 
Schwache. Er ist ... nicht imstande, seine eigene Grundkonzeption gegen 
die ablenkende Fulle uberkommener Gesichtspunkte und den Druck bereits 
fest geformter Gedanken durchzusetzen," Herrmann, Naturnachahmung, 
262; "Wieder hatte er den Schlussel fur sein Problem buchstablich in der 
Hand .... Aber der Gedanke kommt nicht ins Offene .... Einmal mehr hat 
die Wahrheitsfrage dem alten rhetorischen Wirkungsgesichtspunkt weichen 
mussen," 263-64. 
13. Ibid., 195-98. 
14. Wellbery, Lessing's "Laocoon," registers his agreement with Herr-
mann's evaluation of Breitinger on p. 260, n. 61. Further citations of Wellbery's 
study are in the text in parentheses. 
15. Windfuhr, Barocke Bildlichkeit, 457 and 461. 
16. Wellbery, from whom one would most expect this attention, has only 
three citations from the second volume, and all of them are taken from the 
ninth chapter, "Von dem mahlerischen Ausdruck." 
17. For my distinctions between the semiotic and hermeneutic ap-
proaches, I draw in part on Wellbery's own lucid presentation (44-48) of 
what he calls these different "theory types." Unlike Wellbery, however, I do 
not view these interpretative models as mutually exclusive and I do not con-
fine them to particular historical strata. 
18. Knodt, "Negative Philosophie," 11, takes the extreme step of accusing 
Wellbery of subscribing to a Romantic teleology-contrary to his own asser-
tions-because his paradigms, she argues, merely replicate with different 
terminology traditional categories of periodization and traditional notions of 
"epistemologische Transformation" in the eighteenth century. 
19. Bosse, in his seminal article "'Dichter kann man nicht bilden,"' 
rightly disputes (122) the common belief that the autonomy of the reader is 
strictly a "Besonderheit der romantischen Kunstphilosophie." As evidence 
he cites (in n. 173) a passage published in 1799 by the "unromantischen 
Kantianer" J. A. Bergk: "Jedes Buch, das wir lesen, mufs in uns die Krafte in 
Thatigkeit sezzen, die dazu gehoren, eine gute Composition zu machen. 
Der Dichter mufs unsere Einbildungskraft und unsern Verstand, der Philo-
soph unsere Vernunft beschaftigen, um in uns selbst die Operationen in 
Gang zu bringen, die zur Hervorbringung von irgend etwas nothig sind, 
und uns dadurch selbst zum Gegenstand der Reflexion zu machen. Die Er-
scheinungen, die der Dichter malt, der Philosoph erklart, mussen in unserm 
Gemuthe hervorgerufen werden, wenn wir uns durch Lesen zur Selbsttha-
tigkeit und zur Freiheit empor schwingen wollen." Bosse points out that the 
notion of "Selbsttatigkeit" during the act of reading is rooted in Herder's 
', 
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and Humboldt's concept of the "Arbeit des Geistes" found in their writings 
on language. But Bergk's observation is equally significant, as we shall see, 
as a restatement of the process Breitinger calls "Gerniithes-Beschaftigung." 
Chapter 1 
1. Breitinger, Critische Dichtkunst, 2: 9. Regarding Breitinger's comparison 
of sounds and colors, cf. Dryden, "A Parallel of Poetry and Painting," 147: 
"Expression, and all that belongs to words, is that in a poem which colour-
ing is in a picture"; also, Richardson, The Theory of Painting, 5: "The Pleasure 
that Painting, as a Dumb Art, gives us, is like what we have from Musick; its 
beautiful Forms, Colours and Harmony, are to the Eye what Sounds, and 
the Harmony of that kind are to the Ear." The comparison is as old as the ut 
pictura simile itself, and occurs, for example, in Plato's Cratylus, 4318-D. 
2. In my treatment of the problem of knowledge and representation I am 
indebted to Trirnpi, Muses of One Mind, esp. part 2. Trirnpi's analysis of what 
he refers to as "the ancient dilemma of knowledge and representation" has 
supplied me with my own terms of analysis in this chapter. For a prelimi-
nary statement of the dilemma, see his text 83-106. 
3. The works in question are Cordernoy's Discours Physique de la Parole of 
1677 and Wallis's Treatise on Speech of 1653. Breitinger's attention may have 
been drawn to Wallis by Christian Wolff, Verniinfftige Gedancken von Gott, der 
Welt und der Seele des Menschen, who mentions (§ 324) Leibniz's correspon-
dence with Wallis regarding the "Verbindungs-Kunst der Zeichen." (Wolff's 
work is cited henceforth as Metaphysik.) I am grateful to Thomas P. Saine for 
allowing me to use his copy of the first edition. 
4. For the immediate historical context of this debate, see Aarsleff, "An 
Outline of Language-Origins Theory since the Renaissance," in From Locke to 
Saussure, 278-92; for a description of the nature-convention debate as it de-
rived from antiquity, see Kayser's excellent article, "Bohrnes Natursprachen-
lehre." 
5. Cf. Cordemoy, Discours, 34-35: "Cette extreme difference qu'il y a 
entre ces signes & nos pensees, en nous rnarquant celle qui est entre nostre 
Corps & nostre Arne, nous donne en rnesrne temps a connoistre tout le se-
cret de leur union ... si l'on con~oit que les hornrnes puissennt par institu- ~ 
tion ioindre certains rnouvernens a certaines pensees, on ne doit pas avoir 
de peine a concevoir que l' Autheur de la Nature en formant un hornrne, uni-
fie si bien quelques pensees de son Arne a quelques rnouvernens de son 
Corps" (34-35). (Linguistic signs as "rnouvernens de son Corps" are con-
ceived of by Cordernoy as movements of the breath that strike the ear and 
eventually the brain.) I use the word "skepticism" with reference to Corde.-
rnoy because he appears to repeat Cratylus's skeptical arguments and his so-
lutions; see esp. Cratylus, 438C. 
6. Breitinger quotes from Orator, 55, and Quintilian, 8.5. (I have not been 
able to determine what edition of Quintilian Breitinger used; the passage in 
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question may be found at 8.3.16, Loeb edition.) Breitinger's linking of eu-
phony with the historical development of language is, however, an Epicu-
rean notion, see Kayser, "Bohmes Natursprachenlehre," 529, and cf. my n. 8. 
7. Cf. 2: 19: "Dieses machet neben anderm, da8 das Urtheil iiber die Har-
tigkeit oder Fliessendheit einer Sprache so ungleich herauskommt, indem 
eine jede Nation hierinn ihrem eigenen Geschmacke trauet, den sie in ihrem 
Gehore und in ihrem Munde hat." 
8. Although Kayser explains the Epicurean argument for the existence 
of various languages, adopted by Breitinger, as an ancient refutation of 
the conventionalist position, Breitinger seems to allign himself more with 
convention theories. In another passage on the arbitrary nature of signs 
(2:200-202), he quotes Horace's Ars poetica, lines 60-71: "As forests change 
their leaves with each year's decline, and the earliest drop off: so with 
words ... all mortal things shall perish," quoted from the Loeb edition, 
pp. 455-5.7. (All further quotations from this work are from this edition, 
cited with line numbers in the text.) Brink, in his Horace commentary, 151, 
observes that in context Horace's point is simply "that language is as prone 
to change as other creations of man." Moreover, Breitinger's three laudatory 
references to John Locke's An Essay concerning Humane Understanding, about 
which I will have more to say, are all from Locke's third book, "On Words," 
where a completely unambiguous defense of the conventionality of lan-
guage is presented. 
9. Breitinger's suggestion (2:59-60) for the remedy of this problem is 
identical to Leibniz's: "ein sprachkiindiger Mann" should compile a dictio-
nary of the excellent vocabularies of Opitz, Fleming, and others; cf. § 33 of 
"Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausiibung und Verbesserung 
der teutschen Sprache," which Breitinger knew and admired,. in Leibniz, 
Hauptschriften, 2:519-55, where he calls for a German "Sprachbrauch," 
"Sprachschatz," and "Sprachquell." 
10. The same praise is given Opitz by Leibniz in his "Unvorgreifliche 
Gedanken," §§ 63-65. 
11. 2:311. The reference is to "Unvorgreifliche Gedancken," § 61. 
12. Hantzschel, "Die Ausbildung der deutschen Literatursprache des 18. 
Jahrhunderts <lurch Obersetzungen: Homer-Verdeutschungen als produk-
tive Kraft," in Kimpel, Mehrsprachigkeit, mentions (117-18) in passing Brei-
tinger's and Gottsched's differing approaches to translation, but he under-
estimates the similarities between Breitinger and Herder in this regard. 
13. The passage may be a paraphrase of Locke: "It is not enough for the · 
perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made signs of Ideas, unless 
those signs can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular 
Things: For the multiplication of Words would have perplexed their Use, 
had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by"; see 
Essay, 3.1.3. 
14. Cf. 2:308: " ... deswegen er auch behauptet, da8 alle Worter, mit 
welchen die abgezogenen Begriffe von uncorperlichen Dingen ausgedriickt 
werden, figiirlich seyn . . . " 
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15. Breitinger's text at 1: 15 is a translation of Dubos's words, "La vue a 
plus d'empire sur l'ame que les autres sens ... ," from Dubos, Reflexions 
critiques, 1.40.393. (Further citations of Dubos in the text and notes will give 
volume, chapter, and page number.) Breitinger also reproduces Dubos's ci-
tation of Horace's Ars poetica, 180-81, on the primacy of sight over the other 
senses. Brink, in his edition of Horace, 245-46, finds that this passage has 
less to do with a "philosophical doctrine of vision" than with the issue of 
vivid style and (rhetorical) psychagogia. Dubos may be indebted to da Vinci, 
who argues for the primacy of sight in his treatise on painting; cf. my chap-
ter 3, n. 30. 
16. The problems inherent in this statement and its relation to the prob-
lem of language were anticipated by Plato; cf. Cratylus, 432A-C. Dubos ex-
hibits here the neoclassic confusion between image and copy, which Brei-
tinger is trying to avoid; cf. Trimpi, Muses of One Mind, 106-8, where this 
passage from the Cratylus is discussed. 
17. "Les mots doivent d'abord reveiller les idees dont ils ne sont que des 
signes arbitraires. 11 faut ensuite que ces idees s'arrangent dans l'imagina-
tion, & qu' elles y forment ces tableaux qui nous touchent & ces peintures 
qui nous interessent" (1.40.394). 
18. While the notion of poetic or rhetorical effect through proper org-ani-
zation of particulars had been elaborated by Plato and Aristotle, Breitinger 
says, at 1 :422-24, that he has been supported in these thoughts by Longi-
nus, and quotes from chapter 10 of Ilepl. ihf,ov~ at length. There Longinus 
praises the sublimity of a poem by Sappho as deriving from the "skill with 
which she selects and combines the most striking and intense of those 
symptoms" (i.e., of the passion of love); quoted from the Loeb edition of 
Longinus, On the Sublime, 10.1. (All further quotations from this work are 
from this edition.) 
19. Wellbery, Lessing's "Laocoon," analyzes the Enlightenment's desire to 
transform arbitrary signs into natural signs, but mentions only in passing 
Breitinger's discourse on metaphor in this context (195). Breitinger is inter-
ested in constructing some sort of mimetic relationship between words and 
things, although not of the naive or mystical sort, where words are equated 
with things. In this, however, he differs from Locke, who attempted to re-
solve the problem by saying that words have no connection to things at all, 
but that we assume they do for purposes of communication: "But though 
Words, as they are used by Men, can properly and immediately signifie 
nothing but the Idea&, that are in their Minds; yet they in their Thoughts, 
give them a secret reference to two other Things. First, They suppose their 
Words to be Marks of the Ideas in the Minds also of other Men, with whom 
they communicate .... Secondly, Because Men would not be thought to 
talk barely of their own Imaginations, but of Things as really they are; there-
fore they often suppose their Words to stand also for the Reality of Things" 
(Essay,' 3.2.4-5). These distinctions are related to Locke's discussion of 
"phantastical" and false ideas ~n his second book, the former deriving from 
man's power to "make an Idea neither answering the reality of Things, nor 
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agreeing to the Ideas commonly signified by other Peoples Words" (Essay, 
2.31.25). This0 in turn will form the basis for Addison's concept of the imagi-
nation, which "makes new Worlds of its own"; see the Spectator, no. 419, 
3: 573. Why Breitinger did not follow this particular path of reasoning is dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 2. 
20. Gleichnis-Abhandlung, 135. 
21. These criteria are taken from Breitinger's chapter on style, "Von der 
Schreibart insgemein." Although he refers the reader (2:306) to Aristotle, 
Poetics, 22.3, regarding the use of the "eigentliches Wort" (Aristotle's "ordi-
nary word") and the figurative expression, his guidelines for the use of 
metaphor do not seem to be particularly Aristotelian. Whereas the third 
consideration bears some resemblance to Aristotle's judgment in Rhetoric, 
3.2.12 (quoted from the Loeb edition), that "metaphors must not be far-
fetched," the first two considerations appear to derive from Cicero, De Ora-
tore, 3.38.155: "Metaphor ... sprang from necessity due to the pressure of 
poverty .... when something that can scarcely be conveyed by the proper 
term is expressed metaphorically, the meaning we desire to convey is made 
clear." (My attention was drawn to this passage in De Oratore 1:>y E. M. Cope 
in his commentary on The Rhetoric [London, 1877], 377.) Breitinger is of 
course indebted to a massive rhetorical tradition, and the actual source of 
his ideas may not be ultimately traceable. His theories of language, at least, 
appear to be more Stoic than Aristotelian, as this passage demonstrates; and 
cf. n. 6. 
22. Gottsched, Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst, vol. 6, no. 1, of Werke, 
24. (All further quotations of Gottsched's work are from this volume of this 
edition and are cited in the text by page number only.) I shall return to the 
problem of metaphor in chapter 4. 
23. The interpretation of Horace's comparison in terms of parallel con-
struction was first carried out by Trimpi, "Meaning," 1-34, where an ex-
haustive philological justification of the importance of the parallel construc-
tion is presented. This study has since been augmented by two additional 
articles, cited in nn. 25 and 27. 
24. Horace's reference to Homer actually occurs at line 359, just before the 
ut pictura passage. What he says there, at lines 347-60, is that in long works, 
such as those by Homer, an occasional imperfection should not be allowed 
to ruin our appreciation of the entire work. This anticipates his subsequent 
point that not all poetic compositions should be judged according to the 
standards appropriate to (what he probably meant as) epideictic forms. 
25. For a complete discussion of these terms, see Trimpi, "The Meta-
phorical Uses." 
26. See Trimpi, "Meaning," 7-11. 
27. Cf. Trimpi, "Horace's 'Ut Pictura Poesis': The Argument for Stylistic 
Decorum," esp. 33. 
28. Critias, 1078-D. See also Trimpi, Muses of One Mind, 99-101, for a 
discussion of this passage as a description of the "ancient dilemma of 
knowledge and representation" a.nd as it relates to Horace's simile. 
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29. These two statements are grounded in Stoic conceptions of a coinci-
dence between human ratio and cosmic order, but Longinus represents the 
liberal tradition in this regard: coincidence is "sympathy," or participation in 
natural order, rather than, as in more conservative notions, identity of the 
human and cosmic. An interesting philological exposition of this ancient 
(ultimately Pythagorean) concept is Spitzer's Classical and Christian Ideas 
of World Harmony. 
30. Cf. also Ars poetica, 32-36: "There is a craftsman who in bronze will 
mould nails and imitate waving locks, but is unhappy in the total result, be-
cause he cannot represent a whole figure." That is, he excells at insignificant 
detail and cannot succeed with the larger sculpture of which these details 
would only be embellishment. 
31. Gottsched's diction requires comment: "Vers" confuses line with 
poem; cf. Adelung, Grammatisch-kritisches Worterbuch, 4. Theil, Sp. 1111-12, 
where "Vers" is said to mean "die Zeile eines Gedichtes." The example 
given is the phrase "ein Vers aus dem Horaz." Adelung also notes that "da 
Vers, so wie Reim, nur die aulsere Form eines Gedichtes ausdriickt, so wird 
es auch in der edlern Schreibart und von vorziiglichen Gedichten nicht gem 
mehr fiir das Gedicht selbst gebraucht," except in popular usage: "im gemei-
nen Leben." Horace has of course poesis and not versus. With this inaccurate 
translation, Gottsched betrays either his lack of sophistication with basic 
literary terms or his desire to reproduce the popular term. The use of 
"schon" in the line "das sind die schonen Werke der Poeten" is probably 
sarcastic, inasmuch as he then states that these "Schonheiten" are com-
pletely ephemeral. 
32. Gottsched is merely adhering to traditional views of Horace inherited 
from the Renaissance. Trimpi, "Meaning," 1, explains 'that he began his 
inquiry into the Horatian lines by attempting "to understand the liberties 
which the Renaissance had taken with Horace's phrase-since some norm 
had to be established before departures from it could be measured ... [but] 
the normative meaning had never been departed from because, from the 
earliest commentaries on, it had never been understood." Weinberg, Literary 
Criticism, 1: 72, notes that "the Ars poetica did not come to the Renaissance 
as a naked text" and discusses, 72-79, the determining role of ancient com-
mentaries in the Renaissance neoclassic use of the Horation simile. 
33. See Spingarn's discussion of the term in the introduction to his Critical 
Essays, 29-31. Gottsched's definition is based on Christian Wolff's Metaphy-
sik, § 858: "Wer scharfsinnig ist / der kan sich deutlich vorstellen / auch was 
in den Dingen verborgen ist und von andern iibersehen wird (§ 850). Wenn 
nun die Einbildungs-Krafft andere Dinge hervor bringet, die er vor diesem 
erkand I welche mit den gegenwartigen etwas gemein haben (§ 238); so er-
kennet er durch dasjenige / was sie mit einander gemein haben / ihre Aen-
lichkeit (§ 18). Derowegen da die Leichtigkeit die Aenlichkeit wahrzuneh-
men / der Witz ist (§ 366); so ist klar I dais Witz aus einer Scharfsinnigkeit 
und guten Einbildungs-Krafft und Gedachtnis entstehet (§ 248)." (The num-
bers in parentheses are Wolff's references to definitions from previous para-
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graphs.) Similar definitions of "Witz" are found in Breitinger: "Der Witz ist 
ein Vermogen des Geistes, die sinnlichen Vorstellungen mit einander zu 
vergleichen, und die Uebereinstimmungen in demjenigen, worinn sie von 
einander unterschieden werden, leicht wahrzunehmen .... Der Witz hat 
daran genug, daB er sich die Dinge nach ihrer Aehnlichkeit vorstellet, in so 
ferne sie ahnlich oder verschieden sind" (2: 104); and Locke, 2.11.2: "For Wit 
[lies] most in the assemblage of Ideas, and [puts] those together with quick-
ness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity." 
The differences between Breitinger and Gottsched regarding wit are best 
addressed not by scrutiny of a single passage or definition, but by review-
ing their poetic conceptions as a whole. The problem is taken up again in 
chapter 2. 
34. The Poetics, Fyfe's translation, Loeb edition, 22.17. (All quotations 
from Aristotle's works, unless otherwise noted, are from the Loeb editions, 
and will be cited in the text by section number.) 
35. Gaede, "Gottscheds Nachahmungstheorie," argues that Gottsched is 
the first critic in the German context to realize fully, by arguing for the work 
as a copy of the harmonious order of the universe, what he (Gaede) views 
as Aristotle's equation of a logical "Verknii.pfungsprinzip" with the "Seins-
prinzip" (111-12)-in other words, the equation of mind 31nd nature. Gaede 
refers his reader to 1051b of Aristotle's Metaphysics, where, however, one 
may find the observation that "It is not because we are right in thinWng that 
you are white that you are white; it is because you are white that we are 
right in saying so." It is not clear to me how Gaede arrives at the equivalence 
of ontological and logical categories in Aristotle ("Seinsprinzip" and "Ver-
knii.pfungsprinzip") when clearly Aristotle means that being and truth 
stand in relation to each other. In Gottsched's (typically neoclassic) attempt 
to make them identical lies precisely the difference between him and 
Aristotle. · 
36. Concerning the Sophistic conflation of human law and natural law, 
see Heinimann, Nomos und Physis. 
37. Pope's term is from the "Essay on Criticism," in Works, 1: 260, line 
174. Pope and Breitinger may have been influenced by Le Bossu's comments 
on Horace's simile in his widely read treatise on the epic: "Pictures have 
their Shadows, their Distances, and their Point of Sight, without which they 
lose all their Grace and Regularity. The Images that adorn the Arch of a very 
high Cupola, are very large where they are, and to those who view them 
pretty near, represent only Members that are monstrous in their Projec-
tions. A Man would render himself ridiculous, if he seriously found fault 
with those mishapen Postures, which Men of Understanding greatly ad-
mire .... 'Tis just so with the Works of the Poets" (Bossu's Treatise, 
6.8.263-64). Trimpi, "The Metaphorical Uses," 407-9, gives the ancient 
sources of this "second distortion," esp. in Vitruvius, who is a probable in~ 
fluence on this passage from Le Bossu. 
38. The phrase "nackte Blosse" refers to Gottsched's,definition of "Mah-
lerey." In the firstchapter of the Critische Dichtkunst, "Vergleichung der 
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Mahler-Kunst und der Dicht-Kunst," Breitinger says, 1: 12-13, that "in dem 
erstem Versuch," that is, in Gottsched's Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst of 
1730, poetic painting was interpreted "in dem engen Verstand," which 
means, Breitinger says, that objects are only depicted in terms of "Klarheit." 
Indeed Gottsched, 195-96, admits the term "poetische Mahlerey" only for 
naturalistic description, which is for him "die geringste Art [der Nachah-
mung]." Gottsched does not appear to have recognized that the extreme 
verisimilitude he defended was but another kind of strict naturalism. 
39. Finsler, Homer in der Neuzeit, 395-405, provides to my knowledge the 
only analysis of Breitinger's use of French and English sources in his study 
of Homer. 
40. Cf. 1: 11-12. The evaluation and absorption of the critical issues of 
antiquity played a constitutive role in Europe as a whole during those cen-
turies in which a vernacular literary language was being developed: Italy in 
the late fourteenth, fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries, England in the 
sixteenth century, and France and Germany as already noted. It is astound-
ing that Blackall made no reference at all to this European phenomenon in 
which Germany eventually participated. 
41. Horace, Epistles, 2.1.34-38. Jaufs, "Asthetische Normen," offers the 
best explanation to date of competing concepts of perfection among both the 
anciens and the modernes. 
42. A similar temporalization of the Horatian simile may be found in Le 
Bossu, in the passage cited in n. 37, which continues, 264: "We may like-
wise fall into these false Criticisms for want of Leaming and a deep reach. 
We would fain have Homer and Virgil form the Customs and Manners of 
their Personages according to the modem Mode. We think their ways of 
speaking fantastical, because they would be ridiculous, if tum' d Verbatim 
into our Language." The "fantastical" speech corresponds to the "mon-
strous" figures painted in the cupola, which, _when seen from too much 
proximity (or in the case of speech, according to modem criteria alone) ap-
pear distorted. The passage anticipates Breitinger's own thoughts on trans-
lation, as set forth in the first section of this chapter. 
43. La Motte, Discours sur Homere, 1. 
44. The question of distortion by the reader was treated most fundamen-
tally by Plato in his comparison of painting (i.e., not the skiagraphic image) 
to written discourse (versus oral discourse) in Phaedrus; see esp. 275D-E (al-
though this passage must be read in context with the entire dialogue, which 
concerns the problem of written and oral expression). 
45. Breitinger's criticism of La Motte is to be found mainly at 1: 435-504, 
where he probably intended to attack Gottsched instead of La Motte. 
46. Pope's words (7: 12): "We ought to have a certain Knowledge of the 
principal Character and distinguishing Excellence of each: It is in that we are 
to consider him, and in proportion to his Degree in that we are to admire 
him. No Author or Man ever excell' d all the World in more than one Fac-
ulty, and as Homer has done this in Invention, Virgil has in Judgment .... 
Homer was the greater Genius, Virgil the better Artist." This judgment of 
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the two poets was a topos even tn antiquity; cf. Quintilian, 10.1.46-47 and 
10.1.85-86. Breitinger could have gotten his ideas there, of course, but his 
phrasing of them is Pope's. 
47. Pope, 7:8: "Homer makes us Hearers, and Virgil leaves us Readers." 
48. Pope, 7: 9: "An excellent modern Writer allows, that if Virgil has not 
so many Thoughts that are low and vulgar, he has not so many that are 
sublime and noble." Breitinger wants to use Pope's formulation, but he is 
also copying Pope's allusion to yet another critic. Pope may have had in 
mind here the Spectator, no. 279; see the editor's interpolation in the passage 
cited. 
49. See Shankman, Pope's "Iliad," esp. 74-100 and 165-70, for a fine ar-
gument regarding Pope's use of Aristotelian and Horatian categories. 
50. The distinction between "Haufen'1 and those who are "gelehrt" is not 
actually present in Horace's ut pictura context. Breitinger was perhaps famil-
iar with thisHoratian distinction from Epistles, 2.1.182-84, where Horace 
regrets that a sense of the value of agonistic discourse, the discourse that 
appeals to the ear instead of to the eye, has been lost in society as a whole 
(the translation in the Loeb edition has "rabble") as well as among educated 
listeners. Horace was a favorite of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century neo-
classic thinkers, and it is not unlikely that Breitinger would have read his 
works with an eye to their interrelationship. 
51. According to Shankman, Pope's "Iliad," 79, this indeed was Pope's 
identical dilemma when translating Homer for an audience that could not 
have the same relationship to agonistic discourse as Homers's original lis-
teners: "For while in the 'skiagraphic' style of spoken oratory-to which 
Aristotle compares the style of Homer-high finish is superfluous and un-
called for, the utmost literary polish is indeed required in written composi-
tions-such as Pope's Iliad-because here the reader is given the opportu-
nity to scrutinize the text at leisure" (emphasis in original). 
52. Cf. 2:403-4: "Seine [the poet's] Erzehlung muls als ein sichtbares Ge-
mahlde die Sachen nicht blols erzehlen, sondern zeigen, und das Gemiithe 
in eben diejenige Bewegung setzen, als die wiirckliche Gegenwart und das 
Anschauen der Dinge erweken wiirde. Dazu ist die gemeine und gewohnte 
Art zu reden viel zu schwach: Sein gantzer Ausdruck muls darum gantz neu 
und wunderbar, d. i. viel sinnlicher, prachtiger, und nachdriicklicher seyn. 
Und darum erstreket sich seine Freyheit in Anwendung der figiirlichen Re-
densarten, so wohl was ihre Zahl, als die Neuheit der Bilder und die Verwe-
genheit der Translationen oder Verwendungen anbelanget, ohne Verglei-
chung weiter als des Redners seine." 
53. Breitinger offers at this point one of the longest actual quotations in 
his entire Critische Dichtkunst, extending from 1 :473-76, and continued at 
1: 494-95. The passages from Pope are at 7: 7-8. 
54. Quintilian, 6.2.27-35. 
55. See Kustas, Byzantine Rhetoric, 172-75. 
56. See Bretzigheimer, Johann Elias Schlegels poetische Theorie, 33-43, for an 
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excellent overview of this conflation of terms in the Renaissance. She over-
looks, however, Breitinger's confusion. 
57. "Zudem miissen auch die Tadler dieses Poeten selbst gestehen, dais er 
auch in theologischen Sachen mitten in der <liken Finsternils, die ihn umge-
ben hatte, zuweilen die Wahrheit erblicket" (1: 162). Breitinger is quoting, 
without saying so, a passage to which he then refers his reader, Mme Da-
cier's quotation of La Motte in Des Causes de la Corruption du Goust, 112-13: 
'"Au milieu de cette nuit epaisse du Paganisme,' dit il, 'il n'a pas laisse d'en-
trevoir quelquefois le vray,"' and agreeing with her statement (104) that 
Homer's works display "la conformite de plusieurs de ses idees avec beau-
coup de veritez de nos Livres Saints." See also Kapitza's discussion of "Das 
Offenbarungsargument" in his excellent study Ein bilrgerlicher Krieg in der ge-
lehrten Welt, 367-73, and cf. 431-32. 
58. I am following here Shankman's conclusion that "Pope wishes to 
make sense of Homer as a poet" (Pope's "Iliad," 3), as well as Pope's own 
remark in his Iliad preface, 7:5, that he wants to explain "the great and pe-
culiar Characteristick which distinguishes him from all other Authors." 
59. Breitinger refers his reader in a note to Horace's Ars poetica, line 73, 
and to "Quintilian, Lib. X.c.I." The passage Breitinger has in mind is ob-
viously 10.1.46-47 in which Homer is described as an "Ocean" and the 
source of "inspiration for every department of eloquence"; and cf. Strabo's 
Geography, 1.1.2, a locus to which Breitinger also refers in his Gleichnis-
Abhandlung, 284. 
60. See Friedl, Homer-Interpretation, for a brief historical review of the 
problem as it developed out of antiquity, and Simonsuuri, Homer's Original 
Genius, for a discussion of the eighteenth-century use of ancient images of 
Homer. 
61. The meticulous collection and discussion of texts carried out by 
Bleicher, Homer in der deutschen Literatur, neglect the Neoplatonic reception 
of Homer altogether. 
62. Walzel, Prometheussymbol, 24-30; Blumenberg, "Nachahmung der 
Natur." 
63. All quotations are from the incompletely paginated prefaces of the 
original editions named in the text. An evaluation of the Swiss contribution 
to textual criticism is provided by Henne, "Eine friihe kritische Edition 
neuerer Literatur." 
64. In one of his discussions of the development of German as a literary 
language, Herder criticizes Triller's edition according to standards conso-
nant with Breitinger's: "Auch mit Opitzens Sprache sollten wir vertrauter 
werden, und ein Glossarium iiber ihn aus dem wahren Geist unserer 
Sprache, wiirde uns die stattlichen Veranderungen und Verbesserungen ei-
nigermalsen verleiden, die Triller mit ungeweihten Handen sich erfrechet 
hat, ihm unterzuschieben" (Herder, Werke, 2:43). Herder also notes else-
where (1: 149; 1 : 156; 2: 28-29) that Breitinger was among the first critics in 
Germany to engage in theoretical reflections on language. 
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Chapter 2 
1. Breitinger, Gleichnis-Abhandlung, 200, ahd cf. 201-3. Breitinger is dis-
cussing a passage that can be found on p. 328 in vol. 6, no. 2, of Gottsched's 
Dichtkunst. 
2. The definition at 1:5711lso has "das Vermogen seiner [the poet's] Kunst 
[erstrecket sich] eben so weit, als die Krafte der Natur selbst"; the poet 
should therefore study well "was in ihren Kraften annoch verborgen lieget." 
The reference to nature's unrealized potentialities ("Krafte der Natur") ex-
pressed in the art work comes from Renaissance Neoplatonism; cf. Albrecht 
Diirer, "Lehre von menschlicher Proportion": "Dann warhafftig steckt die 
kunst inn der natur, wer sie herauss kan reyssenn, der hat sie" (3: 295) and 
"ein fleissiger erbetter mag [die Natur] zw grund ersuchen vnd ... vill 
wunders finden, das hyrin begraben leit" (3:239). The excellent study by 
. Moller, Rhetorische Uberlieferung, esp. 44-82 and 137-39, ~uggests that the 
· places in Breitinger's text marked by Neoplatonist vocabulary were lifted 
from Muratori. Regarding the Breitinger passage quoted in this note, see 
Moller, 74. 
3. Herrmann, Naturnachahmung, 251-52. My remarks on his argument 
primarily concern his pages 234-38 and 249-64. 
4. Although Herrmann was correct to point out the superficial analogy 
that had been drawn between Leibniz and Breitinger, his attempt to dismiss 
the Neoplatonic context of Breitinger's possible worlds in favor of a strictly 
Wolffian source was not universally accepted; see most recently Bretzighei-
mer, Johann Elias Schlegels poetische Theorie, 17-23, and Moller, Rhetorische 
Uberlieferung, in places too numerous to cite. Herrmann's interpretation has 
been carried forward by John Neubauer, Symbolismus und symbolische Logik, 
109-12, and Wetterer, Publikumsbezug, 211-14. 
5. Freiheit und Form, 105-18. 
6. Cf. Monadologie, § 33; Essais de Theodicee, § 37. Both works appear in 
Gerhardt, Die philosophischen Schriften, vol. 6. (Subsequent quotations from 
or references to these works will be based on this volume of this edition. 
Citations give paragraphs rather than pages.) Leibniz provides an additional 
discussion of truths of fact and truths of necessity in his Nouveaux essais sur 
l'entendement humain, 4.2.1. (All citations of this work, abbreviated hence-
forth as Essais, will be from vol. 6, no. 6, of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Samt-
liche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1962]. The Essais are divided into "Livre," "Chapitre," 
and paragraphs, all of which will be given by nuinber, as I have done in this 
note.) 
7. Windelband, Lehrbuch, 342, identifies Leibniz's truths of fact with a pos-
teriori knowledge and truths of necessity with a priori knowledge. Schepers, 
in Ritter, Historisches Worterbuch, s.v. "A priori/a posteriori," 466, points out 
that for Leibniz only the divine intellect is capable of pure a priori knowl-
edge. Humans remain dependent on experience for their access to the nee-
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essary truths, although Leibniz is by no means completely consistent on this 
point, in passages cited by Schepers. 
8. Theodicee, § 37. 
9. Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, § 11, ed. Gerhardt, vol. 6, hence-
forth cited as Principes. Cassirer, Leibniz' System, 534, notes (approvingly) 
that Leibniz's "scharfe, dualistische Trennung" between the laws of physics 
and the laws of mathematics was criticized by Bertrand Russell in his work 
on Leibniz. 
10. Theodicee, "Discours preliminaire," § 3. 
11. Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, based his discussion (in his chapter 5) of 
Leibniz's use of the principle of plenitude on the thesis that it was Leibniz's 
intention for all possibles to be actualized according to universal necessity. 
His thesis has been challenged by J. Hintikka, "Leibniz on Plenitude." 
12. That God is not forced to grant real existence to all of the necessary 
truths is the basis of Leibniz's critique of Spinoza's determinism; cf. Theodi-
cee, § 173. 
13. Ibid., § 116. 
14. Cassirer, Freiheit und Form, 109, is quoting from 1 :56-57, and has 
modernized Breitinger's orthography. 
15. Monadologie, § 46. This aspect of Leibniz's thought was not lost on the 
theologian Breitinger. He says at 1: 135 that God is not capable of bringing 
about the impossible, which is defined as the contradictory. Breitinger 
would have found this restated in Christian Wolff's Metaphysik, § 1022. 
16. See Moller, Rhetorische iiberlieferung, 137, for the Muratori passage 
copied by Breitinger that refers to the necessary truths. 
17. 1: 138-39; Muratori's corresponding terms (Moller, _Rhetorische iiberlie-
ferung, 73) are "Vero secondo l'Intelletto" and "Vero secondo la Fantasia." 
Muratori qualifies the former term as "Vero necessario, o evidente, o moral-
mente certo," while the latter term is "Vero possibile, probabile, e credi-
bile." In the former category Muratori includes not only knowledge pro-
vided by the'exact sciences, but also by history-"factual truths," as it were. 
These qualifications appear to be reflected in Breitinger's text at 1: 60-61, 
where he discusses "zwo Gattungen des Wahren in der Natur" that he calls 
"das historische Wahre" and "das poetische Wahre." The distinction be-
tween historical and poetic truth in Muratori and Breitinger ultimately de-
rives, however, from Aristotle's discussion of history and poesis, and does 
not correspond to Leibniz's distinction between verites de fait and verites ne-
cessaires. (Failure to see this was indeed the source of Cassirer's mistake.) 
But Breitinger, unlike Muratori, does not conflate "das Wahre des Verstandes" 
with "das historische Wahre." Instead, he is distinguishing two kinds of ver-
ites de fait, poesis and history, from the verites necessaires ("dasWahre des 
Verstandes"). The entire matter is taken up again systematically in chapter 3 
of this study. Here the problem of terms demonstrates how tricky the ques-
tion of sources can be. For while Breitinger may have borrowed words from 
Muratori (or Aristotle), he factored them into his reading of Leibniz and Wolff. 
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18. Cf. e.g. Preisendanz, "Nachahmungsprinzip in Deutschland," 79: 
"Fur Breitinger selbst handelte es sich nur darum, das Wunderbare ... in-
nerhalb eines noch durchaus rationalistischen Horizon.ts legitimieren zu 
konnen," so that one should not attribute to him "die Vorstellung einer sehr 
weit gehenden Autonomie des poetischen Gebildes." Wetterer, Publikumsbe-
zug, 222, concludes that "Breitinger [laist] ... keinen Zweifel daran, dais 
auch er [i.e., like Gottsched] nicht bereit ist, Poesie vom Anspruch auf 
Wahrheit und Verniinftigkeit ganzlich zu entbinden." During the last 
twenty years, critics have generally argued against finding stirrings of "Ro-
mantic genius" in Breitinger's work, as did, e.g., Bockmann, Formgeschichte, 
573, who says that in Zurich "die Dichtung wird als selbstgenugsame Schop-
fung der Phantasie anerkannt. Sie braucht nicht mehr am Maisstab der Ver-
standigkeit gemessen zu werden," an interpretation that has virtually noth-
ing to do with Breitinger's text but which occurred in various permutations 
throughout the nineteenth century and the first two-thirds of this century as 
part of the ideological program of Germanistik. A detailed description of the 
reception of Breitinger's work lies outside the bounds of this study. 
19. I am following here Megill, "Aesthetic Theory and Historical Con-
sciousness," esp. 39-40. Megill argues convincingly (versus the influential 
positions o( Cassirer and Meinecke) that "historism" (not Rankean "histori-
cism") developed out of late seventeenth-century aesthetics, which Megill 
characterizes as "the contextual mode of evaluation," a term consonant with 
Breitinger's enterprise as I attempt to describe it in this study. See Megill's 
opening remarks and notes for ful'ther clarification of the terms "historism" 
and "historicism." Cf. Kapitza's discussion "Die Vollendung am Anfang: 
Unterscheidung der Kiinste von den Wissenschaften," in Ein bilrgerlicher 
Krieg, 378-89, which concerns the German context of this problem (without, 
however, much reference to Breitinger); also Simonsuuri, Homer's Original 
Genius, chap. 1 ("Ancients and moderns: the problem of cultural progress") 
and chap. 7 ("Vico's discovery of the true Homer"). 
20. Cf. Moller, Rhetorische Uberlieferung, 23: "In dem .Maise, wie ein Ge-
genstandsbereich vom Prozeis wissenschaftlicher Klarung erfaist wird, wird 
das Geschmacksurteil vom Verstandesurteil ersetzt. Ein wesentlicher Grund 
fur Gottscheds Versuch, die Poetik auf ein philosophisches Fundament zu 
stellen, besteht darin, diesen Prozeis der Verwissenschaftlichung auch auf 
dem Gebiet der freien Kiinste einzufiihren .... Deshalb versucht er die 
Regeln der Poesie mit einer Genauigkeit zu bestimmen, die dem geome-
trischen Verfahren nahekommt." Moller does not pursue this issue with 
reference to the querelle, nor does he contrast it with Breitinger's enterprise. 
Gottsched's attempt at "Verwissenschaftlichung" must be understood, 
however, in the context described by Jauis, "Asthetische Normen," 44-47, 
namely in terms of the conflict spawned by the querelle between "vollendete 
Perfektion" (exemplified by literature) and "unbegrenzte Perfektibilitat" (the 
"telos" as it were of the physical sciences). Gottsched's poetics are "geomet-
ric" not because Gottsched puts literature on a par with the sciences (a the-
sis maintained by Borjans-Heuser, Bilrgerliche Produktivitat), but because for 
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him all poetic knowledge has been forever discovered and need only be de-
ductively re-produced. 
21. Cf. Dichtkunst, 1: 115-17; Gleichnis-Abhandlung, 286-93. 
22. Breitinger did read Leibniz as well as Wolff. Certainly he knew, as a 
literate person in the early eighteenth century, the Theodicee. He probably 
read the Monadologie, published in German and Latin in 1720-21, and per-
haps also the Principes, which first appeared in 1718. He may have seen the 
Meditationes de cogitione in the Acta eruditorum of 1684 because he wrote a 
textbook on logic at the same time he was preparing his Critische Dichtkunst. 
The only Leibniz text to which he makes specific reference (2:46 and 311) 
is the Unvorgreifliche Gedancken, betreffend die Ausilbung und Verbesserung der 
teutschen Sprache. He did not know, of course, the Nouveaux essais. In this 
and the following chapter, I use Leibniz's system as a model to explain Brei-
tinger's poetics, not as a source. His specific indebtedness to Wolff will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
23. Meditationes de cognitione, in Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, 
traris. Paul Schrecker and Ann Martin Schrecker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mer-
rill, 1965), 6. (Further references to this work are based on this translation.) 
The passage continues with Leibniz's distinction between what is thinkable 
and what is possible expressed as the difference between nominal and real 
definitions: "Hobbes, who pretended that all truths are arbitrary, because 
they depend on nominal definitions . . . did not consider . . . that the re-
ality of a definition does not depend upon us and that not any notions 
whatever can be combined together" (7). Cf. Essais, 3.3.15: "Ce qu'on sup-
pose possible est exprime par la definition, mais cette definition n' est que 
nominale quand elle n'exprime point en meme temps la possibilite .... Il 
ne depend done pas de nous de joindre les idees comme bon nous semble, a 
moins que cette combinaison ne soit justifiee ou par la raison qui la monstre 
possible, ou par l'experience qui la monstre actuelle, et par consequent pos-
sible aussi." 
24. Meditationes, 6-7; cf. also Essais, 3.10.7. 
25. Monadologie, §§ 36-38 and 45. With the a posteriori proof, Leibniz an-
swers one of the two great questions of metaphysics (cf. Principes, 7), i.e., 
why something exists rather than nothing. It is curious, in view of his mathe-
matical insights, that he considered this question answerable, or even pos-
sible. For just as an infinite chain of contingent beings does not include 
a first member that could be the cause of all subsequent contingents, so 
Leibniz states that it is not possible to give the greatest number (cf. Essais, 
2.17.1), that is, to specify the end of an infinite sequence. Yet sufficient rea-
son, even though it be said to stand outside the chain of contingents that it 
actualizes, appears to do just that. 
26. Essais, 4.10.7: "Et c'est deja quelque chose que par cette remarque 
[i.e., the assertion of God's possibility] on prouve, que suppose que Dieu soit 
possible, il existe, ce qui est le privilege de la seule Divinite" (emphasis in the 
original). Beierwaltes, Platonismus, 118, notes that the identification of pos-
sibility and necessary existence in the divine mind is a fundamental Neoplo-
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tinian concept: "Der Gegensatz von Moglichem zu Wirklichem ist sowohl in 
Schellings Absolutem als auch in Plotins absolutem Geist aufgehoben. Im 
Absoluten ist das Mogliche als ein zeithaft Noch-nicht-Wirkliches undenk-
bar, es destruiert <lessen Unendlichkeit; der Geist ist als Denken seiner 
selbst denkendes Leben und dies heilst: reine Wirklichkeit" (emphasis in the 
original); cf. also 51: "Die Frage nach dem Ve:thaltnis von Sein und Denken 
ist seit Parmenides eine Grundfrage der Philosophie und der philosophi-
schen Theologie. Plotin hat zuerst dieses Verhaltnis als Identitat und damit 
als Wesenskonstituens des absoluten Geistes gedacht." 
27. Theodicee, §§ 7 and 53. 
28. Principes, § 10; cf. Monadologie, § 54, and Theodicee, § 201. 
29. Politella, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Cabalism, 33, points out that 
Leibniz "speaks of a 'fall' into matter, or sin, only when he argues with 
theologians; the real life of the Monad does not, as the Plotinian or Cabalis-
tic spark of life, diminish in its glory as it descends into the inferior worlds 
of creation." Thus the goal of existence in Leibniz's conception was not the 
reabsorption into the Godhead, or Plotinian One, but rather the continual 
approximation to the divine; cf. 24-27. That the existents should strive to be 
like the divine even though they do not lose their value through actualiza-
tion is based on a conscious "ambiguity" (26-27) that allows Leibniz to 
maintain the dignity of the individual existent as well as of the divine unity 
out of which it arose. 
30. Leibniz wants to show, in contrast to Descartes, that God is not a 
completely arbitrary being who freely dictates necessity and, in contrast to 
Spinoza, that the world is hot absolutely determined, thus making human 
choices irrelevant. 
31. Theodicee, § 173. 
32. Ibid., § 7. 
33. Ibid., § 37. 
34. Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, 172. 
35. A concise overview of Leibniz's critique of Descartes is provided by 
Windelband, Lehrbuch, 360-65. 
36. Cf. Cassirer, Leibniz' System, 514-20. 
37. De ipsa natura, trans. Schrecker, 102. 
38. Monadologie, § 61. 
39. For all of the terms in this paragraph, see De ipsa natura, esp. 104 and 
106-8. 
40. Cf. Monadologie, § 57, and Principes, § 2: "C'est comme dans un centre 
ou point, tout simple qu'il est, se trouvent une infinite d'angles formes par 
les lignes qui y concourent." 
41. De ipsa natura, 97. 
42. Monadologie, § 14. 
43. Ibid., § 7. 
44. Principes, § 4; Monadologie, §§ 11-15. 
45. Monadologie, § 60. 
46. Ibid.,§§ 42 and 49. The Neoplotinian undercurrent in Leibniz's sys-
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tern is evident in his identification of Mind with the unifying of a multi-
plicity represented in matter; cf. my n. 26, and Beierwaltes, Platonismus, 24, 
for an additional historical clarification of this issue. 
47. The example illustrates the difficulty of the relationship in Leibniz's 
thought between the a priori and the a posteriori. Although Leibniz does not 
mention it, the astronom~r must rely on mathematics to develop his knowl-
edge, cf. n. 7. Near the end of the Essais (at 4.17.23), Leibniz suggests that a 
priori knowlecl.ge is embedded in experience: "le comment [d'un] fait," such 
as the rising of the sun, reveals "la raison a priori de cette verite." In the 
opening argument of the Essais, he had offered the proposition that the 
senses provide the "occasion" for our becoming conscious of innate (a 
priori?) knowledge (1.1.1). Cf. 1.1.11 for an even more emphatic statement: 
"Les idees intellectuelles et les veritez qui en dependent sont distinctes, et 
ni les unes ni les autres n'ont point leur origine des sens; quoiqu'il soit vrai 
que nous n'y penserions jamais sans lessens" (my emphasis). Why, however, 
one being should develop a priori knowledge and another not ( or not to the 
same degree) is not explainable by the effects of the outer world, but only by 
the individuality of each being: "Toutes les pensees et actions de notre ame 
viennent de son propre fonds" (1.1.1), which appears to be Leibniz's point 
in Monadologie, §§ 26-29. 
48. Cf. Windelband, Lehrbuch, 362-63. 
49. Principes, § 4. 
50. Meditationes, 10; Essais, 2.2.1. 
51. Monadologie, § 30. 
52. Ibid., §§ 14 and 23. In the Monadologie, the distinction between "pe-
tites perceptions" and "perception" is not clear. Both terms are used to de-
scribe the death state; cf. § 21. 
53. Ibid., §§ 60-61; cf. Essais, 2.21.5. 
54. Principes, § 3. 
55. Cf. Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, 332: "A qualitative continuum, at all 
events, is a contradiction in terms. Wherever, in any series, there appears a 
new quale, a different kind of thing, and not merely a different magnitude 
and degree of something common to the whole series, there is eo ipso a 
breach of continuity'' (emphasis in the original). Lovejoy points out here the 
difficulty of divorcing degrees of force in the monads from the category of 
quantity, as Leibniz attempts to do. 
56. Essais, 2.1.15 and 2.21.47. 
57. Monadologie, § 15. 
58. Theodicee, § 360; Monadologie, § 22; and cf. the preface to the Essais, 
(Akademie ed., p. 55): "en consequence de ces petites perceptions le pres-
ent est plein de l'avenir, et charge du passe .... Ces perceptions insensibles 
marquent encore et constituent le meme individu, qui est caracterise par les 
traces, qu' elles conservent des estats precedens de cet individu, en faisant 
la connexion avec son estat present"; also cf. 2.1.12, where Leibniz argues 
against Locke's definition of the individual as a conscious entity: "Ce n' est 
done pas le souvenir qui fait justement le meme homme .... Caril faut sa-
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voir que chaque ame garde toutes les impressions precedentes [i.e., whether 
or not one is aware of them] ... l'avenir dans chaque substance a une par-
faite liaison avec le passe, c'est ce qui fait l'identite de l'individu." 
59. Principes, § 3; Monadologie, § 79. 
60. Cf. e.g. Monadologie, § 14; Principes, § 4; and the preface to the Essais. 
61. Monadologie, § 23: "Une perception ne sauroit venir naturellement que 
d'une autre perception, comme un mouvement ne peut venir naturellement 
que d'un mouvement"; Essais, 2.1.9: "Un estat sans pensee dans l'ame, et 
un repos absolu dans le corps me paroissant egalement contraires a la na-
ture, et sans example dans le monde"; Theodicee, § 403: "Toute perception 
presente tend a une perception nouvelle, comme tout mouvement qu'elle 
represente rend a un-autre mouvement." 
62. The monads, or simple substances, come into being only at the cre-
ation, and are not created or destroyed naturally (Monadologie, §§ 1-6). Com-
posite substances, including bodies, are likewise not subject to creation and 
annihilation but only to gradual alteration(§§ 72-73). 
63. Ibid., § 58. 
64. Essais, 2.1.15 and 2.21.39. 
65. Theodicee, § 201. 
66. Because increasing intelligibility equals greater integrative activity: 
"Toute action est un acheminement au plaisir, et toute passion un ache-
minement a la douleur" (Essais, 2.21.72). 
67. Ibid., 2.21.37: ''L'amas de ces petits succes continuels de la nature qui 
se met de plus en plus a son aise, en tendant au bien et jouissant de son 
image, ou diminuant le sentiment de la douleur, est deja un plaisir consider-
able et vaut souvent mieux que la jouissance meme du bien; et bien loin qu'on 
doive regarder cette inquietude comme une chose imcompatible avec la felicite, je 
trouve que !'inquietude est essentielle a la felicite des creatures, la quelle ne 
consiste jamais dans une parfaite possession qui les rendroit insensibles et 
comme stupides, mais dans un progres continue! et non interrompu a des 
plus grands biens" (emphasis in the original). 
68. See, e.g., Aristotle's distinction between demonstration and dialectic 
in the Topica, 1.1. The problem of unattainable certainty is discussed in my 
chapter 1 with reference to the <rKiaypa<f,ia and Aristotle's conception of 
rhetorical style. 
69. Breitinger could also have gotten this idea from Wolff, who carries 
forward Leibniz's notion of perfectibility with reference to the arts and sci-
ences ("die Kunst") in his Vernunfftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und 
Lassen, § 366: "Wir finden auch, dais der Mensch geschickt ist theils durch 
die Kraffte seiner Seelen, theils durch die Kraffte des Leibes ein Ding ausser 
ihm zur Wiircklichkeit zu bringen, was ohne ihn seine Wiircklichkeit nicht 
erreichen wiirde .... Z. E. Durch die Geschicklichkeit eines Poetens kom-
met ein Gedichte zu seiner Wiircklichkeit, welches ohne ihn sonst nimmer-
mehr dieselbe wiirde erreichet haben." Beetz, Rhetorische Logik, 8-9, dis-
cusses the complicated linguistic context of "Kunst" at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. 
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70. For Muratori's indebtedness to Plotinus, Neoplatonism, and Leibniz 
(with whom Muratori corresponded for several years), see von Stein, Asthe-
tik, esp. 309-17. 
71. This passage merges Liebnizian-Wolffian categories with the Aristote-
lian problem of history and poesis set forth in the Poetics. The problem is 
discussed in chapter 3. 
72. The entire passage from Breitinger just quoted was lifted from Dubos, 
cf. my chapter 3, n. 21. Addison's "influence" here can be at best only 
indirect. 
73. Breitinger says (1: 267) he is disagreeing here with Muratori's position. 
His reasons for this, given in the following paragraphs, are based (I believe) 
on his reading of Wolff. 
74. Monadologie, §§ 56 and 60: "Cette representation [i.e., each monad] 
n'est que confuse dans le detail de tout l'univers et ne peut etre distincte 
que dans une petite partie des choses ... autrement chaque Monade seroit 
une Divinite." 
75. The italicized sentences in§ 171 are not in the first edition. They were 
added for the second edition in 1722. See the list of variants provided by 
Charles A. Corr in the Olms reprint of the Metaphysik in Christian Wolff: 
Gesammelte Werke, l. Abt., Deutsche Schriften, 2:724. 
76. Wolff, Metaphysik, §§ 404, 409-12. 
77. I summarize here Wolff's remarks in Metaphysik, §§ 242-46 and 362-
67. "Erfindung" or inventio is, of course, a terminus technicus of the rhetorical 
tradition, which I leave out of consideration at this time in order to focus on 
Breitinger's use of the Wolffian notion. In my following remarks I have been 
aided by the editor's "Einfiihrung" and "Anmerkungen" to Christian Wolff, 
Vernunfftige Gedanken von den Kriiften des menschlichen Verstandes, cited hence-
forth as the Lqgik, and also (to a lesser degree) by Dieter Kimpel, "Pro-
gramm der literarischen Bildung," in Schneiders, ed., Christian Wolff 1679-
1754, 203-36. 
78. Cf. Baeumler, Irrationalitiitsproblem, 149: "Es is also kein Unterschied 
zwischen Geist, Witz und Phantasie; nur der (allerdings nicht unbedeu-
tende), dais die Definition des Witzes eine bestimmte Methode des Schaffens 
angab, wahrend der Phantasiebegriff bei der Bestimmung der willkurlichen 
schopferischen Verbindung uberhaupt stehen blieb" (emphasis in original). 
With due respect to the author of what is perhaps the best book ever written 
on early eighteenth-century German poetics, Baeumler seems to have 
missed the fact that Wolff ascribes an arbitrary function to both "Einbil-
dung" and "Witz." Moreover, the second "Manier" of the imagination, ex-
plained in my text, functions according to a rational method of creation, so 
that Baeumler's statement regarding Wolff's "Phantasiebegriff" is completely 
untenable. 
79. Logik, 140. 
80. The discrepancy between Leibniz and Wolff on this point may ulti-
mately derive from Wolff's differences with Leibniz concerning the monad. 
Wolff had criticized Leibniz for his panpsychism, the notion that all monads 
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represent (vorstellen) the entire universe (cf. Metaphysik, §§ 598-99 and 
742-53). While Leibniz had assumed the universe to be a plenum, in keep-
ing with Cartesian physics, Wolff followed the Newtonian conception of the 
· universe that included vacuums. Hence Wolff seems to posit a far lesser de-
gree of interconnection between the monads, or "Geister" as he prefers to call 
them, than Leibniz had, which would in turn produce an unresolvable onto-
logical disjunction between the divinely created "best possible" world and 
the humanly conceived possible worlds of the "Romainen." (Breitinger, fol-
lowing Muratori, tends more toward Leibniz in this matter than to_Wolff.) 
Wolff's departure from Leibniz based on his adherence to Newtonian phys-
ics is analyzed by Saine, Kopernikanische Revolution, 48-53, 150-57, and 
174-78. 
81. Breitinger may also have in mind here (with "Luge") Locke's discus-
sion of false ideas at 2.31.21-26. 
82. Cf. Dichtkunst, 1: 74-75. The passage quoted in my text refers to po-
etic reception but also to production. The question of the identity between 
poet and recipient is cliscussed in my chapter 3. Here I am suggesting that 
poet and recipient are involved in a parallel process of apperception. 
83. Both Baeumler, Irrationalitiitsprpblem, 142, and Moller, Rhetorische Uber-
lieferung, 74-75, give the passages from Muratori that Breitinger apparently 
used as models for his statements on the wondrous. -
Chap~r3 
1. Bender's observation is found on page 158* of the "Nachwort" in vol-
ume 2 of the Critische Dichtkunst. He interprets the passage as an anticipa-
tion of "Empfindsamkeit," but he does not mention the more important 
point that it also expressed a neoclassic commonplace. 
2. The three authors I have chosen for my exposition were all widely read 
in their own time, hence were considered "authorities" of sorts, and there-
fore may be described as "typical." They are Rene Rapin, an ancien, Bernard 
de Fontenelle, a moderne, and Dubos, who wrote after the querelle had sub-
sided but whose work nonetheless addresses the major points of the earlier 
neoclassic literary feud. Reference is also made to Boileau. 
3. Although "verisimilitude" is a better translation of vraisemblance, I use 
"probability" throughout the text because the critics under discussion 
thought they were using, or "improving," the Aristotelian concept: Bray, 
Doctrine classique, 115-16, notes that French Neoclassicism, as opposed to 
the Italian, would attempt to move from "la parole du maitre" to reason as 
the basis of poetic rules. I am indebted in the following pages to Bray's dis-
cussion of vraisemblance, esp. 191-239. 
4. Fontenelle's position is discussed later. Bray, Doctrine classique, 225-26, 
notes that Corneille was less interested in le vrai per se, than ill'exploiting 
the historical record for obscure and marvelous events. The position of the 
modernes is shared by Dennis, "The Advancement and Reformation of Mod-
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ern Poetry," in Works, 1 :237: "'Tis plain, [the Ancient Grecian Poets] had no 
clear and distinct Idea, of one Supreme and Infinite Being: For either the 
Knowledge of the True God must be drawn from Reason, or Revelation. 
From Revelation they could not draw it, because their own Revelation was 
not true .... and the Exercise of Reason was too little known among them" 
(by which presumably is meant post-Cartesian scientific method). Neverthe-
less, "the Gentleman who writ the History of Oracles [Fontenelle], treats 
[pagan Religion] as a Fiction, and a Fiction so palpable, as not to be worth 
the answering. But, perhaps, that Gentleman had not consider' d this Matter 
enough" (1 :235). Dennis constructs the rest of his argument on the value of 
religion, be it "true" (i.e., Christian) or "false" (pagan), for poetic produc-
tion and reception. 
5. L'Art poetique, chant 3, verses 47-48, p. 339. (Subsequent citations are 
in the text by page number.) 
6. Rapin, Reflexions, 39. (Further references are given in the text.) 
7. Cf. Bray, Doctrine classique, 218: "Sur le precepte de la convenance, 
Scaliger esquisse une sorte de realisme historique: il faut que les person-
nages soient en harmonie avec les temps et les lieux ou on les represente 
comme ayant vecu." 
8. Cf. Chapelain's comment: "Tout ecrivain qui invente une fable, dont 
les actions humaines font le sujet, ne doit representer ses personnages, ni 
les faire agir que conformement aux moeurs et a la creance de son siecle," 
quoted by Bray, Doctrine classique, 225. 
9. For a concise discussion of Plotinus's use of Aristotelian terms and its 
effect on art theory, cf. Panofsky, Idea, esp. chaps. 1 and 2. Additional dis-
cussion of Plotinian notions follows at later points in my text. 
10. Dacier, Poetique, 433. (Further citations of this work are by page num-
ber only in the text.) 
11. Rapin's distortion of Aristotle may stem from a misunderstanding in 
the early reception of the Poetics; cf. Weinberg, Literary Criticism, 1: 388-89, 
commenting on "the first of the 'great commentaries' [on the Poetics]," that 
of Robortello: "The imitation is not only of human actions and passions (as 
in Aristotle) but of all kinds of objects as well." That is, the poetic work is not 
seen as an interpretation of events, as plot, but as a mirroring of "things" 
in reality (however this last term may be defined). A constant theme of 
Weinberg's study is the conflation of Aristotle's Poetic~ with Horace's Ars 
poetica, which was itself thought to recommend exact "painting" of "reality" 
or "truth" -again, terms that have varying definitions. 
12. Rapin's notion of the artistic experience as the perception of a gener-
ality based on identification appears to owe a lot to Plotinus's essay on 
Beauty, Enneads, 1.6. l (which may have entered the neoclassic context via 
Renaissance Neoplatonism). Thus, beauty "in bodily forms ... is some-
thing that the soul ... fuses with." But the beauty of base objects is a lesser 
form of the divine beauty that it is our purpose to know, through identifica-
tion: "For the eye must be adapted to what is to be seen, have some likeness 
to it, if it would give itself to contemplation. No eye that has not become like 
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unto the sun will ever look upon the sun .... Let each one therefore be-
come godlike and beautiful who would contemplate the divine and beauti-
ful" (quotation from pp. 35 and 43). 
13. The entire passage in question is the following: "La grande regle de 
traiter les moeurs, est de les copier sur la nature, et sur tout, de bien etudier 
le coeur de l'homme, pour en s<;avoir distinguer tousles mouvemens. C'est 
ce qu'on ne s<;ait point: le coeur humain est un abysme d'une profondeur, 
ou la sonde ne peut aller, c'est un mystere impenetrable aux plus eclairez: 
on s'y meprend toujours, quelque habile qu'on soit. Mais au moins ii faut 
til.cher de parler des moeurs conformement a !'opinion publique" (43-44). 
14. Oeuvres, 3:22. (Further quotations of Fontenelle are cited by page 
number in the text). 
15. Fontenelle appears to be paraphrasing Poetics, 1451b15 ff., at this 
point: "What is possible is plausible; now what has not happened we are 
not yet sure is possible, but what has happened seems clearly possible; for 
(we say) it would not have happened if it were impossible" (trans. G. Else, 
Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument, 315). In his commentary, Else classes this as 
a "vulgar error" (317) in logic. The significant thing here is Fontenelle's re-
striction of the possible, and then the probable, to that which has already 
happened and/or which we have already seen. But "things as they were or 
are" is only one of the three possible sources of the probable in Aristotle's 
account. 
16. Fontenelle may have in mind here Corneille's distinction between "le 
vraisemblable ordinaire" and "le vraisemblable extraordinaire": "L' ordinaire 
est une action qui arrive plus souvent ou du moins aussi souvent que sa 
contraire, l'extraordinaire est une action qui arrive, a la verite, moins sou-
vent que sa contraire"; see Pierre Corneille, "Discours de la Tragedie," in 
Oeuvres, 839. 
17. A parallel case of Fontenelle's neoclassic reversion may be found in 
his influential Digressions sur les anciens et les modernes of 1688. There he ap-
pears to argue against the unjustified authority granted ,to classical antiquity 
by the anciens in favor of the equal capacity of all ages to have important 
insights. But this argument eventually reveals itself to be a mere rhetorical 
device for dethroning the anciens in order to assert the superiority of the 
modern period. Fontenelle thus fails to discredit the neoclassic position, but 
instead uses it, in inverted form, for his own ends; cf. JauB, "Asthetische 
Normen," 32-33: "Auch das Denken der fortschrittsglaubigen Modernes 
bewegt sich noch im klassischen Zirkel der Vollkommenheit, nur daB der 
'Punkt der Vollendung' jetzt aus einer unwiederbringlichen Vergangenheit 
in eine zu, erstrebende Zukunft verlegt ist ... die Norm einer einst erfiill-
ten, im gegenwartigen Zeitalter erreichten oder erst in Zukunft erreichbaren 
Perfektion gehort ... zu den erst noch selbstverstandlichen Vorausset-
zungen und Gemeinsamkeiten der Ausgangspunkte ... der Querelle." 
18. Breitinger refers to this passage at 1 :496 as part of his continuing at-
tack on Fontenelle's best friend, La Motte, but Breitinger's criticism is also 
aimed at Gottsched, who "stole" nearly all of La Motte's faultfinding in Ho-
mer for his own Versuch einer kritischen Dichtkunst. The debate over poetic 
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probability between Dubos and La Motte is carried out not only in the same 
terms but with the very same words twenty years later in the German 
context. 
19. The opening sentence, "Je s<;ais bien que le faux est quelquefois plus 
vrai-semblable que le vrai," is the neoclassic paraphrase of Aristotle's prefer-
ence for the "impossible probable" over the "possible improbable." The sub-
stitution of terms comes about when the probable is identified with the true 
(cf. Fontenelle's "une petite portion du vrai") and then reduced to the his-
torical. Thus the sentence reads, in agreement with the sense of the rest of 
the passage, "I know that that which has not happened [cannot happen 
-i.e., is "impossible" or "false"] may seem more probable [believable] than 
that which has actually happened. However, ... " Dubos's real difficulties 
here are indicated by his need to create two kinds of probability: "metaphy-
sique" and "historique." For Aristotle's qualified admission of the impos-
sible probable, see Else's discussion of chapter 24. 
20. In fairness to Dubos, it is probably expecting too much of him to pre-
sent a critique of the problem of periodization when he had only just come 
up with the idea of "period" at all, namely in his reflection on the difference 
between "le siecle" and "l' age" at 2.12.128-44. Krauss, Studien zur Aufklii-
rung, 9, thinks that this distinction is "Ausdruck des sensualistischen, an 
Lockes Essay concerning human understanding orientierten Sprachbewufst-
seins." But might it not also (or even primarily) stem from Dubos's applica-
tion of (Aristotelian) poetic probability to history itself, which would create 
the concept "historical context" or "l'age"? 
21. The following is a preliminary list of those borrowings from Dubos 
that Breitinger worked into his text as if they were his own words, with 
these exceptions: nos. 6 and 16 are introduced by "Man hat (gesagt]" with-
out further identification; nos. 8 and 11 contain a "sagt Dubos" but no quo-
tation marks or text citation; nos. 3, 7, and 17 are paraphrases but restate 
Dubos's words so closely that I have assigned them to this list. I do not give 
the many passages where Dubos's words are cited in quotation marks, ac-
companied by volume and chapter. The left side of the equation refers to 
Breitinger, the right side to Dubos: (1) 1: 15 = 1.40.393-94; (2) 1: 64 = 
1.3.27; (3) 1 :68 = 1.3.28; (4) 1 :69-70 = 1.3.29-30; (5) 1: 72 = 1.10.66-67; 
(6) 1:73-74 = 1.12.75; (7) 1:79 = 1.26.221; (8) 1:81-82 = 1.6.51; (9) 1:85 
("Alleine die Sachen") = 1.8.63; (10) 1:85 ("Die Unruh") = 1.1.11; (11) 1:86 
("Die verstii.ndigen") = 1.6.52-53; (12) 1: 86 ("Eben daher") = l. 9.66; 
(13) 1: 132-33 ("Auf einer Seiten ... getrieben") = 1.28.238-39; (14) 1: 133 
("In den Romanen ... Eckel") = 1.28.239-40; (15) 1: 143-44 ("Was nun erst-
lich") = 1.24.183-84; (16) 1: 148 = 1.25.213; (17) 1 :479-80 = 1.30.255-56. 
Some of these passages are discussed in my text. 
22. Breitinger writes out (at 1: 280-82) a lengthier version of the Dubos 
passage and identifies its author. The problem of the "impossible probable" 
exercised all neoclassic critics, and Breitinger's comments may be a generic 
response not tied to a specific context. The passage at 1: 138-39 may also be 
a conflation of sentences by Dubos and Muratori; see my chapter 2, n. 17. 
23. Pascal, Pensees, 9-10. The perception of the mind-heart split becomes 
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particularly acute in the querelle, in the form of the debate over the relative 
value and achievements of the natural sciences versus the arts. Spingarn, 
Critical Essays, notes in his introduction, 89, that Pascal (in his Fragment du 
Traite du Vide) was the first to point out the distinction between the arts and 
sciences. Cf. also Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts," in Renais-
sance Thought, 2:194, who argues that in the querelle "the ground is prepared 
for the first time for a clear distinction between the arts and the sciences, a 
distinction absent from ancient, medieval or Renaissance discussions of 
such subjects even though the same words were used." Both Kristeller and 
Spingarn, how~ver, acknowledge the importance of Bacon's Advancement of 
Learning as an early formulation of the issue. The problem is extraordinarily 
complicated, because there seems to have been wide disagreement among 
all parties about the terms of the debate (e.g., Fontenelle locates "reason" in 
Cartesian categories, Dubos in Aristotelian logic). 
24. Although Dubos was much more sympathetic to the arts than to the 
sciences, while Fontenelle was more interested in the sciences than in the 
arts, Dubos states his position in words highly reminiscent of Fontenelle; cf. 
Fontenelle's Oeuvres, 3: 14: "Ce plaisir qu'on prend a pleurer est si bizarre, 
que je ne puis m'empecher d'y faire reflexion .... Le coeur aime naturelle-
ment a etre remue, ainsi les objets tristes Jui conviennent, et meme Jes ob-
jets douloureux, pourvu que quelque chose Jes adoudsse .... On pleure Jes 
malheurs d'un heros a qui !'on s'est affectionne, et dans le meme moment 
!'on s'en console, parce qu'on sait que c'est une fiction." With proper quali-
fications, one may see here an anticipation of certain ideas of both Lessing 
and Schiller. 
25. Else, in his edition of Aristotle's Poetics, 128, notes that the substitu-
tion of works of art for Aristotle's "likenesses" was made by Victorius, and 
Else himself goes so far as to suggest that Aristotle really meant something 
like "drawings, models, reproductions used for teaching ... laboratory 
equipment." The point is that Aristotle meant for reproductions to convey 
knowledge about classes of objects; therefore they are pleasurable. Were 
they photographically accurate "paintings" of another object, no learning 
would occur. 
26. Breitinger was probably referred to the parallel passage in the Rhetoric 
by Dacier, Poi!tique, 37, who does not, however, quote it. Breitinger's incor-
rect citation reads: "in dem ersten B. seiner Rhetorick im zweyten Cap.," 
whereas Dacier has, correctly, "dans le Chapitre XI, du premier Livre de sa 
Rhetorique." Breitinger may have written the arabic numeral "11" in his 
manuscript, which his printer (or he himself) later mistook for a roman "II." 
Whatever the cause of tile discrepancy, Breitinger apparently used Dacier's 
translation as his primary edition of the Poetics ( even though his Greek was 
quite good), inasmuch as his German quotations of Aristotle are exact trans-
lations of Dacier's French; cf., e.g., Dichtkunst, 1:71 and Dacier's rendering 
of the same passage, p. 31. 
27. Dubos has at 1.3.26 "comme !'impression que !'imitation fait n'est dif-
ferente de !'impression que l'objet imite feroit, qu'en ce qu'elle est moins 
fort, elle doit exciter dans notre ame." 
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28. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, 5.1.10 and 5.2.11. Although an impression, 
according to the sensation theories of e.g. Locke, is subject to degrees of 
strength based on the source of the perception (cf. Locke, 2.7.4-5), the pas-
sage from Dubos that Breitinger restates is more directly related to Dubos's 
ideas on the relative merits of painting versus poetry. At issue here is the 
strength of the perception ("Eindruck" or "impression") as a function of 
the degree of reality of its source. (Note that warm things do not have less 
"reality" for Locke than hot things, only a weaker effect on our sense of 
hotness.) Painting produces stronger impressions than poetry in Dubos's 
account precisely because its depictions are closer to being nature itself 
than those of poesis are. Dubos defends painting over poesis on the same 
grounds as da Vinci had, whose treatise on painting he does not cite but 
must have read while preparing his own eighteenth-century continuation of 
the "paragone"; cf. da Vinci, Trattato della pittura, 5: "Von de~ Einbildung 
zur Wirklichkeit ist gerade solch' ein Abstandsverhaltnis, wie vom Schatten 
zum schattenwerfenden Ko~er, und dasselbe Verhaltnis besteht zwischen 
der Poesie und Malerei." 
29. Cf. Dubos, 1.3.26-27: Breitinger inverts the statement; Dubos says 
the impression made by the imitation, compared with that made by the ob-
ect imitated, is "pas aussi profonde," "pas serieuse," and "elle s'efface 
bientot." . 
30. Cf. 1.40, where Dubos not only argues in favor of the stronger effect 
of painting over poetry on the recipient, but also suggests (1.40.395) that 
plays owe their very effect to their visual reception, i.e., to their perfor-
mance, or to spectacle (thus controverting Poetics, 6.28: "Spectacle, while 
highly effective, is yet quite foreign to the art and has nothing to do with 
poetry"; also cf. 14.1-2). I do not understand Kristeller's assertion, Renais-
sance Thought, 2: 198, that Dubos "is not interested in the superiority of one 
art over the others, as so many previous authors had been." 
31. As evidence of Dubos's intention, see 1.9.64: "L'esprit ne s<;auroit 
joui:r deux fois du plaisir d' apprendre la meme chose, comme le coeur peut 
joui:r detix fois du plaisir de sentir la meme emotion. Le plaisir d'apprendre 
est consomme par le plaisir de s<;avoir." 
32. 1.10.66-67: "On pourroit objecter que les tableaux ou nous ne voi:ons 
que !'imitation de differens objets qui ne nous auroient point attachez, si 
nous les avions vus dans la nature, ne laissent pas de se faire regarder long-
tems. Nous donnons plus d' attention a des fruits & a des animaux represen-
tez dans un tableau, que nous n' en donnerions a ces objets memes. La copie 
nous attache plus que l'orginal. Je repons que, lorsque ... "(I have omitted 
Breitinger's sentence about "die Friichte und die Thiere" from my quotation 
of 1: 72.) These differing attitudes with respect to poesis as purely emotive 
rather than intellective experience carry over further into their poetics. Du-
bos says at 1.28.239: "II ne me paroit done pas possible d' enseigner I' art de 
concilier le vrai-semblable & le merveilleux. Cet art n'est qu'a la portee de 
ceux qui sont nez Poetes, & grands Poetes." Breitinger says, on the contrary, 
that this "Verbinding des Wunderbaren und Wahrscheinlichen" that is "die 
vornehmste Schonheit der Poesie" (1: 133) may be understood because Aris-
130 Notes to Pages 80-83 
totle has given us the "Grundstein und das Band der Vereinigung" (1: 137), 
which he then relates to his own "Grundsatze des Wahnes." 
33. These are not the "useful lessons" of the Horatian tradition; the 
phrase means "useful bits of information." 
34. The process of idealization and the process of organization of the mul-
tiple particulars seem to reflect a tension in the original Plotinian conception 
of the return, or "epistrophe"; cf. Armstrong, Plotinus, 38-39: "If [the soul] 
devotes itself selfishly to the interests of the particular body to which it is 
attached it becomes entrapped in the atomistic particularity of the material 
world .... But the mere fact of being in body does not imply imprisonment 
in body. That only comes if the soul surrenders to the body .... Matter then 
is responsible for the evil and imperfection of the material world: but that 
world is good and necessary." Idealization would stress the renunciation of 
the "base" particular; Breitinger (like Leibniz) stresses the preservation of 
the particular in the unique-universal. Breitinger does not mean, however, 
that the author should try to represent all particulars of a scene in a "natu-
ralistic copy." Organization means that the artist must decide on an order of 
significance in what he sees. 
35. At 1: 171, Breitinger describes the "Einheit einer Fabel" with the 
words "wenn nemlich alle Zi.ige und Linien derselben in einem gewissen 
Gesichtes-Punct mit einander i.ibereintreffen." This recalls Leibniz's defini-
tion of the monad in Principes, § 2: "C'est comme dans un centre ou point, 
tout simple qu'il est, se trouvent une infinite d'angles formes par Jes lignes 
qui y concourent." · 
36. Pensees, 9. (A further quotation from Pascal is cited in the text by page 
number.) · 
37. Leibniz appears to describe the "esprit de finesse" in the preface to 
the Essais (53): ''Ces impressions sont ou trop petites et en trop grand 
nombre, ou trop unies, en sorte qu'elles n'ont rien d'assez distinguant a 
part, mais jointes a d'autres, elles ne laissent pas de faire leur effect, et de se 
faire sentir au moins confusement dans !'assemblage." Given that the Nou-
veaux Essais were written as an attempt to explain the nature and function of 
the "petites perceptions," Leibniz seems to find the same inadequacy in the 
neoclassic model of the inscrutable mind as Breitinger later would. Most in-
teresting is Leibniz's inclusion in this passage of the preface of an oblique 
reference to neoclassic aesthetics: ''Ces petites perceptions sont done de 
plus grande efficace qu'on ne pense. Ce sont elles, qui forment ce je ne say 
quoy, ces gouts, ces images des qualites des sens, claires dans l'assemblage, 
mais confuses dans les parties" (54-55; my emphasis). 
38. Panofsky, Idea, chap. 4, n. 51, describes a new usage of the terms "ei-
kastic" and "phantastic" imitation in the Renaissance in a way that bears on 
Breitinger's scale of probability. Whereas the original Platonic distinction 
(Sophist, 2350) was between objectively correct likenesses and semblances 
made to accommodate the perspective of the viewer, the terms later came to 
indicate the imitation of existing objects and nonexisting objects (e.g., chi-
mera) respectively. Breitinger appears to be attempting, with his scale, a ne-
gotiation between these two types of representation, such that the imagina-
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tion remains anchored in experience but also goes beyond it in the creative 
moment. Birmelin, "Philostrats Apollonios," discusses the Aristotelian con-
cept of imagination (which she shows to be at work in Philostratus's Life of 
Apollonius of Tyana, 6.19), as the negotiation between the known and the un-
known, whereby new knowledge is produced. Imagination in this account 
is not merely reproductive, as most modern accounts of Aristotle would 
have it, but in the first instance productive. It seems that one may therefore 
ascribe an Aristotelian intention to Breitinger at this point. 
39. The word "Gemuth," in its broadest designation as an emotional-
intellective faculty, is omnipresent in the Critische Dichtkunst, but the post-
Idealist tradition transforms Breitinger's use of this term into "Gefiihl," a 
significant distortion of the text. Breitinger himself uses "Gefiihl" only twice 
in the first four chapters (for example) of the Critische Dichtkunst, where it 
means "the sense of touch" (1: 16), and sense impression as opposed to 
"Verstand" (1: 80). "Gemuth" appears fifty-four times. 
40. This passage may have been lifted from Muratori; see Baeumler, Irra-
tionalitiitsproblem, 52, who quotes parallel phrasing in Italian but without ref-
erence to Breitinger. 
41. Cf. Gleichnis-Abhandlung, 4-13, esp. 9. The important term here is 
wiihnen, which, unlike the last two, has now fallen out of general usage. 
Adelung, Grammatisch-kritisches Worterbuch, 4. Theil, Sp. 1342-43, gives the 
meaning "dafiir halten, meinen, glauben, im weitesten Verstande; eine im 
Hochdeutschen veraltete Bedeutung, worin es aber in den altern Ober-
deutschen Schriften haufig vorkommt." Under the entry "Wahn" he gives 
the (antiquated) meaning "Eine jede Meinung, d. i. Urtheil nach blo8 
wahrscheinlichen Grunden .... Wahn [ist] noch so viel als Vermuthung." 
Adelung notes that this "allgemeine Bedeutung" is still present in Opitz. 
Breitinger may have found it there, or it may be alive in his Swiss (i.e., "Ober-
deutsch") vocabulary; cf. his use of the term at 2: 93. Meyer, "Restaurative 
Innovation," in Burger, Literarische Offentlichkeit, 39-82, argues contrary to 
the philological context of the term that Breitinger's use of "Wahn" means 
his poetics were conceived as an aid to theologians resisting the demise of 
religious fanaticism. 
42. Young, "Conjectures on Original Composition," 341. 
43. Some of the social-historical implications of this difference-which 
most decidedly need not always have had a liberating function-are de-
scribed by Schulte-Sasse, "Das Konzept burgerlicher Offentlichkeit," in 
Burger, Literarische Offentlichkeit, 83-115, in terms of the transition from 
"Moral" to "Sitte" in the eighteenth century, whereby literature acts as the 
primary medium of socialization, a process in which poets play the role of 
a "vorausdenkende Elite" (95). 
Chapter 4 
1. Wellbery, Lessing's "Laocoon," refers to Breitinger's "close proximity" 
(203) to Lessing, and notes (210) that "Lessing makes exactly the same ob-
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servation [i.e., regarding distinct cognition and poetry] as Breitinger, but he 
interprets it in an entirely different way." Wellbery argues that Lessing's cri-
tique of Breitinger is based on "the changing perspective on poetic language 
that develops across the work of Baumgarten, Meier and Mendelssohn" 
(207). For a different approach to Laokoon that analyzes Lessing's contribu-
tion to the development of historical hermeneutics, see Seeba, "'Der wahre 
Standort,"' an article to which I am much indebted in the present chapter. 
2. Cf. 1: 22: "Fraget ihr jemand, der entweder in der Natur, oder in der 
kiinstlichen Vorstellung eines Gemahldes eine weitlauftige Durchsicht 
gesehen hat, was vor einen Begriff dieselbe in seinem Gehirn hinterlassen 
habe, wie fliichtig, dunkel und ungewill wird seine Beschreibung heraus-
kommen?" 
3. Lessing, Laokoon, vol. 9 of Schriften. Quotations in my text come from 
102-4. 
4. Haller is quoted by Guthke, Literarisches Leben, 138-39. Guthke also 
cites (138) Haller's repetition of this phrase in an open letter to Gemmingen 
of 1772: "Die Poesie mahlt, was kein Pinsel mahlen kann: Eigenschaften. 
andrer Sinne neben dem Gesichte." 
5. Herder, Werke, 4:19 and 15:540; cf. also 18:128, 2:40-41, and my 
chapter 1, n. 64. 
6. Bosse, '"Dichter kann man nicht bilden,"' points out (119) that Breitin-
ger's Critische Dichtkunst was widely used as a "Schulpoetik" well into the 
1770s, being recommended by Basedow and other "Reformpadagogen." 
Bosse interprets this as a conservative trend in the latter eighteenth century, 
during which the more modern works of Herder and Hamann were side-
lined. If this be the case, Breitinger's obscurity should be defined as the in-
frequency with which he is cited by other theoreticians and should not sug-
gest that his book was not read-which it apparently was. 
7. A useful review of Chladenius's life and work is given by Reill, German 
Enlightenment, 105-12. Reill describes Chladenius as one of the originators 
of modern hermeneutic theory, a distinction that was challenged by Gada-
mer, Wahrheit und Methode, 171-72, in his revision of Dilthey's and Wach's 
approaches. To my knowledge, the works of Breitinger and Chladenius 
have never been critically compared. In this study I can only outline a few 
aspects of their conceptual commonality. 
8. Chladenius, Einleitung, §§ 61, 309, 567,. and 639. (Further citations of 
his work are in the text by paragraph number in parentheses.) 
9. See also his unpaginated "Vorrede": "Denn so konnen z. E. Leser off-
ters nicht in einem Philosophischen Buche fortkommen, ob es ihnen gleich 
nicht an Erkanntnils der Sprache fehlet, auch das Buch gar nicht zweydeutig 
abgefasset ist, sondern bey behorig [sic] zubereiteten Lesern den allergewis-
sesten Verstand hat. Eben solcher Anstols findet sich offters bey denen histo-
rischen Biichern, ohne dais der Verfasser, und die Einrichtung des Buches 
die geringste Schuld daran haben .... Daher, wenn der Leser dieselben 
[i.e., necessary] Begriffe nicht schon hat, so konnen die Worte nicht die 
Wirckung bey ihm thun, noch die Begriffe veranlassen, welche bey einem 
andern Leser, der gehorig unterrichtet ist, gewill erfolgen werden:: 
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10. Breitinger uses the identical example of "fliegen" to illustrate exactly 
the same point about abstraction in his Gleichnis-Abhandlung, 34-35, with 
the added observation that the metaphoric use of this term is based on an 
"Optischer Betrug." This is interesting given the origin of perspectivism in 
optics and the fine arts. Of course Chladenius need not have seen this pas-
sage in Breitinger. Their common classical source was probably the descrip-
tion of Poseidon's rapid stride and his '.'flying" horses in book 13 of the Iliad, 
which may have been turned into a neoclassic critical topos by Longinus's 
reference to it in his chapter 9. 
11. Leventhal, "Semiotic Interpretation," 234, takes this aspect of Chla-
denius's exposition to mean that "the notion of Sehepunkt is always discussed 
in terms of the author, never in regard to the interpretational position of the 
reader." This statement is apparently contradicted by what Chladenius says, 
e.g., at§ 324 regarding the interpretor's relation to the student of history: 
"Ein Ausleger mufs also die Geschichte, die er auslegen will, aus beyden 
Sehe-Punckten sich vorstellen, theils wie sie derjenige sich vorstellt, dem sie 
unglaublich vorkommt, theils wie sie der Scribent sich vorgestellt hat." Lev-
enthal's aim is to deny any perspectivity to the reader at all; cf. my n. 15. 
12. Cf. Guillen, "Metaphor of Perspective," 317: "A point of view is not 
always individual, or subjective in an individual sense. It can also be ultra-
personal. Diirer's perspective apparatus did not necessarily set up a per-
sonal field of vision: a number of people could occupy the same position. 
This distinction becomes operative [outside the fine arts] in the area of opin-
ions or experiences collectively shared, such as politics, class prejudices, re-
ligion." Chladenius's and Breitinger's use of perspective betrays its status as 
a term in transition between its use in the fine arts and in the historical sci-
ences. Chladenius notes(§ 309), however, that he takes the term from Leib-
niz (probably from Monadologie, § 57), who himself may have borrowed it 
from the artists. 
13. I use "historian" here in Chladenius's conflated sense as one who has 
"Einsicht in die Geschichte" either "aus eigener Erfahrung" or "aus anderer 
· Leute Zeugnifs" (307), a definition that illustrates the emerging tendency to 
identify the position of authors and readers. 
14. Cf. Reill, German Enlightenment, 110, for a discussion of this problem 
in Chladenius's later work, the Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft of 1752. In 
the Einleitung, Chladenius admits(§ 157) that "alle Bucher der Menschen, 
und ih:r;e Reden, [werden] etwas unverstandliches an sich haben." 
15. Leventhal, "Semiotic Interpretation," 234, overlooks the possibility of 
an ultrapersonal or multipersonal perspective in the Enlightenment: "The 
task of the interpretor in Chladenius's theory is to see through the perspec-
tivity of the author's presentation ... in order to obtain a more global and 
rational representation of the ideas themselves." Relying on the theories of 
Foucault, Gadamer, and, most recently, Wellbery, Leventhal recognizes only 
the utterly individual perspective or its destruction in the "transparency of 
the sign." He does not consider that the attempt by Enlightenment readers 
to occupy the author's perspective might not be based exclusively on the 
urge to assume an impersonal, totalizing, standpoint-although this is cer-
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tainly one of the strands of Enlightenment thought-but rather on the de-
sire to identify with, i.e., act as, author. Cf. n. 19 of my Introduction. 
16. See my chapter 1, n. 21, for the passage in question from De Oratore. 
17. Szondi, Einfiihrung, 36. I arrived at the same conclusion indepen-
dently of Szondi through my study of Breitinger. Subsequent quotations 
from Szondi's work are in the text by page number in parentheses. 
18. This and the following lines from Gottsched's Versuch einer Critischen 
Dichtkunst are quoted by Szondi, 91. Gottsched incorrectly identifies the 
work in question as Cicero's Orator. 
19. Cf. Gleichnis-Abhandlung, 6-9. 
20. Cf. Adelung, Gelehrten-Lexico, 2:302. Henn, "Sinnreiche Gedancken," 
esp. 252-55, provides an excellent discussion, withp slightly different focus 
than my own, of Chladenius's initial interest in poetic language and his sub-
sequent essay on probability. 
21. For Wegelin's biography, see Reill, German Enlightenment, 118-19. 
Wach, Das Verstehen, 3:42-52, says only in passing that Wegelin draws on 
Leibniz and other French sources for his theories. Wach's real interest lies in 
what he finds to be the striking similarities between Wegelin and Humboldt, 
while acknowledging that "direkte Beziehungen ... sind mir allerdings 
nicht bekannt" (46). As an exponent of nineteenth-century German histori-
ography, he wants to see Wegelin as a "Vorlaufer" (43) of Classicism rather 
than as an heir to the German reception of the French querelle. Hence he 
fails to consider that Wegelin's attention may have been directed to French 
sources by the Swiss. 
22. Reill, German Enlightenment, 119, emphasizes this, as well as Wegelin's 
acquaintance with Breitinger and friendship with Bodmer. But Bodmer was 
known to enjoy-and to advertise-his role of mentor to younger men, as 
the episodes with Klopstock and Wieland attest. That Breitinger's influence 
on Wegelin may have been as great as Bodmer's cannot be excluded. 
23. Wegelin, Briefe, 7. Further citations are in the text in parentheses. 
24. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. 
25. Novalis, Schriften, 1 :259. My attention was drawn to this particular 
passage by Seeba, "Literatur und Geschichte," 206. 
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